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The political economy transformations of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe have received a great deal of attention over the past decade.
The focus of much research has been to examine the internal national
reorientations of the countries with regard to the changes in political and
economic conditions. The importance of the international reorientation of these
countries toward Western Europe in general and the European Union in
particular has been generally overlooked. This dissertation examines public
opinion on the political and economic transformations within the framework of the
direction of the international reorientations of the countries. The countries were
divided into three categories, those that can expect to be invited to join the
European Union in the next enlargement, those that can expect to join the
European Union in a subsequent enlargement, and the countries not seeking
European Union membership. Public opinion on democracy and the market
economy and attitudinal factors that influence these opinions are compared in 16
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The data are from the Central and East
European Barometers 3-7 (1992 – 1996). The findings suggest that general
opinions regarding satisfaction with democracy are not related to the status of the
country seeking membership in the European Union while support from the
market economy does differ. When examining attitudinal factors that are related
to satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy, differences
emerged between the three categories of countries. These findings suggest that
public opinion is in part shaped by the international orientations of the country
and that changes in public opinion are important in understanding the political
and economic transformation processes.
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The 1980s and 1990s were periods of significant political and economic
changes in Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the former
Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War and announced to the world the
long-term deterioration of the Soviet political economy. These events forced the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe to initiate upon unprecedented
transformations of their political economies. Many of the countries looked to the
United States and Western Europe for guidance and assistance in their political
and economic transformations toward democracy and the market economy.
As changes were occurring in parts of Central and Eastern Europe,
changes were also underway in Western Europe. The final agreements were
being made to transform the European Economic Community into the European
Union. The further unification of the European Community into the European
Union, coupled with the desire of many of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe to rejoin Europe after forty-plus years of separation, represented an
unprecedented unification of Europe.
Many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have taken steps
toward the establishment of democracies and market economies internally.
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Additionally, these countries have sought to be integrated into the world market
economy and to be recognized by the international community for their
achievements of democratization. For these countries, Europe is the gateway to
international political and economic integration into the world economy and world
polity. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have pursued integration
with the rest of Europe. As European countries, these former Socialist countries
have the right to seek membership in the European Union under the Maastricht
Treaty. Ten countries have started to work toward membership in the European
Union, bringing about the possibility of a politically and economically unified
Europe as never before achieved.
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine public opinion on the
political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe within the
context of the integration of these countries into the European Union. In order to
address the general theme of this dissertation, four specific questions will be
explored.
1. What are the public’s opinions about democracy and the market
economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe?
2. Is there a difference in public opinion about democracy and public
opinion about the market economy in the countries working to join the
European Union compared to the countries that are not working to join
the European Union?
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3. How are political, economic and foreign relation opinions related to
opinions about democracy and opinions about the market economy?
4. Does the status of seeking membership in the European Union
influence the differences in the attitudinal factors that contribute to
opinions about democracy and opinions about the market economy?
These questions are asked in order to understand the relationships between
politics and economics and public opinion and institutional change.
Plan of Study
This dissertation is designed as a series of research papers that
collectively seek to explore and answer the research questions posed in this
chapter. Chapter 2 is a general review of the literature on the relationship
between politics and economics and the importance and state of public opinion in
Central and Eastern Europe. Particular attention is paid to public opinion on
democracy and the market economy. Chapter 3 presents the major theoretical
perspectives on the European Union integration. The theoretical framework used
in this dissertation is presented. Chapter 4 is a general overview of the data and
methods used for this dissertation.
Chapter 4 is the first research paper in this dissertation. Public satisfaction
with democracy and support for the market economy is examined in sixteen
Central and Eastern European countries over a five-year time period.
Comparisons of the public’s opinions about democracy are made between the
countries formally seeking European Union membership and those countries not
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seeking European Union membership. Likewise, public opinion on the market
economy is compared between the ten countries seeking membership into the
European Union and the six countries not seeking European Union membership.
Based on the conclusions drawn in Chapter 4, Chapters 5 and 6 explore
specific factors that contribute to public opinion on democracy and the market
economy. Chapter 5 focuses on public opinion on democracy. In this chapter, I
explore attitudes that contribute to satisfaction with democracy in sixteen
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1996. Five attitudinal factors are
considered in this chapter. These are perceptions of human rights conditions,
support for the market economy, prospective microeconomic expectations,
retrospective microeconomic experiences and opinions about future national
relationships to the European Union. The factors are considered for the sixteen
countries individually, as well as on the countries pooled based on the status of
their relationship to the European Union.
Chapter 6 is the final research paper included in this dissertation. It
considers the factors that contribute to support for the transformation to a market
economy. Again, five specific public opinions are examined as contributors to
public opinion on the market economy. These are perceptions of human rights
conditions, satisfaction with democracy, prospective microeconomic
expectations, retrospective microeconomic experiences and opinions about the
future national relations to the European Union. Analyses are completed on the
sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe individually as well as based on
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the status of the country’s membership in the European Union. Comparisons are
made between the countries based on their status of membership into the
European Union.
In the concluding chapter (Chapter 7), I present a discussion of the results
from each of the earlier chapters as well as a discussion of the results in light of
the research questions presented in this chapter. The implications these results
may have for the development of Central and Eastern Europe are discussed.
Finally, future research ideas are offered.
Significance of the Study
This dissertation offers a significant contribution to the study of public
opinion in Central and Eastern Europe in three important ways. First, I examine
opinions about democracy and the market economy separately and with regard
to their influence on each other and considering other related opinions. At the
institutional level, scholars have long argued that there is a strong relationship
between democracy and free market (Dahl 1989; Hayek 1944). At the same time,
social scientists have been engaged in a heated debate as to whether a stable
democracy and a well-functioning economy, with a commitment to core
democratic and market economic values, require mass-level support (Slomcznski
and Shabad 1997: 69). Certainly, the structural perils of the political and
economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe are important. As these
structural conditions affect the general public, examinations of the mass support
and motivations regarding the dual transformation processes are important.
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Second, current theories of the political economy of transition and
transformation cannot account for the variation in attitudes toward democracy
and the market economy except to say that these opinions somehow reside in
the political culture or specific historical conditions of that country and its people.
Other research has presented a realist approach, attempting to avoid a
theoretical debate altogether by reporting their findings without a theoretical
foundation. The theoretical framework of this dissertation is to try to understand
the patterns of public opinion within the context of the changing international
conditions that have resulted because of the end of the Cold War.
The premise of this dissertation argues that in order to understand public
opinion about the political and economic conditions in a country, particularly in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, one must consider the context of
international relations. In particular, the relations of the Central and Eastern
European countries and that of the supranational organization of the European
Union need to be considered. This framework was selected because it provides a
means by which to conceptualize patterns in the transformation process beyond
that of individually specified national histories. It allows for public opinion to be
related to a concrete, real situation and examination of specific institutional
conditions.
What sets this dissertation apart from other research on public opinion in
Central and Eastern Europe is the grounding of the understanding of public
opinion within the political economy transformation and national integration into
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the international community. Finally, specifically considering public opinion on
democracy and the market economy within the context of the country’s desire for
integration into the European Union imposes a framework grounded in the
countries’ own self-imposed relation to the international community. Specifically
avoided is the imposition of a categorization exclusively outside of the countries.
By using the status of their seeking membership in the European Union, the





This chapter reviews research applicable to the understanding of public
opinion on the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern
Europe. First, there is brief discussion of economic and political development.
This is followed by an examination of opinions about the links between national
political and economic development and public opinion. A brief history of public
opinion research in Central and Eastern Europe is presented, followed by an
analysis of current public opinion research on politics and economics in Central
and Eastern Europe. Finally, the development of the European Union and its
importance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is discussed.
Political and Economic Development
Since its inception, sociology has wrestled with ideas of progress and
development. Current understanding of the experiences of the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe can be framed within the larger debate on the
relationships and complexities of political and economic development. These
countries are undergoing a dual transformation of both politics and economics,
moving away from state-centered socialism. Since their experience is that of a
dual, political and economic, transformation, this presents an opportunity to
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examine the relationships between politics and economics generally and
democracy and a market economy specifically. Therefore, while the
transformations of political economy in Central and Eastern Europe may be
unique in the sense that these countries are experiencing dual transformations,
these events are part of a larger discussion about progress and state
development in general, and the interaction and development of democracy and
the market economy in particular.
Many have argued that there is a link between democracy and capitalist
economic development (e.g., Bollen 1979, 1983; Lipset 1959). The development
of political institutions necessary for democracy is interdependent with the level
of economic development (Cutright 1963, Cutright and Wiley 1969). At the
institutional level, scholars have long argued that there is a strong relationship
between democracy and free markets (Dahl 1989; Hayek 1944). Further, it is
agreed that historical structures and institutional arrangements have long-term
effects on the political development of a country (Moore 1966).
Despite support of the argument linking democracy to a market economy,
democracy and the market are not necessarily maintained at the same level or
with the same degree of commitment by the regime in power. Some have argued
that democracy and the market economy do not necessarily advance one
another. For example, O’Donnell (1979) asserted that democracy was discarded
in the most economically advanced Latin American countries in favor of
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in order to deepen industrialization. In these
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cases, economic development superceded political development through the
actions of the national leaders.
States do not exist in an international vacuum. The development of
democracy and the market economy occurs as much within an international
context as it does within the national context. The international community is
important to national political and economic development because the state, as
an entity, is positioned between international and domestic power relations
(Skocpol 1979). Therefore, in addition to the national interaction of political and
economic forces, international interactions must be understood to account for the
political and economic development of a country.
For many countries that have attempted democratization and
marketization, their political and economic transformations were undertaken as a
single or sequential transformation process rather than as a dual transformation.
In a single or sequential transformation, the changes in economic orientation
occurred either separately, followed, or were preceded by the political
transformation. This is contrasted with the cases of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, where a dual transformation has occurred in which both the
political and economic transformations were undertaken simultaneously, with
each effecting the other. Balcerowicz (1995) identified the dual nature of the
transformation in both the political and economic spheres. He noted that there
have been asymmetrical changes between political and economic conditions
despite the dual nature of the transformation processes. Further, he suggested
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that the introduction of market liberalization under democratic conditions has
been one of the peculiarities in the post-Soviet political economy transformations
that had not been present in previous political or economic transformations.
Therefore, the dual transformation of politics and economics makes the Central
and Eastern European transformations inherently different from previous
transformations.
The political and economic transformations in the former socialist
countries present a complex situation of interactions between politics and
economics and domestic and international power relations. It brings to issue the
importance of historical factors, prior institutions, resource bases and public
support for the transformation. The complexity is compounded by the fact that
these countries have undergone a dual transformation of both political and
economic conditions.
There has been a growing realization that the dual transformation from
state-centered socialism and a command economy to democracy and a market
economy may not be as simple as first imagined (Centeno 1994). In fact, the
requirements to institutionalize democracy and measures to undertake the
necessary economic reforms to develop a free market may be in opposition to
each other. More specifically, newly democratizing countries face three distinct
problems that can limit a country’s ability to impose new economic policies. In a
democracy, since citizens are more involved with the government by the process
of voting as well as through other democratic activities, the public can oppose
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new economic policy through collective action, distributive allocation and
institutionalizing the interests of political groups (Haggard and Kaufman 1995).
These means of opposition to policies and political actors, through the
development of the democratic process, can severely hamper economic reforms
that are necessary to strengthen the economy but unpopular due to social or
political costs.
Likewise, the profound social costs of economic reform may serve to
severely hamper the development of democracy. As has been the case in
Belarus, as well as other countries, anti-democratic parties have been elected
into office as a response to economic reform measures of the incumbent regime.
In this way, democratic reforms have been reversed as a response to opposition
to the economic reform measures.
There have been asymmetrical political and economic developments in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The political requirements of
establishing a minimal democracy have been easier to achieve than the
economic requirements (Logue and Hancock 2000). The reforms necessary for
the development of a viable market economy require significant economic
restructuring and institution building, much of which comes with high social costs.
Each country has had to construct these reform measures in light of their own
history and resources. Therefore, the development of a market economy in
Central and Eastern Europe does not present a uniform model by which to judge
the establishment of the market economies (Hancock and Logue 2000).
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The difficulty in these transformation processes is compounded by the fact
that, with the end of the Cold War, the whole world has been in transition. The
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have looked to the West and specifically
the European Union for guidance. At the same time, the European Union itself
has been in a state of economic and political transition. For the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, the changes in the European Union have made it “a
moving target, which makes the national strategies of states like Slovenia extra
complex and complicated” (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 805).
The lifting of the Iron Curtain exposed far more problems in the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe than were anticipated originally. While addressing
the problems of corrupt and bankrupt political and economic institutions, the
countries have had to work through their political and economic transformations
in a variety of ways. The extent to which each country has transformed itself is
highly variable (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997). Some countries such as the Czech
Republic and Estonia have made significant progress toward democratization
and marketization, while other countries such as Belarus and Macedonia have
made some progress toward democratization and marketization only to be
caught in a reverse wave of democratization and marketization.
Despite the apparent differences between countries, two factors have
been consistent for all of the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. The first factor is that all of the former socialist countries of Central and
Eastern Europe have made at least tentative steps toward democracy and a
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market economy. While the progress may not have lasted, and some countries,
such as Belarus have retreated considerably, the fact remains that the political
economy transformations have occurred. For some of these countries, this has
been as close to an established democracy and a market economy as they will
get at this time. For other countries, democratization and marketization have
become firmly embedded and institutionalized. What is for certain is that none of
these countries will be able to return to the political economy conditions of the
past half century.
The second factor the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern
Europe share are the standards by which their progress toward democracy and
the market economy are measured. Generally speaking, their progress is based
on a model of the Western democracies and market economies. More
specifically, the model of progress is found in Western Europe. For ten former
socialist countries, the yardstick of Western Europe has been formalized into an
explicit desire to join the European Union as member states.
While the institutional changes have been profound, the political and
economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe are more than just
institutional reforms affecting the organization of the state. These reforms have
macro and micro social consequences. For example, the transfers of state-
owned enterprises into private hands have prompted profound changes and
fundamental shifts in social, political and economic power (Supyan 2000).
Institutional changes have been undertaken in order to integrate the countries
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into the global market economy. The governments of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe have carried out a number of economic reforms. These
economic reforms, especially the “shock therapy” of the early 1990s, have had a
deleterious effect on social conditions throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
Although there were expectations that the steps of the transition, particularly the
economic restructuring, would have serious social consequences, few expected
that the social costs would be so high (Nelson 1997).
It was anticipated that the hardships brought about by the reforms,
although severe, would be short in duration (Nelson 1997). The general publics
in these countries appeared to understand that social costs were inevitable with
the political and economic reform measures. What was not expected was the
duration and severity of the hardships. The economic reforms, which were almost
always launched by surprise, often received widespread initial public support.
That support subsequently eroded as the nature of the social costs became
apparent (Przeworski 1991).
If one thing is clear from these political and economic transformations, it is
that the transformations have had profound social costs. At the structural level,
profound changes have occurred during the processes of the political and
economic transformations. The transformations have had significant social costs
in terms of health (Barr and Field 1996, Chernichovsky and Potapchik 1999,
Field 1995, Nekrassov 1996, Ryan 1994, Stroev et al. 1999, Walberg et al.
1998), the environment (Bowers 1993, Clark and Cole 1998, Dranomirescu et al.
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1998, Kotz 1993, Stroev et al. 1999, Watkins and Rees 1999), employment
(Godfrey 1995, Timar 1995, Vecernik 1992) and crime (Cebulak 1996, Sergeyev
1998, Williams and Rodeheaver 1998, 2000), to name a few. With the high social
costs of the economic (and political) transformation, concern has grown that if the
social costs are too high for too long, the general public will grow dissatisfied with
the transformation. Since in many of these countries the publics now live in a
democracy, they have the ability to voice their disapproval by voting leaders into
power that promise an end to the economic reforms, thereby stopping economic
integration into the world market. Belarus is one example where this appears to
have occurred.
Despite the social costs of the political and economic transformation,
retreat to pre-transformation conditions is not an option. The pursuit of the
democracy and the market economy are important for these countries.
Democracy has become the single, legitimized form of governing in the eyes of
the international community (Zakaria 1997). Likewise, integration into the world
market economy is viewed as the only legitimate economic form. Furthermore,
with the end of the Soviet Union, there are no longer economic alternatives for
these countries. Therefore, the economic and political transformations, with their
inherent social consequences, were and are inevitable.
With the exception of Poland, each country in Central and Eastern Europe
experienced political and economic change instigated primarily from the ‘top-
down’ where those in power instituted the initial political and economic changes.
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In the political arena, the role of the elite is clearly important, but democracy
ultimately requires consent of the masses. Popular support is a necessary
condition for the lasting transformation toward democracy (Miller et al. 1993).
Additionally, the economic transformations require the consent of the masses if
they are to be allowed the necessary time to develop and to operate efficiently.
Due to the inherent connections of politics to economics and the belief that
economic unrest can lead to political change (Przeworski 1991), public opinion
and confidence about the transformation are at the foundations of the full
development of a market economy. Furthermore, “it is generally agreed that
public opinion and popular sovereignty are the foundations of liberal democracy”
(Bennett 1993: 101). The institutional changes, both political and economic, have
had an effect on the political, economic and social conditions of the general
public. When institutions and social conditions change, corresponding changes
occur in underlying group structures, ideological codes and opinion formations.
These changes occur in clear and predictable ways (Bennett 1993: 101). One
means by which to examine the changes resulting from the political economy
transformation is through the use of public opinion research.
Public Opinion Research
Social scientists have been engaged in a heated debate as to whether a
stable democracy and a well-functioning market economy, with a commitment to
core democratic and market values, requires mass-level support (Slomcznski
and Shabad 1997: 69). Understanding public opinions about democracy and the
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market economy are important because political and economic transformations
are difficult and carry with them enormous social costs. These costs are most
clearly seen in the declines of economic performance, standard of living and
public health and safety. It is the general publics of the transforming countries
that must bear the brunt of these costs. The fear of many that support the
marketization and democratization processes in the Central and Eastern
European countries is that the problems such as health, safety and economic
well-being may become so great that they result in the possibility of a reversal in
public support for democracy (Miller, Reisinger and Helsi 1998: 328) and the
market economy.
The study of public opinion has a long history in Western social thought. In
the classical seventeenth- and eighteenth-century works of David Hume and
John Locke, public opinion meant the social pressure to conform (Noelle-
Neumann 1979). It was viewed as an inhibitor of full citizens’ involvement. In
more recent times, public opinion has been linked directly with democracy. In the
former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there were conflicting
meanings of public opinion. It has served as a tool to control the population as
well as a means to shape social policy. As the Central and Eastern European
countries have moved away from state-centered socialism there has been
growing interest in public opinion research from both within the region as well as
from the West.
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Western interest in public opinion and survey research in Central and
Eastern Europe dates back to the 1950s, with the pioneering study by Alex
Inkeles (1950), Public Opinion in Soviet Russia. In this work he argued that the
Bolshevik theory in the Soviet Union did not disregard public opinion, rather, the
identification of public opinion was used to mold, lead and control the masses.
This is clearly more in line with thinkers such as Hume and Locke. During this
period in the Soviet Union, information gathering was not approached
scientifically and often relied on coercive tactics. The results of research on
public opinion being used in this manner in the Soviet Union were to produce the
situations of societies characterized by high-coercion and low-information (Apter
1965) where public opinion gathering merely reinforced what the state expected
to hear. One of the by-products of such an approach was that the official
conception of reality was imposed upon the public and reflected back to the
leadership. The most serious consequence of this situation was a lack of
adequate information regarding public opinion provided to the leadership
(Brzezinski 1956). This led to unrecognized social needs in the public and an
emphasis on a one-way flow of information from the center of power to the public
at large (Sicinski 1967).
Conner and Gitelman’s (1977) edited a volume entitled Public Opinion in
European Socialist Systems. In this book, public opinion was explored in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Hungary. These chapters presented a
descriptive analysis of the conditions of public opinion in the countries but did not
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utilize political culture or any other theoretical perspective from which to interpret
the data. The theme of the book was to present the idea that there was a history
of public opinion data collection and public opinion research but that data
collection and research results were limited due to the interference of the
socialist governments.
Gitelman (1977) presented a brief overview of the development of public
opinion research in the various “communist political systems.” He argued that at
different points in time, the Eastern Bloc countries moved in and out of public
opinion stages. During the totalitarian stage, public opinion was supportive of the
views of those in power and limited to specific designated issues. This was
consistent with the above discussion on public opinion as public control. As the
restraints on issues and results were lessened, public opinion played a slightly
different role, being both supportive and permissive. In this stage public opinion,
to a small degree, was considered important in policy-making decisions. Finally,
from time to time and on selected issues only, some countries supported reform
movements where public opinion played a more decisive role in public policy.
Gitelman’s main argument was that public opinion in these countries has served
different functions at different points in time. From Gitelman’s work, it is clear that
many of the Eastern and Central European countries had varying degrees of use
and support for public opinion research, but that the research failed to reach the
level of methodological sophistication found in public opinion research in the
West.
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In 1981, another serious examination of the condition of survey research
and public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe was undertaken in the edited
volume Survey Research and Public Attitudes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union (Welsh 1981). This volume explored the specific conditions of survey
research in eight countries (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Romania). This collection of information presented a general introduction to the
breadth of survey research in these countries. General problems identified in all
of the countries included a lack of national surveys, reliance on major daily and
periodical presses for data and the questionable quality of the data. Again,
governmental pressures restricted the development of public opinion research on
par with that of the West.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it
became possible to move beyond anecdotes, limited data and overarching
governmental supervision toward research quality data comparable to that found
in the West. The burning issue that has received the most attention was to ask
people what they were doing and thinking about the transformation processes
around them. Since the overt start of the political and economic transformations
away from socialism, there has been growing interest in public opinion research
throughout Central and Eastern Europe. For example, evidence of this growing
interest in this includes the two multinational survey series that have been
conducted, in a somewhat yearly fashion, in select Central and Eastern
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European countries. Both of these survey series have focused on public opinion
regarding the social, political and economic changes underway since the end of
the Cold War.
The first post-Cold War multinational survey of Central and Eastern
Europe was the Central and Eastern European Barometer (conducted by the
Commission of the European Communities). This has been conducted in
selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe every year since 1990. The
other multinational survey series is the New Democracies Barometer (conducted
by the Paul Lazarfeld Society under the direction of Christian Haerpfer and
Richard Rose). It has been conducted in selected countries of Central and
Eastern Europe in 1991, 1992, 1993/94, 1995 and 1998. These, in addition to a
number of national and regional surveys, have provided a new level of
sophistication in research on public perceptions of the conditions in Central and
Eastern European.
Public Opinion on Democracy and the Market Economy in Central and Eastern
Europe
Following Dahl (1971) and others (Dalton 1988; Hahn 1991), it is assumed
that democratization and marketization require the growth of certain orientations,
beliefs and values conducive to democracy and a market economy. These are
assumed to develop from historical and cultural traditions of the country. The
imposition of communist rule in the mid-1940s largely ignored the diverse
historical and cultural traditions of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.
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Under the Soviet Union, the goal was to transform these publics into societies of
new socialists. In the end the effort failed. The question for many scholars
remains “the extent to which Central and East Europeans are likely to embrace
democratic values and beliefs after more than 40 years of socialist rule and
against the backdrop of quite different historical and cultural experiences”
(McIntosh and Mac Iver 1992: 379) from that of the West. Added to this question,
is a question about the acceptance of the market economy in light of the values
and beliefs of more than 40 years of socialist rule and the historical and cultural
experiences.  The challenge for scholars is to understand the complexity of the
publics support and understanding of the two sides of this dual transformation
processes.
It has been argued that economic conditions influence political and social
attitudes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994). There is widespread agreement that the
deteriorating economic conditions in the Soviet Union prior to the recognized
start of the political economy transformation contributed to both elite and mass
support for the economic changes in the former socialist countries (Duch 1993).
The problem is that the costs of the political and economic transformation toward
democracy and the market economy may be too much for the general public to
bear. The fear is that the reaction of the public will lead to decreasing support
and a reverse wave away from democracy and a market economy.
The transformations in the Central and Eastern countries are as much
economic as political. It is difficult enough to establish democratic institutions and
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norms, but it is far more difficult to establish the economic institutions and
reforms necessary for a functioning market economy. The economic
transformations are further complicated because it is the economic changes that
have produced the greatest social costs. The market reforms have resulted in
serious short-term dislocations and hardships (Klein and Pomer 2001) which the
general public has had to endure.
One of the problems of a dual transformation is that changes in the
economic and political conditions can be difficult to differentiate. For example,
McIntosh and MacIver (1992) found that the public in Hungary, Poland and
Czechoslovakia demonstrated support for fundamental democratic values but
that the majority defined democracy in primarily economic terms. This supports
the argument that democracy and the market economy are linked in the minds of
people but also suggests that people are confounding these concepts. By
confounding these concepts, the public may hold one (most probably democracy)
responsible for problems and hardships created by the other (most probably the
market economy).
The effects of economic institutional reform require that the general
population bear the heaviest burden of the reforms. Some have argued that
public support for institutional reforms may withstand economic chaos for only a
certain period of time, after which citizens begin to blame democracy and
capitalism for their plight (Przeworski 1991). As the erosion of the popular base
of support for democratization is related to poor performance of the regime
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(Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990, Schumpeter 1942), it affects the ability of the
new regimes to deliver the economic goods. If economic catastrophe threatens
support for democratic institutions, it will have similar, if not an exaggerated,
effects on support for economic reforms (Duch 1993).
To attempt to understand the public’s perceptions of and reactions to the
political and economic changes, there has been a great deal of interest in public
opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A number of studies have
explored attitudes toward democracy with mixed results. For example, Grey et al.
(1995) reported that 52.4% of the Russian respondents in their study found
democracy to be broadly satisfactory, while in the same survey 46.7% felt that
Russia was not yet ready for democracy.
Wyman (1994) reported the findings of a number of surveys conducted in
Russia from 1991 through 1994 and found that support for democracy varied with
the wording of the question. Despite the effects of wording, a substantial
percentage of respondents in each survey chose non-democratic options over
democratic options. Since the citizens of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe have lived under non-democratic regimes, their selection of those over
democratic alternatives is provocative. Following in this line of research on the
support of undemocratic alternatives, Rose (1997, 2001) considered the support
of undemocratic alternatives using the New Democracies Barometer surveys.
Rose (1997) found that, on average, 67% of the citizens of seven countries in
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Central and Eastern Europe rejected authoritarian alternatives to democracy. In
Russia, only 45% rejected authoritarian alternatives.
The Churchill Hypothesis (Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999; Mishler and
Rose 1996; Rose 1995; Rose and Mishler 1996; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer
1998) tests the idea that democracy, although not the best form of government,
is preferable to other forms. Central and Eastern Europe offers an opportunity to
test this hypothesis because the adult populations have lived under two, and in
some cases three, regime types. People are not asked for their support of
democracy, rather they are asked to choose among alternative regimes. Their
results suggest that while support for democracy may not be high, it is higher
than support for any alternative form of governing.
Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes with the
level of support for democratization and a market economy among the masses
and elites in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. They
found that the link between support for democratization and attitudes towards
market norms was more important than the like between support for
democratization and democratic norms in the 1992 and 1995 elections. Indeed,
they found the relationship between support for democratic reformers and
democratic principles to be very weak while the relationship between support for
democratic reformers and support for the market was fairly strong.
Kluegel, Mason and Wegener (1999) focus on economic justice attitudes
in Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria to
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examine the development of a solid market economy. They stressed the
importance of both a structural and individual level of analysis. Their findings
suggest that the theory of legitimation of the market (as is found in the West)
does apply to post-communist countries. Further, that the changes in the market
and in social justice are functions of collective and individual level factors.
Duch (1993, 1995) looked for identifiable pockets of citizenry that either
supported or opposed democracy and the market economy. He found that the
bases of support for democracy and markets are located in the more highly
educated members of society (Duch 1993). Additionally, he was unable to
identify a pocket of “unsophisticated citizenry” that would “respond to economic
catastrophe by embracing antimarket or antidemocratic solutions” (Duch 1995:
122). Duch (1995) found support for a free market related to gender, age,
education, and prospective and retrospective economic performance in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Beyond characteristics of the supporters of the democratic transformation,
research has been conducted that explores specific factors that may be seen as
contributing to general and specific attitudes toward democracy. For example,
Kunioka and Woller (1999) explored the effects of social capital and economic
performance on preferences for parliamentary or authoritarian governments in
Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Ukraine.
Using the New Democracy Barometer III, they found that the indicators of social
capital (e.g., institutional trust, viewing minorities and/or immigrants as threats,
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order versus freedom, patience versus quick results and town size) were
statistically more important than were future or current economic perceptions in a
preference for parliament over a strong leader.
One of the most frequently cited complaints about the conditions under the
Soviets was the lack of respect for individual human rights. Many of the émigré
surveys of the Cold War period suggest that this was a serious problem under
the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe (Gleitman and
Greenbaum 1960, Kracauer and Berkman 1956). Following in this line of
argument, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) examined attitudes toward human
rights conditions in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s and found them
to be related to support for democratic regimes and institutions.
Preferences for democracy and to a lesser degree capitalism are rather
widespread in Central and Eastern Europe (Duch 1993, Gibson and Duch 1993).
Support for the transformation to a market economy has been examined in a
number of ways. Using data collected from a survey of European USSR in 1990,
Duch (1993) tested different explanations for attitudes towards free-market
reforms. He found that there was a free-market culture developing that
resembles social democracy, rather than laissez-faire capitalism. Democratic
values and support for free markets are mutually reinforcing, suggesting that
support for democracy makes a very important contribution to support for free-
market reform (Duch 1993: 590).
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Slomczynski and Shabad (1997) conducted a survey of Polish students
aged 13 to 14 and a corresponding ‘cohort’ of their parents and teachers to
examine the relative levels of support for democracy and a market economy.
They found that support for democracy was greater for the adults. Support for the
market economy was greater for the students. Their findings suggest a
generalized disconnect between the generations in terms of the expectations
about the transformation, but such limited survey data could not be generalized.
Duch (1993) has called attention to the need to examine the supporting
sets of beliefs and attitudes about the structural changes implemented in the
transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. To that end, this project
examines public opinion about democracy and the market economy in Central
and Eastern Europe. The use of public opinion is supported within the context of
democracy, as public opinion can be said to shape democracy (Miller et al.
1993). Since politics and economics are assumed to be linked, public opinion
should be expected to be shape the market economy.
One of the recurring problems found in many of the studies of public
opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe has been the selection of
countries to be included in the studies. Often the countries are selected based
simply on availability. While this problem cannot be avoided completely, there are
means by which to better conceptualize the countries included in a project.  To
date, little work has been done to categorize the countries in a meaningful way
that can shed light on patterns and similarities in the countries as they undergo
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their transformation process.  Although, as Kaldor and Vejvoda (1997) argue, the
extent to which each country has transformed itself is highly variable. It could be
argued that the task for sociologists is to examine the variability for patterns that
may emerge and shed light on the transformation processes.
The categorization of the countries included in a study is a means by
which to create a heuristic device to assist in understanding social reality. It is
acknowledged that categories do not act. Rather, the categories created serve as
an ideal type by which to gage social reality. The development of a heuristic
device to search for patterns was a method used by Weber (1968) which both
differentiated sociology from history and provided a means by which to explore
social reality.
Some attempts have been made to create a framework from which to
understand patterns in public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe since the
start of the political and economic transformations. For example, to conceptualize
the similarities and pattern in public opinion, the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe were divided into categories of free, partially free and unfree, based on
the Freedom House scale of civil and political rights (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer
1998; Rose 2001). The findings suggest that the countries in these studies
considered to be free (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) were
making the greatest strides in the percentage of the population generally positive
about the democratic regimes. Rose (2001) reported that 63% of the
respondents in the countries that Freedom House categorized as “free” opposed
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undemocratic alternatives to democracy, while 43% of the respondents in the
countries considered “partly free” or “not free” opposed the undemocratic
alternatives to democracy.  The problem is that these studies (Rose 2001; Rose,
Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) contained data on nine countries, only one of which
was classified as ‘not free’. Additionally, the means by which they chose to
categorize the countries was based on an externally defined division (i.e.,
Freedom House). Although Rose el al. (1998) and Rose (2001) did use a
categorization in their attempts to discern patterns in public opinion in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, their selection of this as a framework
has a number of limitations.
Conclusion
Overall, the literature suggests that there is a relationship between politics
and economics, and specifically that there is a relationship between democracy
and market economy. The support for the presence of a relationship between the
two conditions is found in the institutional research and public opinion research.
Further, there is support for the conclusion that there is a relationship between
institutional change and public opinion.
It has been argued that public opinion should be studied with regard to the
political and economic changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
In considering public opinion about the transformation processes, much of the
work to date is descriptive in nature, reporting the varying levels of support for
either democracy of the market economy. Some work has been done that goes
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beyond description toward a more complete understanding of the complexity
public opinion within the context of the political economy transformation
processes. The findings of these studies suggest that economic and political
opinions are related and influence each other. Further work is needed to extract
a more meaningful understanding of the specific factors that influence public
opinion on democracy and the market economy. 
A second weakness in the research on public opinion on democracy and
the market economy in Central and Eastern Europe is the lack of theoretical or
conceptual framework of many studies. The question becomes, how does one
study public opinion and gain insight into these processes with so many countries
with such diverse national experiences and resources?  The answer lies in
creating a conceptual framework from which to explore potential patterns in
public opinion.
In Chapter 3, the competing theories of European Union integration will be
presented. This is followed by a general discussion of the theoretical framework
of this dissertation. Based on the literature in this area, a conceptual framework
is proposed that would allow for the examination of public opinion on political,
economic and foreign relations conditions within the a contextual framework of
the international reorientation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
seeking membership in the European Union.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT
AND PUBLIC OPINION ON POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is based on premise that
public opinion is important to and influence by the international reorientations of
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe undergoing political and economic
transformations in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is based on
two important assumptions. First and foremost, the political and economic
transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are nascent
international reorientations. While the transformations are occurring within the
national contexts of the individual states, it is within the greater context of the
international arena that the political economy transformations can be
contextualized and understood. Second, and equally important, the development
of a solid and viable political culture contributes to the consolidation of the
political and economic transformations. It is through this that the foundations of
the political and economic transformations can be solidified and institutionalized.
In this section, I will explore the assumptions I have made about the political and
economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, I will
present the theoretical framework to understand public opinion in Central and
Eastern Europe regarding the political and economic transformations.
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International (Re)orientations
The Cold War and Post-Cold War periods have been characterized by
series of international integrations into various supranational bodies. Pentland
(1973: 21) defines international political integration as “a process whereby a
group of people, organized initially in two or more independent nation-states,
come to constitute a political whole which can in some sense be described as a
community” (italics in the original).  Some of these organizations have been
linked directly to Cold War security such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact. Other supranational organizations have
regional orientations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the
Organization of American States (OAS). Organizations such as these often have
important economic roles to play in their specific region of the world. This chapter
will focus on the European Union and potential enlargement of the European
Union to include some of the Central and Eastern European countries that were
former members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
 The European Union represents a supranational organization of nation-
states. The European Union started as the European Coal and Steel Community
in 1958, and was composed of six nations: Belgium, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  The first
enlargement occurred in 1973, as Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
were integrated into the European Community. Greece joined in 1981. Portugal
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and Spain were integrated into the European Community in 1986. In 1995, the
European Union enlarged to include Austria, Finland and Sweden.
Central and Eastern European Integration into the European Union
Although aware of the reform efforts underway in the Soviet Union under
Mikhail Gorbachev, the end of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union
from 1989-1991, came as a surprise to many political leaders and experts in the
West (Van Oudenaren 2000). On it face, the political and economic changes
represent a simple end to the Cold War. At a deeper level, the changes that
started as a result of the end of the Soviet Union, represent a profound
reorientation of these countries in the international arena.      
At the same time that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were
undergoing disintegration and political and economic re-orientations, much of the
rest of Europe was undergoing a profound change. It was at this time that the
European Economic Community was transformed into the European Community.
The European Union came into being on November 1, 1993, when the Treaty on
European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) came into force.
During this period of political and economic change, for both the former
Soviet countries and the countries of the European Community, the European
Community was cautious in their relations toward the countries that had
belonged to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The
European Community limited the aid it provided to the former Socialist countries
to practical technical and financial assistance to support the reform efforts.
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Additionally, tentative steps were made toward normalizing trade relations
between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of Europe
(Gower 1999: 3).
At the start, the European Union was extremely reluctant to make any
specific commitments to the principle of enlargement, let alone to set a date for
the formal accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the
European Union. This changed by 1993, when the Copenhagen European
Council established the pre-accession strategies and accession criteria. It is no
longer a question of if the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be
allowed to enter the European Union. It is now a matter of when the countries will
be integrated into the European Union (European Union 2001: 10).
Accession into the European Union required that the candidate countries
meet political and economic goals as well as demonstrate the ability to meet the
obligations of membership (European Union 2001: 10). The political
requirements included the achievement of stable institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect and protection of
minorities. The existence of a functioning market economy, stable enough to
cope with the market forces and competitive pressures from within the European
Union were some of the key economic requirements (Archer 2000, 196-198).
The pre-accession plans were not as simple as may appear. First, since
no plan was in place when the political and economic transformations of Central
and Eastern Europe became apparent to the rest of the world, the strategies
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were developed as their absence became apparent. Second, the social and
economic disparities between the current European Union member states and
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are greater than those found during
any enlargement of the European Union (Brusis 2000). Finally, the European
Union presents a moving target of political and economic development to the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe that must not only catch up, but must
also be in a position to effectively compete (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999).
Despite the difficulties of achieving an invitation for membership into the
European Union, a number of former Soviet countries have expressed an
interested in working towards membership. In 1994, starting with Hungary, then
Poland, the first Europe Agreements were ratified. By 1996, a total of ten former
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance started to work formally
towards the goal of integration into the European Union. At the Luxembourg
Summit in December 1997, the European Council agreed to start on the process
of accession negotiations and to reinforce the pre-accession strategy for
membership.
In March of 1998, at the First Europe Council, the accession process was
launched formally with the adoption of accession partnerships and the opening of
accession negotiations with the countries of the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. These five countries were identified as the
‘frontrunners’ in the race toward integration into the European Union and could
expect, with adequate progress, to become member states in the next
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enlargement of the European Union. In December 2000, formal accession
negotiations were started with the remaining five countries that had ratified the
Europe Agreements, including Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the
Slovak Republic.
The process of integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
into the European Union is important for a number of reasons. First and
foremost, since the beginning of the fundamental political and economic changes
in the late 1980s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have considered
integration to be one of the main tools of achieving political and economic
transformation (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 816). Differences in the successes of
the transformations have emerged between the countries that are seeking
membership in the European Union and the countries that are not seeking
membership. Despite the progress made by many of the countries to meet the
requirements for membership as identified by the European Council, none of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been invited to join the European
Union as full members.
As the political and economic transformation occurred in Central and
Eastern Europe, at the national level each country experienced the
transformation in a distinct manner. As Stark (1992) has argued, there is no
single model of the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite the
apparent distinction of each country’s transformation, there is an overarching
commonality between each of the countries.  Each country experienced a shift
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away from a single and unified political economy of state-centered socialism
toward varying degrees of participation economically in a market economy and
politically in some nominal form of democracy. This requires a reorientation of the
Political Culture
A great deal of work has been done under the rubric of political culture
theory (Reisinger 1995).  At the core, Almond (1990: 143-144) summarized the
basic, accepted ideas of political culture. Political culture consists of the set of
subjective orientations to politics in a national or sub-national population. Political
culture has a number of components including cognitive, affective and evaluative.
These components produce knowledge and beliefs about political reality that
include feelings with respect and commitment to politics and political values. The
content of political culture is the result of childhood and adult socialization,
education, media exposure, and experiences with government. Political culture
can constrain but does not determine political and governmental structure and
performance. There is an interaction between culture and structure. 
In recent years there has been a rekindled interest in political culture
directly related to the political economy transformation in Central and Eastern
Europe. A series of studies has examined mass values and attitudes of these
transforming countries in order to advance hypothesis of ‘political culture’
influence on the prospect of democratic consolidation (Reisinger 1995: 347).
Political culture is “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols,
and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It
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provides the subjective orientation to politics” (Pye and Verba 1965: 513). By
extension, economic culture is the system of empirical beliefs, expressive
symbols, and values which defines the situation in which economic action takes
place. It provides the subjective orientation to economics. Together political
culture and economic culture come to form a foundation of a subjective
orientation to the culture of political economy. It presents the set of empirical
beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which political and economic interaction
takes place.
At the foundation of understanding the political and economic culture of a
society are the fundamental conceptualizations of key ideas on the political and
economic features of that society. The conceptualizations of democracy and
market economy can be understood as the building-blocks of the values, beliefs,
attitudes and opinions that form political and economic culture in its entirety in a
given society. While it may seem trivial to separate political and economic culture
from each other, in fact politics and economics, although intertwined are not
equivalents. Indeed, one of the reasons to examine the transformation of Central
and Eastern Europe is to explore the effects and consequences of the interaction
of the dual political and economic transformation.
It is clear that Almond (1990) views political culture of the masses as
exercising influence on the structure and performance and of governments.
Indeed, public opinion and the political culture that it represents may be an
important precondition to democratic transition. Indeed, it may become a
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dynamic force in the transition or may become a serious hindrance that may
prevent or complicate the transition (Melville 1993: 56). Likewise, there is a need
for an economic culture that may provide an important foundation for economic
transformations. Therefore, political culture and economic culture represent
“broader tectonic shifts” (Melville 1993: 56) in the political and economic
reorientation of a country. The more secure the masses are in the development
and redefining of the political culture toward democracy and a market economy,
the more likely that political culture will serve as a dynamic force for change
rather than a hindrance to it.
At the foundation of the political culture framework is argument that the
political culture of a society will shape that society.  This is not to diminish or
neglect the presence of other factors that also contribute to the shaping of a
society.  Political culture theorists have argued for a greater understanding of the
interaction of societal structures and institutions with political culture (Lane 1992).
One means by which to do this it to examine political culture in the context of the
international reorientation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the
wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet Union. There is
a link between public opinion and political culture.  Public opinion is an
appropriate vehicle by which to examine political culture. It “is a primary indicator
of the state of a particular society’s political culture and the features, trends and
dynamics that characterize it” (Melville 1993: 60).
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Theoretical Framework
The transformation process underway in Central and Eastern Europe is
not only a political change, but carries with it a concurrent economic
transformation. The challenge then is to examine political culture as it transforms
concurrently with the economic transformations during the institutional change of
the political economy. Adding to the complexity of the transformation process is
the international reorientation these countries away from the defunct Soviet
Union. Some of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are moving toward
membership in the European Union, while others, undergoing this same
transformation processes, are not seeking to join the European Union.
This difference between the countries that are moving toward integration
into the European Union and those that are not is a pivotal distinction between
countries. Nationally, the countries may be attempting to achieve the same goal
in political and economic transformation, but their international orientations and
intentions are of great apparent importance to their national transformation
processes. This international orientation toward the European Union and the
degree of formal invitation by the European Union to these countries is the
single-most important criteria for distinguishing between these two groups of
countries. Therefore, this difference becomes the cornerstone for examining
patterns in public opinion in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The fundamental framework for the examination of the public opinion on
the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe is to
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look for patterns in public opinion that are related to the international reorientation
of these countries. In order to do this, there needs to be a means by which to
conceptualize the divisions between the countries and therefore create
categories to work with that would provide insight into the occurrence of patterns
in public opinion. The categorization needs to be neutral and not affect the
probability that data will be collected for that country. Additionally, the
categorization needs to be historically relevant to the situations of these
countries. Finally, the categorization should be relatively self-imposed by the
countries to avoid an externally imposed bias. This is important because a self-
imposed categorization reflects the country’s own perception of their conditions
within the transformation processes.
A number of classificatory devices could meet the criteria identified above
and would allow for the searching of patterns in public opinion in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. One option is to consider the foreign relations
changes that the countries are attempting within the international community.
Therefore, public opinion would be examined within the context of the changing
international alliances of the countries. The very fact that the Soviet Union no
longer exists forces this change on each of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Each country has had to make significant changes in this area. One
option within this context is to examine public opinion in the countries based on
the country’s desire for integration into the European Union. Therefore, for the
purposes of this dissertation, the framework for understanding public opinion in
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the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is based on their interest and status
of seeking membership in the European Union.
A classificatory system that would meet the stated requirements is that of
the status of the country seeking membership in the European Union. All the
countries in Central and Eastern Europe what wish to join the European Union
may apply for membership based on their geographical location in Europe. The
problem is it is not as simple as geography. There are a number of political and
economic requirements that must be met by these countries (Preston 1997).
These changes require massive structural adjustments. The structural
adjustments that are necessary for the developing and maintaining the political
and economic transformations can be costly (Nelson 1997). Therefore, because
the transformations of political economy are complicated and costly, only some of
the countries will be successful enough in their transformations to be invited into
the European Union. At the same time, comparisons can be made between the
countries seeking and not seeking membership in the European Union. Further,
since not all attempts at political and economic transformations will be equally
successful, even the countries that are formally seeking membership in the
European Union will be invited to join at different times. Therefore, comparing the
countries based on the status of seeking membership in the European Union will
be useful in discerning patterns of public opinion.
The public opinion factors that will be examined relate to elements that
can expect to be part of a transforming political and economic culture in the
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countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, public opinion on political,
economic and foreign relations will be examined in light of the status of seeking
membership in the European Union. The two political public opinion conditions
are satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of human rights conditions.
There are three economic opinions, support for the transformation to a market
economy, retrospective microeconomic opinions and prospective microeconomic
opinions. The foreign relations opinion specifically focuses on opinions about the
orientation of their country to the European Union. Specific hypotheses are




In this chapter, I will provide a discussion of the datasets and general
discussion of the selection of variables. A brief discussion of the methods to be
used is included. Additionally, the operationalization of variables is presented in
this chapter. Specific hypotheses will be discussed in each of the three
substantive chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6).
Data
The data used in this dissertation are from the Central and Eastern
European Barometers 3-7, published annually from 1992 through 1996
(Cunningham 1996; Reif and Cunningham 1992, 1993, 1994; Reif et al. 1995).
The data were collected on behalf of the Commission of the European
Communities, Directorate General X, Audiovisual, Information, Communication,
Culture, “Surveys, Research Analysis, (Eurobarometer)” Unit. The data were
made available through the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social
Research (ICPSR).
Sample and Data Collection
The Central and Eastern European Barometers were conducted via face-
to-face interviews in the respondent’s home. All respondents were citizens of the
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country and 15 years of age or older. To select the respondents, probability
sampling procedures were followed to sample the entire population within the
national borders. The standard procedure for the selection of the respondents
started with the selection of sampling points (for example, from a geographical
division of the country into its major socio-economic areas). Within these initial
sampling points, smaller electoral or administrative districts were selected.
Approximately ten interviews were conducted within each sampling point.
The individual respondents were selected via one of four methods. The
first method used to select the respondents was a double clustered random
address sample. The person 15 years of age or older having the next birthday in
the household was selected. For the second method, selection was based on
random selection from a list of the electorate (usually no more than three years
old). Third, respondents were randomly selected by address from a published or
commissioned list, with the specific individuals selected by a random method.
Finally, respondents were selected by starting with a random route from a
selected starting point. In these cases, the individual respondents were identified
through a random method. Quotas were imposed to ensure that people below
the age of enfranchisement were represented.
The Central and Eastern European Barometers were conducted in the Fall
of each year over approximately a 2 to 3 week period in each country. The
specific countries varied from year to year and slight modifications in data
collection were necessary in some countries.  Specific information on the
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collection of data for each Central and Eastern European Barometer is provided
on Appendix A.
 For the purpose of this paper, analysis is limited to those countries for
which data are available for the five-year period, 1992 through 1996. The sixteen
countries are Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Ukraine. The number of respondents in each country for each year
is found on Table 1.
Selected Variables
Six variables were selected from the Central and Eastern European
Barometers 3-6. Political, economic and foreign relations variables were selected
to be analyzed in this dissertation. In this section, I will discuss each variable in
general. In the substantive chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), each variable used
will be discussed in relation to the specific research questions and hypotheses
addressed in that chapter.
One of the variables included in this dissertation is that of public opinion
on democracy.  Specifically, satisfaction with democracy is used. This variable
was selected for two reasons. First, democratic institutions were initiated in all of
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe prior to the first year included in this
study. Although reforms were still underway, for the most part, at least a loosely
formed democratic form of governing had been established in all of these
countries. Second, satisfaction with democracy was more consistently worded
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and available in each of the years included in this study. Alternative questions
about public opinion on democracy changed wording and placement relative to
other question, whereas this question did not.
To measure satisfaction with democracy, respondents are asked the
following question: “On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very
satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?”  The
response categories are “satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” “not very satisfied” and “not
at all satisfied.”
A second political public opinion variable is included in this study. The
variable considers perceived human rights conditions within the countries. A
human rights variable is included for two reasons. First, it is included because of
the use of a human rights framework by Rose et al. (1998) and Rose (2001) to
examine public opinion on democracy. In these studies, the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe were divided into categories of free, partially free and
unfree, based on the Freedom House scale of civil and political rights (Rose,
Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Rose 2001). They found that the populations in the
countries rated as ‘free’ were generally positive about the democratic regimes.
This suggests that human rights may be important an important factor to consider
the formation of public opinion on the political transformations in Central and
Eastern Europe.
Additionally, perceived human rights conditions are included because it is
expected that this may be one of the areas in which people are able to see more
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immediate changes in the post-Soviet regimes. As Rose (1997) suggests, the
totalitarian practices and institutions such as censorship and shoot-to-kill border
guards can be done away with rather quickly. Therefore, it would be expected
that human rights conditions, particularly civil and political rights, would be some
of the first noticeable changes within the political transformations. The variable
measuring perceived human rights condition is based on the question, “To what
degree do you believe that there is respect for individual human rights in (our
country)?”  The response categories are “a lot of respect for individual human
rights,” “some respect,” “not much respect” and “no respect at all.”
Three economic variables are included in this dissertation. The first is that
of support for the market economy. In all of the countries included in this study,
initial economic reform measures have been implemented. While some countries
have been marginally successful in the economic transformation, for the most
part only limited reforms, most with very high social costs, had been implemented
in the first year included in this study. Further, the ideology and institution
building necessary for the establishment of a market economy are a greater sea
change than changes implemented in the political arena for the citizens of the
former socialist countries.
Since the economic transformations are still very much in their infancy in
these countries in the first years included in the study, support for market reforms
is included as the measure of public opinion on the economy. To measure
support for the market economy, respondents are asked to report their opinion on
51
the market economy in their country. This variable, market economy support, is
measured on the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free
market economy, that is one that is largely free from state control is right or
wrong for (our country)?”  The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”
The second two economic variables are prospective and retrospective
microeconomic measures. The two variables are included because these
consider the effects of the macroeconomic changes on the perceived
microeconomic conditions of the people in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. Household microeconomic perceptions are selected over individual
microeconomic perceptions because of the socio-economic living arrangements
of the people in these countries. Simply stated, people are most likely to live in
households with two or more adults engaged in some employment or pension-
drawing activities.  Prospective microeconomic expectations is measured with
the question, “Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation
of your household will . . .?” The response categories are “get a lot better,” “get a
little better,” “stay the same,” “get a little worse” and “get a lot worse.”
Additionally, the respondents were asked about their retrospective opinions on
their household economic conditions over the past year. For this variable, the
question asks, “Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation
of your household has . . . got a lot better, got a little better, stayed the same, got
a little worse, got a lot worse?”
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Finally, public opinion on the future relationship of the respondent’s
country to the European Union is selected because of the framework to be used
to categorize the countries based on the countries’ status of seeking membership
in the European Union. The opinions about their country’s future being joined
closely to the European Union is measured with the question, “As things now
stand, with which of the following do you see (our country’s) future most closely
tied up?”  The response categories are “The United States of America,” The
European Union,” “Other European countries like Norway and Switzerland, which
remain outside of the European Union,” “Other Central and Eastern European
countries,” “Russia or other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent
States,” “Turkey” and “Japan / South Korea.”
The six variables are used in the next three chapters and form the
foundation of an overarching model of public opinion on democracy and the
market economy. A frequency distribution of all of the variables is found in
Appendix B. The frequency distributions are broken-down by country and year.
Methods
A number of methods are used in the substantive chapters in this
dissertation. For each of these three chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), the method
or methods are selected based on the research question being addressed and
the hypotheses being tested. Specifically, univariate analyses, non-parametric




In chapter 4, frequency distributions were reported on two variables,
satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy for the five
years of this study. These were examined to look for patterns in public opinion on
democracy and the market economy in the sixteen countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. To look for patterns, the frequency distributions of public opinion
in the sixteen countries were compared based on their status of seeking
membership in the European Union.
Non-Parametric Tests
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test appropriate for use
with ordinal data. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests whether two independent
samples represent two distinct populations. In Chapter 4, this test is used to
compare public opinion on democracy and the market economy in the countries
seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking
membership in the European Union.
Measures of Association
Measures of association are used to examine the strength and direction of
the relationship between two variables. Correlation matrices were created in
Chapters 5 and 6 to examine the association between the five predictor variables
used in each of those chapters. This is done to examine the strength and
direction of the relationship between the predictor variables in each model prior
to using a multivariate technique.
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Regression Techniques
Multinominal logistic regression and ordinal regression were attempted
since the variables were collected at an ordinal level of measurement originally.
In running the diagnostics for the analysis, a number of cells between the
predictor and predicted variables were very small. This presented a problem for
the multinominal and ordinal regression analysis because it resulted in inflated
and logically unacceptable regression coefficients. To correct for the problem, the
variable response categories are collapsed so that each cell will be large enough
to allow for analysis.
The steps taken to correct for the small cell size are as follows. First, the
two household economic variables had their categories collapsed. Specifically,
the response categories for the variable of future household economic
expectations are collapsed into two categories of improved and not improved.
The responses of “getting a lot better” or “getting a little better” are considered to
indicate improved expectations. The remaining response categories are
considered to not be expecting improved household economic conditions over
the next 12 months. Likewise, the response categories for household economic
experiences over the past 12 months are collapsed into a dichotomous variable
indicating either improvement or no improvement in household economic
conditions over the past 12 months. Improved conditions were those where the
respondents reported that their household economic conditions got better, either
a lot or a little. The responses that indicated that the household economic
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conditions had stayed the same or worsened composed the category of no
improvement in household economic conditions over the past 12 months.
The variable on the perceived future of the respondent’s country with the
European Union was collapsed into a dichotomous variable. Specifically, the
responses were divided into two categories. The first category is composed of
the response that the future of the respondent’s country is with the European
Union.  All other responses were collapsed into the residual category of ‘other.’
The perceived human rights condition variable presented a problem as
there were very few responses in the “no respect at all” category. Therefore, this
variable is collapsed into two categories.  The first category is labeled “respect
for human rights” and is composed of the original responses of “a lot of respect”
and “some respect.”  The second category, “no respect for human rights,” is
composed of the original response categories of “not much respect” and “no
respect at all.”
Finally, to fully resolve the problem of small cells, the variable measuring
satisfaction with democracy was recoded. Specifically, the original responses
were re-categorized as “satisfied” and “not satisfied.” The satisfied category
includes all responses of either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied.” The responses of
“not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” are placed into the “not satisfied”
category.
With the variables in dichotomous form, multinominal logistic regression
and ordinal regression are inappropriate. Logistic regression is selected as an
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appropriate procedure due to the dichotomous nature of the variables. This
technique is used in Chapters 5 and 6 to test the model of predictor and
predicted variables.  Logistic regressions are run for each of the sixteen countries
for the year 1996 to see which variables are important to public opinion on
democracy (Chapter 5) and the market economy (Chapter 6). The individual
country models are examined for patterns in statistical significance of the
component variables in the models in the countries based on the status of the
country seeking membership in the European Union. Additionally, the individual
country models are compared with regard to goodness-of-fit and the explanatory
power of the model for each category of countries.
In addition to the logistic regressions of each of the individual countries,
logistic regressions are run on the countries pooled into the categories based on
the status of their seeking membership in the European Union. The logistic
regressions of the pooled countries are compared based on the strength of the




THE EXTENT OF PUBLIC SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY AND SUPPORT
FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY IN THE COUNTRIES OF 
                                       CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
                         In any democracy or market economy, public opinion matters. It matters in
                        a democracy, for it is a means by which the representatives of the public come to
                        understand the general needs, beliefs and opinions of those they represent.
                        Likewise, public opinion in a market economy is important. Support and
                        confidence in the market contributes to economic stability and growth.
                         Public opinion on democracy and the market economy are explored in this
                        chapter. The purpose is to identify the extent of public opinion on democracy and
                        the market economy in sixteen former socialist countries of Central and Eastern
                        Europe. Using the Central and Eastern European Barometers for the years 1992
                        to 1996, this chapter provides a baseline of information on political and economic
                        attitudes. As a framework to understand public opinion in these countries,
                        comparisons are made between countries seeking membership in the European
                       Union and the countries not seeking membership in the European Union. Public
                       opinion in these sixteen countries is compared based on the status of the            
                       relationship of the country to the European Union. This will provide an
                       understanding of the development of similarities and differences in public opinion
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on two of the most apparent elements of the political and economic
transformations of these countries.
The sixteen countries in this chapter are divided into two groups (see
Table 2). The first group consists of the ten countries seeking membership in the
European Union. These countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. These
countries are considered to have made the most significant progress toward
adopting democratic and market institutions. The second group of countries is
composed of the countries not seeking formal integration into the European
Union. For some of these countries, membership may be a future goal, while for
others it is a highly unlikely goal. There are six countries included in this
category, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Macedonia, Russia and Ukraine.
Literature Review
The Cold War division of Europe ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin
Wall. This and the events to follow took Western Europe and the rest of the world
by surprise. At that time the general expectations were for rapid and successful
transformations away from the political economies of the former socialist
countries. Visions emerged of a unified Europe. It was expected that the
countries would be able to navigate away from an authoritarian polity and
command economy directly to democracy and a market economy. Despite the
optimism and rhetoric, the economic, political and policy voids quickly became
apparent.
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The countries of Western Europe were unprepared for the challenges of
transforming the political and economic landscape of Central and Eastern
Europe. Indeed, Europe as a whole was undergoing changes at this time. In
Western Europe, the European Economic Community was coming together to
form the European Union. During this period of political and economic change,
the European Community was cautious in their relations towards the countries
that had belonged to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance. The European Community limited its offerings to practical technical
and financial assistance to support the reforms as well as some progress
towards normalizing trade relations with the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (Gower 1999: 3).
As time passed, the difficulties of the transformation processes for the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe have become much more apparent. At
the same time, the European Union has gradually developed a broad policy
strategy that made it possible, by the end of 1997, to identify states to be
considered for future accession into the European Union. For ten former socialist
countries, membership in the European Union has become the target, albeit a
moving one (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 802) for successful political and economic
development.
If anything has become apparent in this transformation process, it is the
variety of economic and political paths upon which the former socialist countries
have embarked. The political and economic transformations have occurred in
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Central and Eastern Europe at the national level, with each country experiencing
the transformation in a distinctive manner. As Stark (1992) has argued, there is
no single model for the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite
the apparent uniqueness of each country’s transformation, there is an
overarching commonality between many of the countries. Each country shifted
away from a single and unified political economy grounded in state-centered
socialism toward varying degrees of participation in a market economy and a
nominal form of democracy.
In all countries that have made the transition to democracy and a market
economy, at least a portion of the elite supported these reforms. The further
consolidation of the democracy and a market economy requires a degree of
support by the citizens of the state (Fleron and Ahl 1998). The transformations to
democracy and a market economy have started. A great deal of research has
examined the political and economic transformation at the state level (Handcock
and Logue 2000, Kaldor and Vejvoda 1999, Klein and Pomer 2001, Przeworski
1991). An issue that needs to be examined is the degree of public opinion on
democracy and the market economy that has developed in the citizens of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
There has been a great deal of interest in public opinion in Central and
Eastern Europe. A number of studies have explored attitudes toward democracy.
For example, Grey et al. (1995) reported that 52.4% of the Russian respondents
in their study found democracy to be broadly satisfactory, while in the same
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survey 46.7% felt that Russia was not yet ready for democracy. Wyman (1997)
reported the findings of a number of surveys conducted in Russia from 1991
through 1994. He found that support for democracy varied with the wording of the
question. Despite the effects of wording, a substantial percentage of respondents
in each survey chose non-democratic options.
The realist argument of the Churchill Hypothesis (Rose et al. 1998) states
that democracy may be the worst form of governing but is preferable to all the
rest. Studies suggest that the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe support
democratic regimes as the lesser of other regime evils (Hofferbert and Klingmann
1999; Mishler and Rose 1996; Rose 1995, 1997; Rose and Mishler 1996; Rose,
Mishler and Haerpfer 1998).
Rose (1997, 2001) considered the extent of support for undemocratic
alternatives using the New Democracies Barometer surveys. He found that on
average 67% of the citizens of seven countries in Central and Eastern Europe
rejected authoritarian alternatives to democracy (Rose 1997). By contrast, in
Russia, only 45% rejected the authoritarian alternatives. Rose (2001) reported
that 63% of the respondents in the countries that Freedom House categorized as
“free” opposed undemocratic alternatives to democracy. While only 43% the
respondents in the countries considered to be “partly free” or “not free” by
Freedom House were opposed to undemocratic alternatives to democracy.
Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes with the
level of support for democratization and a market economy among the masses
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and elites in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. They
found that attitudes toward market norms (e.g., individual responsibility, approval
of private enterprise, opposition to regulated incomes, approval of business
influence and pursuit of economic reform) were more important than attitudes
toward democratic norms (e.g., approval of popular participation, organized
opposition party competition and minority rights) in the 1992 and 1995 elections.
Indeed, they found the link between support for democratic reformers and
democratic principles to be very weak while the relationship between support for
democratic reformers and support for the market to be fairly strong.
Duch (1993, 1995) looked for identifiable pockets of citizenry in Central
and Eastern Europe that either supported or rejected democracy and the market
economy. Bases of support for democracy and the market were found in the
more highly educated members of society (Duch 1993). He was unable to
identify a pocket of “unsophisticated citizenry that will respond to economic
catastrophe by embracing antimarket or antidemocratic solutions” (Duch 1995:
122). Therefore, it can be concluded that while there is a base of support for
democratic and market transformations, there does not appear to be a base of
support for a transformation to some alternative political and economic condition.
Kunioka and Woller (1999) explored the effects of social capital and
economic performance on preferences for parliamentary or authoritarian
governments in Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and the Ukraine. Using the New Democracy Barometer III, they found that
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indicators of social capital (e.g., institutional trust, viewing minorities and/or
immigrants as threats, order versus freedom, patience versus quick results and
town size) were statistically more important than were future or current economic
perceptions in terms of the impact on preference for parliament over a single
strong leader. A problem is that they failed to measure any form of satisfaction or
support for democracy that may influence support for a parliament.
One of the most frequently cited complaints about conditions within the
Soviet Union was the lack of respect for individual human rights. Many of the
émigré surveys conducting during the Cold War period suggest that this was
viewed as a serious problem under the communist regimes of Central and
Eastern Europe (Gleitman and Greenbaum 1960, Kracauer and Berkman 1956).
Following in this line of argument, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) examined
attitudes toward human rights conditions in Central and Eastern Europe during
the 1990s and found them to be related to support for democratic regimes and
institutions. According to a 1990 survey of the European portion of the USSR,
perceptions of the government were significantly related to conventional and
unconventional (actual and hypothetical) political participation (Rose, Mishler and
Haerpfer 1998).
Preferences for democracy and to a lesser degree capitalism are rather
widespread in the region (Duch 1993, Gibson and Duch 1993). The greater
variation in the degree of support for capitalism and the market economy suggest
that this is an important element of the transformation processes to consider.
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Support for the transformation to a market economy has been examined in a
number of ways. Duch (1993) explicitly examined the development of an
economic culture in Central and Eastern Europe. He developed the concept of a
‘free market culture’ in which “preferences for free-market reform reflect an
acceptance on the part of individuals of certain basic premises of free-market
mechanisms” (Duch 1993: 590). Using data collected from a survey of European
USSR in 1990, he (Duch 1993: 590) tested different explanations for attitudes
towards free-market reforms. He found that there is a
. . . nascent free-market culture in the Soviet Union that
makes a modest contribution to support for free-market
reforms. The free-market culture that is developing in the
former Soviet Union resembles that of social democracy,
rather than laissez-faire capitalism. Democratic values and
support for free markets are mutually reinforcing, suggesting
that support for democracy makes a very important
contribution to support for free-market reform.
Duch (1995) found that in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, support for a
free market related to gender, age, education, and prospective and retrospective
economic performance. In Russia, of the respondents that felt the state should
exercise a high level of support for production and the provision of social good,
34.1% supported the transition to a market economy (Grey et al. 1995).
65
In general, the research on Central and Eastern European public opinion
on democracy and the market economy suggests that there is support, albeit
small at times, for both democracy and a market economy. The publics in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe do not express a desire to return to the
past forms of political economy. The support for both the economic and political
transformations appeared to be generally concentrated within certain segments
of society. Yet opposition to the various aspects of the political and economic
transformation appears to have no concentrated base of public support.
Despite the general conclusions that can be made regarding public
support for the political and economic transformations, the research discussed
above has some general shortcomings that need to be addressed. In most
cases, with possible exception of Rose et al. (1998), only a few countries were
studied at a time. The countries selected at often based on convenience and
without real-world justifications. Since each country is addressing the needs of
the transformation process differently, using these studies to generalize about all
of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is questionable. Yet
understanding trends and generalizing patterns are important if models of
political economy transformation are to be developed.
One option is to categorize the countries based on some criteria and then
examine the public opinion on democracy within that context. Rose et al. (1998)
categorized the countries of Central and Eastern Europe based on Freedom
House rankings. Unfortunately, their analysis is limited to countries that are free
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or partially free, leaving the unfree countries undiscussed. There needs to be a
similar analysis of public opinion on the market economy which is framed within
some context in which all of the categories of the framework are included.
To address these two problems, this chapter includes sixteen countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. The countries are divided into two categories,
based on a real-world situation, the relation of that country to the European
Union. Public opinions in the countries are tested to see if this categorization
identifies two separate populations. Therefore, this chapter will address the
problems of too few countries included in the studies as well as the problem of a
lack of logical categorization of these countries.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In response to the discussion above, two research questions are
addressed in this chapter. This is done to examine the extent of public opinion on
democracy and the market economy and to see if public opinions differ in the
countries that are seeking accession into the European Union from public opinion
in the countries that are not seeking accession into the European Union. It is
expected that the political milieu of working to enter the European Union should
have an effect on mass public opinion that differs from the political milieu of the
countries not seeking membership in the European Union.
The first research question asks, what is the public’s opinion about
democracy and the market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe? The other research questions addressed in this chapter consider the
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differences in public opinion between the countries seeking European Union
membership and the countries not seeking European Union membership and
whether this changes over time. The questions are: 1) is there a difference in
public opinion about democracy or about the market economy in the countries
working to join the European Union compared to the countries not working to join
the European Union? 2) Do these differences increase over time? Four
hypotheses are derived from these research questions.
H1: Satisfaction with democracy will be greater in the countries seeking
membership in the European Union than in countries not seeking European
Union membership.
H2: Support for a market economy will be greater in the countries seeking
membership in the European Union than in countries not seeking European
Union membership.
H3: Overtime, there are increasing differences in public opinion about democracy
between the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the
countries not seeking membership in the European Union.
H4: Overtime, there are increasing differences in public opinion about the market
economy between the countries seeking membership in the European Union and
the countries not seeking membership in the European Union.
Data and Methods
The data for this chapter are from the Central and Eastern European
Barometers 3-7, published annually from 1992 through 1996 (Cunningham 1996;
Reif and Cunningham 1992, 1993, 1994; Reif et al. 1995; available through the
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research). The Central and
Eastern European Barometers are conducted as face-to-face interviews with
respondents in their homes. The respondents are selected via standard sampling
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procedures to derive a random probability sample of the entire population within
the national borders. The standard procedure starts with the selection of
sampling points and from within these sampling points, smaller electoral or
administrative districts are selected. In most cases, ten interviews are conducted
around each sampling point. The individual respondents are selected using one
of four methods to insure a representative sample.
The specific countries included in the Central and Eastern European
Barometer varied from year to year. For the purpose of this paper, analysis is
limited to those countries for which data are available for the five-year period,
1992 through 1996. The sixteen countries are Albania, Armenia, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The countries are
divided into two categories, those seeking European Union membership and
those not seeking European Union membership. Table 2 is a listing of the
countries divided based on the status of their seeking membership in the
European Union.
Selected Variables
Two variables are used in this chapter, one for public opinion on
democracy and one for public opinion on the market economy. These variables
are each based on a single question from the Central and Eastern European
Barometers 3-7. Although the questions may not be ideal, they are very useful in
that they are asked in each country and in each year of this study. The variable
69
on public opinion about democracy focuses on the degree of satisfaction with
democracy. The economic variable explores support for the transformation to a
market economy.
Satisfaction with democracy is measured with the question, “On the whole
are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the
way democracy is developing?” The responses categories are coded as
“satisfied”, “fairly satisfied”, “not very satisfied”, and “not at all satisfied”. The
frequency distributions of the respondents reporting to be satisfied with
democracy include the original response categories of  “satisfied” and “fairly
satisfied”.
Support for participation in a market economy is measured using the
question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that
is one that is largely free from state control is right or wrong for (our country)?”
The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”
Methods
The analysis for this paper starts with general frequency distributions on
satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy for each
country for each year of the study. Table 3 is a frequency distribution of the
combined percentages of respondents reporting to either be “satisfied” or “fairly
satisfied” with democracy. Table 4 covers the percentage of respondents in the
sixteen countries for each year who reported supporting movement toward the
market economy.
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The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for two independent samples is employed
to test the difference in opinions reported in the surveys between the
respondents in the ten countries seeking membership in the European Union and
respondents in the six countries that are not seeking membership. The procedure
tests two independent samples to see if they represent two different populations.
The test is based on the principle that if “there is a significant difference at any
point along the two cumulative frequency distributions, the researcher can
conclude there is a high likelihood the samples are derived from different
populations” (Sheskin 2000: 319). In order to run this test at the national level,
each of the above mentioned frequency tables were used to create the dataset
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
Results
In this section, public opinions in the countries are presented in two ways.
First, the individual countries are compared. To do this, the frequency
distributions for satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy
are discussed on each country for each of the five years in the study. The
countries are then grouped based on their status of seeking membership in the
European Union. For this, the countries are compared over the five years.
Satisfaction with Democracy Compared by Individual Countries
 To examine satisfaction with democracy generally, the response
percentages for the respondents reporting to be either satisfied or fairly satisfied
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were combined. The percentages are shown in Table 3. Appendix B contains the
complete frequency distributions of all of the response categories.
In 1992, in the Czech Republic the percentage of respondents either
satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy was 39.6%. In 1993, the percentage
rose to 49.7%. In 1994, 45.1% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy.
In 1995, satisfaction was at 48.1%. In 1996, 42.0% reported that they were
satisfied with democracy in the Czech Republic.
In Estonia in 1992, 29.9% of the respondents were either satisfied or fairly
satisfied with democracy. The percentage increased to 41.0% in 1993.
Approximately 36.0% percent of the respondents reported being satisfied with
democracy in 1994. This increased to 39.6% in 1995, and increased again in
1996, to 42.2% of the respondents.
For the Hungarian respondents, 24.1% reported being satisfied or fairly
satisfied with democracy in 1992. In 1993, 21.4% of the respondents were
satisfied. The percentage of respondents peaked at 27.6% satisfied with
democracy in 1994. The numbers dropped to a low of 20.6% in 1995. In 1996,
22.0% of the respondents reported being satisfied with democracy. 
In 1992 in Poland, 36.0% of the respondents were satisfied or fairly
satisfied with democracy. This percentage rose to 44.0% in 1993 only to drop in
1994 to 27.4%. In 1995, over half of the respondents (56.8%) reported they were
satisfied with democracy. In 1996, 48.5% of the respondents reported
satisfaction with democracy.
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In the first year of the study, 1992, almost half of the Slovenians (49.9%)
reported being satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped to 36.8% in
1993 and 35.0% in 1994. The percentage of Slovenians that reported to be
satisfied with democracy increased to 38.2% and 43.8% in 1995 and 1996
respectively.
In Bulgaria, in 1992, 39.9% of the respondents reported as being either
satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped to 23.1% in
1993 and 4.0% in 1994. In 1995, 14% of Bulgarians were satisfied with
democracy. The percentage dropped again in 1996, to 6.2%.
In Latvia, satisfaction with democracy was at a low of 17.5% in 1995. The
following year, 1993, 33.7% of the respondents reported being either satisfied or
fairly satisfied with democracy. In 1994, the percentage satisfied with democracy
dropped to 27.0%. In 1995 and 1996, 30.6% and 28.8% of the respondents
respectively reported to be satisfied with democracy.
In Lithuania from 1992 to 1996, there was a general decline in satisfaction
with democracy. In 1992, over half of the Lithuanians (51.7%) reported being
either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage dropped in
1993, 1994 and 1995 to 38.1%, 35.9% and 27.2% respectively. In 1996, one-
third of Lithuanians (33.3%) were satisfied with democracy.
Romanian satisfaction with democracy generally increased over the five-
year time span of this study. In 1992, 29.3% of the Romanians were satisfied or
fairly satisfied with democracy. This increased in 1993 to 34.4%. There was a
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decline in 1994 to 31.0%, followed by increased in satisfaction with democracy in
1995 and 1996 to 38.4% and 56.1% respectively.
 The percentage of Slovakian respondents who reported to be satisfied or
fairly satisfied with democracy in 1992 was 24.1%. In 1993, about one in five
respondent (20.7%) reported being satisfied with democracy. The percentage fell
to 17.3% in 1994. In 1995, 28.5% of Slovakians reported satisfaction with
democracy. In 1996, 23.0% reported satisfaction with democracy.
In Albania, satisfaction with democracy was greater overall than in any of
the country in this study. There was a gradual decrease in support for democracy
from 1992 to 1994, starting with 43.3% of the respondents, decreasing to 41.7%
in 1993 and 34.3% in 1994. The percentage satisfied or fairly satisfied with
democracy increased dramatically in 1995 to 61.7%. Again, the percentage
increased in 1996, to over three-quarters (76.5%) of the respondents.
In each year of the study, Armenian satisfaction with democracy never
rose above one-fifth of the respondents. In 1992, 14.3% of the respondents
reported being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage
dropped to 6.4% in 1993. In 1994, only one-in-ten (10.0%) reported being
satisfied with democracy. In 1995 and 1996, 19.6% and 19.7% respectively, of
respondents reported being satisfied with democracy.
 In Belarus in 1992, 12.2% of the respondents were either satisfied or
fairly satisfied with democracy. In 1993, the percentage rose to 16.2%. In 1994,
13.4% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1995 and 1996, the
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percentage of Belarusians satisfied with democracy was 15.4% and 20.3%
respectively.
In Macedonia in 1992 over fifty percent (51.1%) of the respondents were
either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The percentage of respondents
who were satisfied with democracy decreased in 1993 and 1994 to 46.8% and
35.8% respectively. Satisfaction the democracy among the Macedonians then
increased in 1995 and 1996 to 39.7% and 40.9% respectively.
Satisfaction with democracy in Russia generally declined from 1992 to
1996. In 1992, 13.0% of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1993,
17.0% were satisfied or fairly satisfied. In 1994, satisfaction with democracy
dropped to 8.0%. In 1995, satisfaction dropped to a low of 6.6%. In 1996, 8.6% of
the respondents reported being either satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy.
In Ukraine, 20.9% were satisfied or fairly satisfied with democracy. The
percentage of respondents satisfied with democracy dropped to 16.9% in 1993.
Eighteen percent were satisfied with democracy in 1994. In 1995, 17.1% of the
respondents were satisfied with democracy. In 1996, 20.8% of the respondents
were satisfied with democracy.
Support for the Market Economy Compared by Individual Countries
Table 4 shows the percentages of respondents who supported the
transformation to a market economy in their country. Compared to the
percentage of respondents reporting to be satisfied with democracy, much
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greater percentages of the respondents supported the movement toward a
market economy overall. 
The support for the movement toward a market economy showed a steady
decline from 1992 to 1996 in the Czech Republic. Starting in 1992, 62.8% of the
respondents reported that they supported the movement toward a market
economy. Support dropped to 59.1% in 1993, 57.3% in 1994 and 54.8% in 1995.
In 1996, support for the transition to a market economy reached a low of 52.5%. 
In Estonia, support for the market economy was at 62.4% in 1992. In the
second year of this study, support rose to 68.1% only to fall to 58.7% in 1994.
There was a rise in support in 1995 to 62.1% and a slight rise in 1996 to 62.9%
Support for the movement toward a market economy had a general
decline in Hungary. In 1992, Approximately three-quarters of the respondents
(75.6%) supported the transition to a market economy. Public support for the
transition to a market economy in Hungary dropped to 64.8% and 65.3% in 1993
and 1994, respectively. In 1995, support further dropped to 54.4%. In 1996,
support for a market economy was at 55.6%.
In the Central and Eastern European Barometer 3 (1992) support for a
market economy was at 69.6% in Poland. The following year, support rose to
72.0%. In 1994, 68.9% of the respondents supported participation in a market
economy. Support rose to a five-year high in 1995 with 81.2% of the respondents
having reported support for participation in a market economy. Support for the
market economy dropped to 75.4% in 1996.
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In Slovenia, support for participation in a market economy was at its
highest level in 1992 with 73.9% of the respondents. In 1993, support dropped
almost twenty percentage points to 52.9%. In 1994, 62.3% of the respondents
reported support for participation in a market economy. Approximately 55.0% of
the respondents reported support for participation in a market economy in both
1995 and 1996.
In Bulgaria in 1992, 73.4% of the respondents reported believing that the
movement toward a market economy was right for their country. Support fell to
65.6% and 48.2% respectively in 1993 and 1994. In 1995, support for the
movement to a market economy rose to 55.0%. In 1996, support rose again to
58.8% of Bulgarians.
In Latvia, the 1992 level of support for a market economy was 46.7%.
Support rose to 55.4% in 1993 only to fall the next year to 48.7%. In 1995, the
percentage of respondents reporting to support the movement toward a market
economy increased to 52.3%. This was followed by another increase in 1996 to
56.4% of respondents supporting a market economy in Latvia.
Support for the transition to a market economy in Lithuania showed a
general decline from 1992 to 1996. In 1992, support for a market economy was
at 78.2%. In 1993, support for a market economy declined to 73.2% of the
respondents. In 1994, there was a further fall in support to 59.5% of the
Lithuanian respondents. In 1995, 59.5% of the respondents supported the
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transition to a market economy. In 1996, support reached a low of 57.4% of
Lithuanians.
Romanian support for participation in a market economy in 1992 was
73.0%. Support fell to 68.6% in 1993. In 1994 and 1995, 77.5% and 77.3%,
respectively, of the respondents reported supporting participation in the market
economy. Support again rose in 1996 to a high of 85.2% of the respondents
supported the transition to a market economy.
Support for Slovakian participation in a market economy was at 57.3% of
the respondents to the Central and Eastern European Barometer 3 in 1992.
Support dropped to half (50.0%) of the respondents in 1993. From 1994 to 1996,
support for participation in a market economy remained at approximately half the
population, at 50.9%, 50.1% and 51.1% in 1994, 1995 and 1996 respectively.
In 1992, 78.3% of Albanians reported support for participation in a market
economy. In 1993, support was at 77.4%. Support was 72.0% in 1994. In 1995
and 1996 support for participation in the market economy was 83.3% and 83.5%
respectively.
The Armenians reported a 39.6% level of support for participation in a
market economy in 1992. In 1993, support reached a five-year low at 25.4%.
Approximately 26.0% of the respondents reported support for participation in a
market economy in 1994. Support rose to 44.2% in 1995, only to fall to 26.4% in
1996.
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  Support for participation in a market economy was 38.2% in Belarus in
1992. In 1993, support was at 38.0%, and in 1994 support for the market
economy was 34.9% of the respondents. In the following two Central and
Eastern European Barometers (1996 and 1997), support rose to 42.3% and
47.3% respectively.
In Macedonia, support for participation in a market economy rose
generally over the five-year period. In 1992, 36.9% of the respondents reported
support for participation in a market economy. Support increased to 38.6% of the
respondents in 1993. Support continued to increase to 40.7% and 52.5% in 1994
and 1995, respectively. In 1996, support for participation in a market economy
was at 52.4%
In Russia in 1992, support for participation in a market economy was just
below fifty percent at 49.4% of the Russian respondents. In 1993, the percentage
of respondents reporting support for participation in a market economy dropped
to 36.6%. Again, in 1994, support dropped further to 27.0%. Support reached a
low of 23.4% in 1995. In 1996, support rose to 29.6%
There was a general decline in support for participation in a market
economy in Ukraine from 1992 to 1996. In 1992, 47.1% of the respondents
reported support for Ukrainian participation in a market economy. In 1993 and
1994, 37.6% and 38.9% of the respondents reported support, respectively. In
1995, support for participation reached a low of 30.2%. Approximately 32.0% of
the respondents in 1996, reported support for participation in a market economy.
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Comparison of Public Opinion in Countries Pooled Based on European Union
Membership Status
A clear pattern does not emerge in public opinion on either satisfaction
with democracy or support for a market economy based solely on examining the
public opinion frequency distributions. A statistical test is needed to examine
whether there is, in fact, a difference between the two groups of countries. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic tests for the presence of two populations that may
or may not be apparent when examining the frequency distributions. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is employed as a non-parametric test with ordinal data
to evaluate whether two independent samples represent two different
populations. In the case of this study, the two independent samples consist of the
samples from those countries in Central and Eastern Europe seeking
membership in the European Union and those countries of Central and Eastern
Europe not seeking European Union membership. It is expected that there is a
difference in the development of public opinion on democracy and the market
economy in the Central and Eastern European countries that is related to their
status of seeking membership in the European Union. The purpose of this test is
to confirm or refute the existence of two distinct populations. The results of the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are found in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 shows the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, using the
cumulative frequency distribution of the respondents who indicated that they are
either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied” with democracy. In the first year, 1992, the
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absolute value of the most extreme differences is 0.567 with the greatest vertical
difference between the two populations having a positive value of 0.133 and a
negative value of -0.567. The value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.097, which
is not significant statistically at p < 0.05. Therefore, the frequency distribution of
the public opinion of satisfaction with democracy in the countries seeking
membership into the European Union is consistent with the frequency distribution
of public opinion on satisfaction with democracy for the countries not seeking
European Union membership. Therefore, statistically in 1992, these two sets of
countries represent a single population rather than two separate populations.
The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the frequency of
satisfaction with democracy in 1993 have an extreme difference in the cumulative
probability distributions of -0.667 and +0.133. The absolute value is 0.667. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.129. Although this approaches statistical
significance, it does not reach the set requirement of p < 0.05. Therefore, the
differences in the probability distributions of the two groups of countries are no
larger than would be expected by chance if the two groups of countries were
derived from the same population.
In 1994, the absolute value of the extreme differences was 0.467 with a
cumulative probability distribution range of +0.100 to -0.467. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z is 0.904 with a p < 0.388. This was not significant statistically and
therefore, the null hypothesis, that there is not a difference between the two
groups of countries, must fail to be rejected. It can be concluded that the
81
distribution of satisfaction with democracy in the countries seeking entry into the
European Union and in the countries not seeking entry into the European Union
differ no more than would be expected by chance.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z in 1995 was 1.097. The absolute value of the
extreme differences is 0.567 with the positive extreme difference of +0.167 and
the negative extreme difference of -0.567. This is not significant statistically.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the distribution of public opinion on
satisfaction with democracy in the countries seeking European Union
membership is consistent with the distribution satisfaction with democracy in the
countries not seeking membership in the European Union.
In 1996, the positive extreme difference in the distributions is 0.167 and
the negative extreme value is -0.567 with an absolute value of 0.567. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.097, which does not reach the threshold for statistical
significance. Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It must be
concluded that at no point is the greatest vertical distance between the
cumulative probability distributions of the two groups of countries any larger than
would be expected due to chance alone if the two groups are derived from the
same population.
Table 6 shows the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic for the frequency
distributions of support the market economy for each of the five years in this
study. In 1992, the extreme differences are +0.167 and -0.733 with an absolute
value of 0.733. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.420, which is significant
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statistically at p < 0.05. Therefore, at the point of maximum deviation separating
the two cumulative probability distributions, the cumulative probability distribution
for the countries seeking entry into the European Union is significantly greater
than the cumulative probability distribution of the countries not seeking
membership in the European Union.
In 1993, the absolute value of the extreme difference is 0.833 with a
positive difference of 0.167 and a negative difference of -0.833. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z is 1.614, which is significant statistically at p < 0.05. Therefore, the null
hypothesis can be rejected and the research hypothesis tentatively accepted.
This means that the distribution of support for the market economy in the
countries seeking entry is not consistent, and is significantly greater, than the
distribution of support for the market economy in the countries not seeking
European Union membership.
 In 1994, the absolute value of the most extreme difference is 0.833 with a
positive difference of 0.167 and a negative difference of -0.833. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Z is 1.614, which is significant statistically at p < 0.05. Therefore, the null
hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis tentatively accepted.
Therefore, public support for the market economy in the countries seeking entry
into the European Union is not consistent with the distribution of support for the
market economy in the countries not seeking European Union membership.
In 1995, the absolute value of the most extreme difference is 0.667 with a
positive difference of 0.167 and a negative difference of -0.667. The Kolmogorov-
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Smirnov Z is 1.291, which is significant statistically at p < 0.05. At this level of
significance, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis
tentatively accepted. Therefore at the point of maximum deviation separating the
two cumulative probability distributions, the cumulative probability of support for
the market economy in the countries seeking entry into the European Union is
significantly greater than the cumulative probability distribution of the countries
not seeking entry into the European Union.
In 1996, the most extreme differences are +0.167 and -0.733 with an
absolute value of 0.733. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z is 1.420, which is significant
statistically at p < 0.05. Therefore, at the point of maximum deviation separating
the two cumulative probability distributions, support for the market economy in
the countries seeking entry into the European Union is significantly greater than
support for the market economy in the countries not seeking membership in the
European Union.
Conclusion
In this chapter, the extent of satisfaction with democracy and support for
the market economy were explored for the sixteen countries individually as well
as based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union. Four
hypotheses were tested in this chapter and will be discussed in this section.
The first and second hypotheses considered in this chapter focused on the
satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy being greater in
the countries seeking entry into the European Union. In the case of satisfaction
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with democracy, there is no significant statistical difference between public
opinion in the countries seeking membership in the European Union and the
public opinion in countries not seeking European Union membership. However,
the results of the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test suggest that when the countries are
divided based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union,
there does appear to be significant difference between the two sets of countries
with regard to public support for the market economy.
Support for a market economy is greater in countries seeking entry into
the European Union. For the countries not seeking entry into the European
Union, there is less support for participation in a market economy generally. Only
one country, Albania, had support above seventy percent for the five years of this
study. The only other country to come close to that level of support for
participation in a market economy was Macedonia. In that case, Macedonian
support for participation in a market economy reached just above fifty percent in
2 years (1995 and 1996) of the study. Over that five-year period, support for a
market economy was significant statistically but a definite pattern did not emerge.
The third and fourth hypotheses considered the differences in public
opinion between the two sets of countries over time. The expectation was that
these populations would become more distinct through the transformation
process. In both public opinion on democracy and public opinion on the market
economy, these hypotheses are not supported. In both cases, no clear pattern
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emerged over time and certainly so pattern of increasing differences between the
two groups of countries.
There are three possible explanations for the findings of no change over
time in the public opinion between the two groups of countries. First, there may
not be a pattern over time because there is no difference in public opinion on
democracy and the market economy between these two groups of countries. The
second reason that a pattern did not emerge could be due to the short duration of
the study, which was not long enough to allow a pattern to emerge. Finally, the
years included in the study may be so close to the beginning of the political and
economic transformations, that the countries were still very similar. If this is the
case, then as time passes, patterns of differences may emerge. Regardless of
the reason, further examination of public opinion on democracy and the market
should be pursued because with such a small time-period, no final conclusions
can be made.
The findings of this study suggest that satisfaction with democracy do not
differ based on the status of that country with regard to the European Union. This
is unexpected considering that the countries seeking integration into the
European Union are considered to be the more democratized of the two groups
of countries. Indeed to enter into formal negotiations for accession into the
European Union significant substantive steps toward democracy have had to
have established in these countries. Yet their citizens are no more or less
satisfied with democracy than are the citizens of the countries which are
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considered by the international community to have made much less progress in
democratization.
There was a difference found in public support of the transition to a market
economy between the countries seeking and not seeking European Union
membership. At the national level, the countries seeking integration into the
European Union have had greater success in their transformation to a market
economy than the countries not seeking European Union membership. This
suggests that the citizens of the countries working toward membership in the
European Union support the market reforms necessary for the economic
transformation to meet the European Union requirements for full membership.
Further, the support for the market economy was greater in the countries seeking
membership in the European Union than was support for the market economy in
the countries not seeking European Union membership.
In conclusion, the differences in public opinion between the countries
seeking membership in the European Union and the countries not seeking
membership in the European Union lies in the attitudes related to the economic
conditions and not in the attitudes related to the political conditions. Studying the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe using the division based on real
international relations appears to be a useful tool in developing an understanding
of the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally,
more emphasis should be placed on understanding public opinion about the
economic conditions, as these appear to be more responsive and possibly more
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important to the integration of the specific country into the international
community than are public opinions about politics. The next two chapters will
continue to explore public opinion about democracy and the market economy in
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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CHAPTER 6
Public Opinion on Political, Economic and Foreign Relations Conditions as
Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe
The political and economic transformations in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe in the wake of the events of the late 1980s and early 1990s have
resulted in profound changes in the lives of the citizens in these countries. A
great deal of work has been done to examine macro-level political conditions of
the transformations. Observations of micro-level political factors are a necessary
complement to the study of the macro-level transformation processes (Rose and
Haerpfer 1994: 6). One specific area in need of examination is the public’s
opinions regarding the political transformation in their country. This chapter
explores attitudinal factors that contribute to public opinions about democracy for
the citizens of sixteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
In the previous chapter, using the Central and Eastern European
Barometers 3 - 7 (Cunningham 1996, Reif and Cunningham 1992, 1993, 1994,
Reif et al. 1995), the percentage of people who are satisfied with democracy
varied from country to country and from year to year. For the most part, over the
five-year time period, there is a great degree of consistency from year to year
within each country. There are much greater differences found between
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countries. In the previous chapter, no clear patterns of variation in the satisfaction
with democracy emerged between the groups of countries. For example, in 1996
in Bulgaria 6.2% of the population was satisfied with democracy. In that same
year, in Bulgaria’s neighbor to the north, Romania, 56.1% of the population
reported satisfaction with democracy. One of the most striking disparities in
public satisfaction with democracy was found between the two countries that
once composed Czechoslovakia. In 1996, satisfaction with democracy in the
Czech Republic is 42.0% while in Slovakia, satisfaction is at 23.0%.
In this chapter, public opinion about democracy is considered in light of
two factors. First, attitudes about democracy are rather consistent from year to
year in most countries. This could suggest that these attitudes may be clustered
around other attitudes relevant to the transformation processes. Because of the
believed inherent link between political and economic conditions, both political
and economic opinions should be considered as potentially relevant to public
opinion about democracy. Additionally, one of the most significant aspects of the
change in Central and Eastern European countries has been in the international
arena. A significant and marked realignment has occurred in many of these
countries. The result is a reorientation of foreign policy to the West in general and
toward Western Europe and the European Union in particular.
The second factor to consider is the framework used to search for patterns
in public opinion. Despite the lack of significance found in satisfaction with
democracy between the countries seeking European Union membership and
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those countries not seeking European Union membership, conceptualizing the
countries in this manner may still be fruitful but may need further refinement. It
has to be understood that not all attempts at membership into the European
Union are equal. Some countries have a better chance at meeting the
requirements for European Union membership than do other countries. To draw
out the differences may require further division of the countries based not only on
whether they are seeking membership but the expected success of their seeking
membership. To that end, for this chapter and the next, the countries have been
divided into three groups, based on the status of their seeking membership in the
European Union. Table 7 lists the specific countries grouped according to their
status on seeking membership in the European Union.
The first group of countries consists of five of the ten countries that are
seeking membership into the European Union. These countries have been
involved in formal accession negotiations since 1998 and are expected to be
integrated into the European Union in the first enlargement. The second category
consists of the five countries seeking membership in the European Union that
started formal accession negotiations in 2000. These countries can expect to be
integrated into the European Union in the second wave of enlargement. The final
category is composed of those countries that are not seeking membership into
the European Union. Each country in this group, as countries within Europe,
have the right to petition for admission into the European Union, but to date,
none have sought European Union membership.
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Literature Review
Today, Europe is divided primarily between the countries with stable
democracies and countries that are working, more or less, toward becoming
democracies. The former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe have
all made some strides toward democracy, but the paths are not unidirectional. As
in any wave of democratization, reverse waves can be expected (Huntington
1991). One problem that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe face is
that, although, the totalitarian practices and institutions such as censorship and
shoot-to-kill border guards can be done away with rather quickly, democracy can
take years to become widely accepted by the masses (Rose 1997: 96). This lack
of acceptance could challenge the development of a stable democracy because
popular support is a necessary condition for the long-term development of
democracy (Miller et al. 1993).
It cannot be expected that once a country takes steps toward democracy
that it will necessarily become an established democracy. As Linz and Stepan
(1996) stress, the totalitarian legacy of the post-communist countries of the
1990s is far more unfavorable to democratization than was the authoritarian
legacy of Southern Europe and Latin America of the 1970s and 1980s. Linz and
Stephan (1996) offer the example of Franco, who prior to his death provided for
the development of foundational democratic institutions that would provide a path
toward democracy. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe had no such
structural foundations in place that would or could aid the democratization
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process despite the apparent political and economic deterioration that had long
been in the making. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe have been forced to choose their own paths of
political transformation. Subsequently, these countries’ responses to the
transformation toward democracy have displayed no single, common pattern
(Rose 1997: 94).
For all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the initial steps of
the transformation process have been a movement away from a socialist polity
toward democracy in its various forms. Some countries such as the Czech
Republic and Hungary have made significant and continued progress toward
democracy. Other countries such as Belarus appear to have made tacit
rejections of democratic principles and have shifted toward a more totalitarian
form of government.
 Bennett (1993: 101) argues that “it is generally agreed that public opinion
and popular sovereignty are the foundations of liberal democracy.” Since public
opinion may be the foundation to democracy, it should not be taken for granted
and ignored, especially in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which
have experienced both political and economic change. While the transformation
to democracy may have been relatively uneventful, the economic transformations
have resulted in severe economic costs. The effects of the economic reforms
have required that the general populations bear a heavy burden from the
economic reforms. In turn, an erosion of the popular base of support for
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democratization would be related to poor economic performance by the regime
(Schumpeter 1942, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). It is feared that public
support for institutional reforms may withstand economic chaos for only a certain
period of time, after which the citizens may begin to blame democracy and
capitalism for their plight (Przeworski 1991). The result could be an economic
catastrophe threatening support for democratic institutions (Duch 1993). It is
clear that a number of scholars (Bennett 1993, Schumpeter 1942, Diamond, Linz
and Lipset 1990, Przeworski 1991, Duch 1993) are concerned about the public’s
linking of the conditions of democracy and the market economy. The fear is that
the performance of one effects support for the other. Understanding public
opinion about democracy is important to understanding the relationships between
structural change (economic or political) and public reaction to that change.
Before considering the relationship between politics and economics in
public opinion, the first step has been to develop a basic understanding of the
state of public opinion about democracy. Looking specifically at Russia, Grey et
al. (1995) reported that 52.4% of the Russian respondents in their study found
democracy to be broadly satisfactory. In the same survey 46.7% of the
respondents felt that Russia was not yet ready for democracy. Wyman (1994)
reported the findings of a number of surveys conducted in Russia from 1991
through 1994. He found that a substantial percentage of respondents in each
survey chose non-democratic options over democratic options. Since the citizens
of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have lived under non-democratic
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regimes, their selection of non-democratic regimes over democratic alternatives
is provocative.
The support for either democracy or its political alternatives is examined
using the Churchill Hypothesis (Hofferbert and Klingmann 1999, Mishler and
Rose 1996, Rose 1995, Rose and Mishler 1996, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer
1998). The thesis of this hypothesis is based on a quote by Winston Churchill,
basically stating that democracy is the worst form of government except for all of
the rest. The Churchill Hypothesis examines support for democracy relative to
support for alternative forms of governing. Central and Eastern Europe offer an
opportunity to test this hypothesis because the adult populations have lived
under two, and in some cases three, regime types. The people are not asked
about their support of democracy, rather they are asked to choose among
alternative regimes, both democratic and non-democratic.
In one of the studies which tested the Churchill Hypothesis, Rose (1997)
found that, on average, 67% of the citizens of seven countries in Central and
Eastern Europe rejected authoritarian alternatives to democracy. In Russia, only
45% rejected the authoritarian alternatives. In general the results of testing the
Churchill Hypothesis suggest that while support for democracy may not be high,
it is higher than support for any alternative form of governing (Hofferbert and
Klingmann 1999, Mishler and Rose 1996, Rose 1995, Rose and Mishler 1996,
Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998).
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Beyond the search for public support of various types of political regimes,
another political condition that has been examined in relation to public opinion on
democracy is that of human rights conditions. For example, Rose, Mishler and
Haerpfer (1998) examined attitudes toward human rights conditions in Central
and Eastern Europe during the 1990s. They found that satisfaction with human
rights conditions is related to support for democratic regimes and institutions.
The public’s opinion about any subject has both supporters and
detractors. Duch (1993, 1995) looked for identifiable pockets of citizenry that
either supported or opposed democracy. Bases of support for democracy are
found in the more highly educated members of society (Duch 1993).  Opposition
to democracy appears to be more diffuse. Duch (1995) found no identifiable
pockets of “unsophisticated citizenry” that could be expected to undermine
democratization by responding “to economic catastrophe by embracing
antimarket or antidemocratic solutions” (Duch 1995: 122).
There is a good deal of work done in the area of public opinion research
that finds a general lack of support for democracy. The problem is that these
studies examine support for democracy in principle while not examining
satisfaction with the political reforms in relation to support for other changes in
the country. Further, the above studies simply provided either bivariate or
univariate descriptions of public opinion regarding democracy. They fail to
consider the interaction of political and economic factors and how these might
shape public opinion about democracy, whether there is a great deal or a little
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support. It is widely assumed that there is a relationship between economic and
political conditions (Lipset 1959, Bollen 1979, 1983, Dahl 1989 and Hayek 1944),
including economic and political public opinion (Przeworski 1991, Miller Reisinger
and Helsi 1998, Duch 1993).
The influence of economics on public opinion about democracy should be
examined further. It is expected that the economic conditions in these countries
will influence political and social attitudes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994). Some
studies have considered the importance of the relationship between political and
economic conditions.
Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes and the
level of support for democratization and marketization among the masses and
elites in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania during the 1992 and 1995 elections. They
found that the relationship between public support for the candidates for
democratic reform and democratic principles to be very weak while the
relationship between support for democratic reformers and support for the market
to be fairly strong. This suggests that the electorate supporting the market
economy voiced their support for the economic reforms by electing democratic
reform candidates into office.
Kunioka and Woller (1999) explored the effects of social capital and
economic performance on preferences for parliamentary or authoritarian
governments in Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and the Ukraine. They found that the indicators of social capital (e.g., institutional
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trust, viewing minorities and/or immigrants as threats, order versus freedom,
patience versus quick results and town size) are statistically more important than
are future or current economic perceptions on a preference for parliament over a
strong leader.
Based on the research on the public’s opinion about democracy, it is clear
that public support and satisfaction with democracy is related to both political and
economic factors. The problem with many of the studies is that they are limited
by technique and scope. The major technical limitation is that most of the studies
used descriptive and bivariate analysis of public opinion about democracy. While
these are important in understanding public support and satisfaction with the
democratic transformation, more sophisticated analysis are needed to
understand the relationship between political, economic and other conditions,
attitudes and opinions about democracy.
A second limitation is the numbers of countries included in the studies. By
examining a few countries only, it is difficult to find meaningful patterns in public
opinion. Therefore, each and every country becomes a unique case. Each
country does have its own history, but the geography of being part of Europe, the
experience of Soviet domination and the challenges of the political and economic
transformations of the past decade or so, have created the potential for as many
similarities are there are differences. Further, a byproduct of the economic and
political transformations to the market economy and democracy should include
the homogenization of these countries, at least on the international stage.
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Patterns and comparisons of the transformation processes can be done only
when as many countries as possible are included in the analysis.
Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998) and Rose (2001) used eight countries
in Central and Eastern Europe to look for patterns in public opinion about
democracy. To conceptualize the similarities and pattern in public opinion, the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are divided into categories of free,
partially free and unfree, based on the Freedom House scale of civil and political
rights (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, Rose 2001). The findings suggest that
the countries categorized as free (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia) have the greatest percentage of the population that are generally
positive about the democratic regimes. Rose (2001) reported that 63% of the
respondents in the countries that Freedom House categorized as “free” opposed
undemocratic alternatives to democracy. While 43% the respondents in the
countries considered “partly free” or “not free” opposed the undemocratic
alternatives to democracy.
Although Rose el al. (1998) and Rose (2001) did use a categorization in
their attempts to discern patterns in public opinion in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, their selection had a number of limitations. First, the limited
number of countries for which data are available is problematic. Specifically, the
studies (Rose 2001, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998) contain data on nine
countries, only one of which is classified as ‘not free’. Additionally, a second
criticism is that they chose to categorize the countries based on an externally
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defined criterion, the Freedom House rating. By using an externally defined
criterion, the perceptions of the people and the regime within the country are
discounted.
In general, future research on public opinion about democracy needs to
build upon the research that has been done to date. Specifically, research
should, when appropriate, be multivariate. This would allow for the inclusion of
political, economic, as well as other factors in the examination of public opinion
about democracy. Additionally, the research should be as inclusive as possible
with regard to the number of the countries included. This will allow for the
examination of patterns in public opinion and it will allow for a better
understanding of the conditions in the Central and Eastern European countries.
Finally, the groupings of countries must be conceptually framed so that
conditions can be examined in the context of real world conditions. This chapter
seeks to meet the shortcoming of past research to provide a multivariate analysis
of public opinion in sixteen countries in Central and Eastern Europe within the
framework of the status of these countries seeking membership in the European
Union.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
In this chapter the research question posed is: How are opinions on
political, economic and foreign relations conditions related to public opinion on
democracy? And, does the status of seeking membership in the European Union
account for differences in public opinion between the countries of Central and
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Eastern Europe? The opinion of the political conditions is that of perceived
respect for human rights by the state. Support for the market economy and
retrospective and prospective microeconomic opinions are the opinions about the
economic conditions included in this chapter. Finally, the opinion about their
country’s future foreign relations to the European Union is included. These
factors are examined in sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe with
respect to each countries status of seeking membership in the European Union.
The attitudinal factors and respective hypotheses are discussed in turn.
First, individual’s perceptions of human rights conditions are included as a
factor contributing to one’s satisfaction with democracy. While, this has not been
directly considered in other public opinion research on Central and Eastern
Europe, human rights have been found to be important conceptually in the
democratization process in these countries. One example is the use of the
Freedom House Ratings to categorize the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe (Rose et al. 1998, Hoferbert and Klingmann 1999).
In the cases of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the
transformations are as much economic as political. Often it is the economic
reforms that have been seen as producing the greatest social costs and finding
the greatest amount of resistance and debate. Since, economic conditions
influence political and social attitudes (Rose and Haerpfer 1994), three
hypotheses have been included that consider various aspects of public opinion
and concern about the economy. First, general support for the transformation to
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the market economy is considered. This is included because it is a general
measure of the attitudes toward the fundamental shift in economic orientation in
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The other two attitudes concerning
economics are the perceptions of past and future household economic
conditions.  Household economic conditions are selected because the majority of
the people in these countries live in households with more than one income
earner. Short-term (12 months) past and future perceptions are included to see if
satisfaction with democracy is related to the more immediate economic concerns
rather than some larger understanding of the transformations as would be
expected to be found in public opinion on the market economy generally.
Part and parcel with the internal economic and political transformations
within the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there are profound
transformations and realignments in external (international) relations. Since the
beginning of fundamental political and economic changes in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have considered
integration into the European Union to be one of the main tools of achieving
transformation (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 805). The European Union requires
that all countries granted membership have a functioning democratic government
and a sufficiently strong market economy.
The movement toward integration with the European Union is the hallmark
of one of the most profound realignments in foreign relations in the 20th century.
While the governments of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe have
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stated their intentions to seek or not seek membership in the European Union,
general public support for this realignment of international relations has not been
examined. Because functioning democratic governments and market economies
require support and confidence of the people, public support for this symbol of
the transformation processes needs to be considered. Therefore, a hypothesis is
included in this paper to examine the contribution that the public’s perceptions of
the future foreign relations of their country to the European Union has on
satisfaction with democracy.
The final hypothesis in this chapter considers the conceptual framework
used to look for patterns in public opinion about democracy. The framework is
that of the status of countries seeking membership in the European Union. By
1996, ten countries of Central and Eastern Europe expressed an interest and
had met enough of the political and economic reforms necessary to be
considered as potential candidates for membership into the European Union.
During the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, five potential candidates for
membership are selected and intensive negotiations with the European Union
regarding accession are started. These five ‘frontrunners’ represent the countries
that have most successfully traversed the course to democracy and the market
economy by international standards. The second group of countries has sought
membership in the European Union but did not start formal negotiations until
2000. These countries are most likely to be included in the second wave of
European Union enlargement. The remaining countries included in this
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dissertation have not sought membership in the European Union. The final
hypothesis in this chapter considers the effects that being a “frontrunner,” and
therefore most likely to be included in the first wave of European Union
enlargement, has on the public’s opinion about democracy.
The six hypotheses tested in this chapter are:
H1: Individuals who believe there is respect for human rights in their country are
more likely to be satisfied with democracy than are individuals who believe there
is a lack of respect for human rights in their country.
H2: Individuals who support the transformation to a market economy in their
country are more likely to be satisfied with democracy in their country than are
individuals who oppose the transformation to a market economy in their country.
H3: Individuals who believe their household economic conditions will improve
over the next 12 months are more likely to report satisfaction with democracy
than are individuals who believe their economic conditions will not improve.
H4: Individuals who perceive their household economic conditions to have
improved over the past 12 months are more likely to report satisfaction with
democracy than are individuals who perceive their household economic
conditions to have not improved over the past 12 months.
H5: Individuals who believe their country’s future is closely linked to the
European Union are more likely to report satisfaction with democracy than are
individuals who do not believe their country’s future is linked to the European
Union.
H6: Satisfaction with democracy will be better explained in the countries which
are most likely to be granted admission into the European Union in the next
enlargement than in the countries not likely to be granted admission into the
European Union in the next enlargement or the countries not seeking entry into
the European Union.
The first five hypotheses are tested in each of the sixteen countries
individually and in the countries pooled based on the status of their seeking
membership in the European Union. The final hypothesis is tested on the pooled
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countries. Together, these six hypotheses should shed light on the dynamics of
public satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The data and
methods used to test the hypotheses are discussed in the next section.
Data and Methods
The data for this chapter are from the 1996 Central and Eastern European
Barometer 7 (Cunningham 1996, made available through the Inter-University
Consortium of Political and Social Research and collected on behalf of the
Commission of the European Communities). Data collection for the Central and
Eastern European Barometer 7 was conducted from November 1st to the 29th
1996, in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and
Ukraine. The survey is a fully representative national sample of the population
over the age of 15 years. A multi-stage random probability sample is used in
each country. There are slight variations in the sample design to account for the
individual characteristics and population structures of the specific country. The
total number of respondents from the sixteen selected countries is 16,876.
Selected Variables
Six variables are used in this study. Each variable is based on a question
asked in the 1996 Central and Eastern European Barometer in each of the
sixteen countries. The questions are written in English, translated into the
appropriate languages and then translated back into English. This is done to
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ensure the consistency of the meaning of the questions. The interviews are held
in the language of the respondent.
A single predicted variable and five predictor variables are included in the
model examining the attitudinal factors related to satisfaction with democracy.
The predicted variable in this study is satisfaction with democracy. To measure
this, the respondents are asked the following question: “On the whole are you
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way
democracy is developing?”  For the purposes of analysis1, the original responses
are categorized into “satisfied” and “not satisfied”. The satisfied category included
all responses of either “satisfied” or “fairly satisfied”. The responses of “not very
satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” are placed into the “not satisfied” category.
The five predictor variables are perceptions of human rights conditions,
prospective microeconomic expectations, retrospective microeconomic
experiences and opinions about foreign relations. The variable measuring
perceived human rights conditions is based on the question, “To what degree do
you believe that there is respect for individual human rights in (our country)?”
The response categories are “a lot of respect for individual human rights,” “some
respect,” “not much respect” and “no respect at all.”  This variable is collapsed
into two categories.  The first category, labeled “respect for human rights”, is
                                               
1 Multinominal logit regression and ordinal regression were attempted since the variables
were collected at the ordinal level of measurement originally. In running the diagnostics
for the analysis, a number of cells were very small. This presented a problem for the
multinominal and ordinal regression analysis because it resulted in inflated and logically
unacceptable regression coefficients. To correct this problem fully, the predicted and
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composed of the original responses of “a lot of respect” and “some respect.”  The
second category, “no respect for human rights”, is composed of the original
response categories of “not much respect” and “no respect at all.”
Respondents are asked to report their opinion about the transformation to
a market economy in their country. This variable, market economy support, is
based on the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market
economy, that is one that is largely free from state control is right or wrong for
(our country)?”  The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”
Prospective microeconomic expectations are measured with the question,
“Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of your
household will . . . get a lot better, get a little better, stay the same, get a little
worse or get a lot worse?” The responses to this question are collapsed into two
categories of improved and not improved. The responses of “getting a lot better”
or “getting a little better” are considered to indicate improved expectations. The
remaining response categories indicate an expectation of improvement in the
household economic conditions over the next 12 months.
The respondents are asked their opinions about their household economic
conditions over the past 12 months. The question is asked, “Compared to 12
months ago, do you think the financial situation of your household has . . . ?” The
response categories are “got a lot better,” “got a little better,” “stayed the same,”
“got a little worse” and “got a lot worse.” The response categories for this variable
                                                                                                                                           
predictor variables were collapsed into dichotomous variables. With all of the variables
107
are collapsed into dichotomous categories indicating either improvement or no
improvement in household economic conditions over the past 12 months.
Improved conditions are those where the respondents reported that their
household economic conditions got better, either a lot or a little. The responses
that indicated the household economic conditions had stayed the same or
worsened are collapsed into the category of no improvement.
The final predictor variable is constructed from opinions on the future
relations of the respondent’s country to the European Union. These opinions are
measured with the question, “As things now stand, with which of the following do
you see (our country’s) future most closely tied up?”  The original response
categories are “The United States of America,” The European Union,” “Other
European countries like Norway and Switzerland, which remain outside of the
European Union,” “Other Central and Eastern European countries,” “Russia or
other countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” “Turkey” and
“Japan / South Korea.”  The responses are collapsed into dichotomous
categories of “European Union” and “other.”
Methods
Correlation analysis is conducted on the predictor variables as part of the
diagnostics preparing for the use of a multivariate technique. The research
question guiding this chapter calls for a multivariate analysis to include factors
that may contribute to satisfaction with democracy. The most appropriate
                                                                                                                                           
reduced to this form, logistic regression was selected as an appropriate procedure.
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analysis would have been ordinal regression due to the ordinal level of
measurement of the data. This was attempted but some of the ordinal categories
had too few responses to run that form of regression analysis properly.
Therefore, the categories of answers of the original variables are collapsed as
indicated above. Two separate sets of logistic regression runs are completed
using the variables discussed. The first set of logistic regression analyses is run
on each of the sixteen countries individually in order to test the hypotheses for
each country. The second set of logistic regression analyses are conducted for
the combined responses of the citizens in the countries in each category. These
three logistic regressions are run to test the final hypothesis discussed above.
Results
Table 8 shows the correlation matrix of the five predictor variables in the
model. The highest degree of correlation (as is expected) is found between past
and future household economic conditions with a Pearson’s r of 0.373. For the
other predictor variables, the correlations are positive and below 0.247.  All of the
correlations are significant statistically but, due to the size of the sample, this is of
little importance due to the moderate to low values of the correlations.
The Frontrunner Countries for Membership in the European Union
Table 9 shows the results of the logistic regressions of the five countries
which expect to be admitted into the European Union in the first wave of
enlargements. The table shows that the perceived human rights conditions are
significant statistically for all of the countries in this group. In each of these
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countries, the odds of reporting satisfaction with democracy are between 2.5 and
4.5 times greater for individuals who perceive good human rights conditions
compared to individual that perceive poor human rights conditions. All else being
equal, in three of the five countries (Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia), perceptions
of human rights conditions are the single best predictor of satisfaction with
democracy.
Two economic variables performed well in the model for each of the five
countries expected to be in the first wave of enlargement. The variables
indicating support for the market economy and future household economic
expectations are significant statistically. For example, in Poland, the odds
reporting satisfaction with democracy are 3.795 times greater for individuals who
support the transition to a market economy compared to the individuals who did
not support the transition to a market economy. While in that same country,
Poland, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.266 times greater for
individuals who expected their household economic conditions to improve over
the next 12 months compared to individuals who expected their household
economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over that same time period.
Past household economic experiences are significant statistically in all but
one country, Hungary. For the remaining four countries, the odds of being
satisfied with democracy are between 1.8 times greater (Slovenia) and 2.7 times
greater (Poland) for individuals who believed their household economic
conditions had improved over the past 12 months compared to individuals who
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believed their household economic conditions had remained the same or
worsened.
Finally, the perceived future of the individual’s country with the European
Union is significant statistically in the Czech Republic only. In that country, the
odds that the citizens are satisfied with democracy are 1.8 times greater for
citizens that believed the future of the Czech Republic is with the European
Union compared to the individuals who did not believe the future of the Czech
Republic is with the European. Although not significant statistically, in Hungary
and Poland, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are inversely related to a
belief that the future of their respective countries lies with the European Union.
On the whole, the model explaining satisfaction with democracy performed
well in all of the frontrunner countries. The percent of cells predicted correctly
ranged from 67.6% in Slovenia to 78.1% in Hungary suggesting a relatively high
goodness-of-fit of the model in each of the countries. The percentage of
variability in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables in the
model is low in Hungary with a Nagelkerke R2 of 14.1%. The percentage of
variability in the predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is better in
the model for public opinion in the Czech Republic. In the Czech Republic case,
the Nagelkerke R2 is 0.357, meaning that 35.7% of the variability in the predicted
variable is explained by the predictor variables.
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The Second Wave Countries Seeking European Union Membership
The five countries seeking European Union that expect to be included in
the second wave of enlargement are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and
Slovenia. As is done with the frontrunner countries for European Union
integration, a separate logistic regression is run on each of these countries.
Table 10 shows the results of these logistic regressions.
The models of public opinion are significant statistically for each of the five
countries.  The percentage of cells predicted correctly ranged from 94.1% in
Bulgaria to 67.8% in Romania. Overall the model did not perform as well in the
second wave countries as it had in the frontrunner countries. The variability in the
predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is as low as 10.0%,
suggesting that very little is explained. The percentage of variability is as high as
30.3% explained, which is much stronger. As is the case for public opinion in the
frontrunner countries, the model performed differently in each of the countries but
there are overall similarities and patterns that emerged.
The single most important predictor variable to explain satisfaction with
democracy is support for the market economy. This economic public opinion
variable is significant statistically in all five countries. Support for the market
economy increased the odds of satisfaction with democracy by 2.956 for the
Latvians that supported the market economy compared to Latvians that did not
support the market economy.
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Perceived human rights conditions are significant statistically in four of the
five second wave countries. The only country that this variable is not significant
statistically is Bulgaria. For the remaining four countries, perceptions of human
rights are the single most important factor in explaining satisfaction with
democracy. For example, in Lithuania the odds of being satisfied with democracy
are 10.104 times greater for Lithuanians who perceived positive human rights
conditions compared to individuals who perceived negative human rights
conditions.
Past household economic perceptions are significant statistically in four of
the five countries. Again, Hungary is the exception. For the other four countries,
public opinion on satisfaction with democracy is between 2.4 (Slovakia) and
1.689 (Romania) times greater for individuals who reported their household
economic conditions had improved over the past 12 months compared to those
that reported their household economic conditions had remained the same or
worsened.
Future household economic expectations are significant statistically in
three of the five countries. The countries where these are significant statistically
are Bulgaria, Latvia and Romania. In Romania, the odds of being satisfied with
democracy are 6.2 times greater for individuals who expected their household
economic conditions to improve compared to individuals who expected their
household economic conditions to remain the same or worsen. In Latvia, the
odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.1 times greater for individuals who
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expected their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12
months. Finally, in Hungary, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 3.3
times greater for the Hungarians that expected their household economic
conditions to improve compared to the Hungarians that did not expect their
household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months.
The people’s perceived future of their country with the European Union is
significant statistically in three of the five countries (Lithuania, Romania and
Slovakia). The relationship between satisfaction with democracy and the
perception of their respective countries is positive in Lithuania and Romania. In
these countries the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.8 and 2.1 times
greater, respectively, for the individuals who reported that the future of their
country is with the European Union as opposed to some other entity. In the case
of Slovakia (and Hungary, although that relationship is not significant statistically)
the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 0.7 times less for individuals who
perceived the future of Slovakia is with the European Union.
The Countries Not Seeking Entry into the European Union
There are six countries included in this analysis that are not under
consideration for membership in the European Union. These countries are
Albania, Armenia, Macedonia, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The logistic
regression results are shown in Tables 11a and 11b. The patterns for Belarus
and Russia appear to differ from that of the other four countries. Specifically, at
least four of the predictor variables are significant statistically in Albania,
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Armenia, Macedonia and Ukraine (all five are significant statistically in the
Ukraine) while only two of the five predictor variables are significant statistically
for Belarus and Russia.
Perceived human rights conditions are significant statistically in all six of
the countries not seeking European Union membership. In Albania, the odds of
being satisfied with democracy are 8.8 times greater for individuals who reported
good human rights conditions compared to those that reported poor human rights
conditions. In Armenia, Macedonia, Belarus and Russia, the odds of being
satisfied with democracy are between 4 and 5 times greater for individuals in
each of these countries that perceived good human rights conditions compared
to individuals who perceived poor human rights conditions. Finally, for
Ukrainians, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.9 times greater for
those that reported good human rights conditions compared to those that
reported poor human rights conditions.
In all but one of the countries not seeking entry into the European Union,
support for the market economy is significant statistically. The only exception is
Belarus. For Belarussians, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 5.9
times greater for individuals who support the transformation to a market economy
compared to Belarussians that did not support the economic transition. For the
remaining five countries, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are between
2.1 and 3.0 times greater for their respective citizens in these countries that are
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supportive of the economic transformation to a market economy compared to
those that are not support of the transformation to a market economy.
 Future household economic expectations are significant statistically in five
of the six countries not seeking European Union membership. In Armenia,
Macedonia, Belarus and Ukraine, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are
between 1.5 and 2.0 times greater for individuals in these countries that expected
their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months
compared to those individuals who expected their household economic
conditions to stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. In Albania, the
odds of being satisfied with democracy are 3.7 times greater for individuals who
expected their household economic conditions to improve compared to the
individuals who expected their household economic conditions to not improve.
  Past household economic experiences are significant statistically in four
of the six countries. In Albania, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are
4.1 times greater for individuals who believed that their economic experience
over the past 12 months improved compared to those individuals who did not
perceived their economic conditions to have improved. In Macedonia, the odds of
being satisfied with democracy are 2.4 times greater for individuals whose
household economic conditions improved over the past 12 months. In the
Ukraine and in Macedonia, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.8
times greater for Ukrainians that reported their household economic conditions to
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improve compared to individuals who reported their household economic
conditions to have stayed the same or worsened.
For the variable on perceived future of their country with the European
Union, only in the Ukraine is this significant statistically. In the country of Ukraine,
the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.2 times greater for individuals
who believed the future of the Ukraine is with the European Union compared to
individuals who did not believe that future of the Ukraine is with the European
Union. Although not significant statistically, it should be noted that the
relationship between perceptions about the future of the country with the
European Union and satisfaction with democracy is negative in Armenia,
Macedonia, Belarus and Russia.
Comparisons Based on Countries Grouped by Status of Membership in the
European Union
In the above sections, a logistic regression is run on each of the countries
included in this study. The countries are categorized based on the status of their
membership with the European Union. One of the most striking findings suggests
that each country has a different pattern in the model, although commonalities do
appear to exist. This suggests that the factors that contribute to that satisfaction
with democracy differ from country to country. In order to examine if there is a
pattern in the public opinion of countries, logistic regressions are run on each of
the groupings of countries.  Table 12 shows the results of the logistic regressions
for the country groupings.
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The five predictor variables are significant statistically for the five countries
expecting to join the European Union in the first wave of enlargement. The odds
of being satisfied with democracy in the countries expected to be in the first wave
of European Union enlargement are 3.1 times greater for individuals who
perceived good human rights conditions compared to those individuals who did
not perceive good human rights. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are
2.4 times greater for individuals who supported the transformation to a market
economy compared to those individuals who did not support the transition to a
market economy. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.7 times
greater for individuals who expected their future household economic conditions
to improve compared to individuals who expected their household economic
conditions to stay the same or worsen. The odds of being satisfied with
democracy are 2.3 times greater for individuals who reported that their household
economic conditions had improved over the past 12 months compared to
individuals who reported their household economic conditions had not improved.
Regarding the perceived future of their country with the European Union, the
odds of being satisfied with democracy are 1.4 times greater for individuals who
perceived the future of their country with the European Union compared to
individuals who perceived the future of their country to not be with the European
Union. The model for the first-wave countries is significant statistically with a chi-
square of 753.005. The model predicted correctly 70.3% of the cells. The
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Nagelkerke R2 suggested that 25% of the variance in the predicted variable is
explained by the predictor variable.
The second logistic regression is on the public opinion in the five countries
that are seeking admission into the European Union and are likely to be included
in the second wave of enlargements. For these countries, the odds of being
satisfied with democracy are 3.2 times greater for individuals who perceived
good human rights conditions compared to individuals who did not perceive good
human rights conditions. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.6
times greater for individuals who supported the transition to a market economy
compared to individuals who did not support the transition to a market economy.
The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.6 times greater for individuals
who expected their household economic condition to improve over the next 12
months compared to individuals that expected household economic conditions to
stay the same or worsen. The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.3
times greater for individuals who experienced improved household economic
conditions over the past 12 months compared to individuals who experienced
stagnant or worsening economic conditions over the pervious 12 months. The
model for the second wave countries is significant statistically with a chi-square
of 749.555. Seventy-four percent of the cells are predicted correctly. Twenty-six
percent of the variation in the predicted variable is explained by the predictor
variables.
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The final group is the countries that are not seeking membership in the
European Union. The five predictor variables are significant statistically. The
odds of being satisfied with democracy are 5.8 times greater for individuals who
perceived their countries to have good human rights conditions compared to
individuals who perceived human rights conditions in their country to be poor.
The odds of being satisfied with democracy are 2.7 times greater for individuals
who supported the transition to a market economy compared to individuals who
did not support the transition to a market economy in their country. The odds of
being satisfied with democracy are 2.3 times greater for individuals who expected
their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months and 2.7
times greater for individuals who experienced improved household economic
conditions to have improved over the past 12 months. Finally, the odds of being
satisfied with democracy are 1.8 times greater for individuals who perceived the
future of their country to be with the European Union compared with individuals
who did not perceive the future of their country to be with the European Union.
The model is significant statistically with a chi-square of 1889.095. The
percentage of cells predicted correctly is 81.2%. Forty-nine percent of the
variation in the predicted variable is explained by the predictor variables.
Discussion
The above analyses suggest many points that warrant discussion. First
and foremost is that satisfaction with democracy is complex and that the factors
that shape this opinion differ from country to country. Second, the difference
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found in examining public opinion in each country individually may be masked
when combining public opinion in a number of countries. Third, the framework
from which the countries are examined provides insights into the patterns of
public opinion of the political and economic transformation processes. This
suggests that people are considering not only their own conditions, but also
considering the changing role that their country has in the international
community.
The first point in this conclusion is that public opinion is a complex and
multidimensional phenomena. It is not simple or clean to examine these sorts of
things. Despite that, public opinion is important for a well functioning democracy
and a market economy, so it warrants further examination.
In this chapter, I examined attitudinal factors and their relationship to
satisfaction with democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries are
examined individually and with respect to their status on seeking membership in
the European Union. The general model proposed in this chapter performed well
for most of the countries in the study. Overall, it suggests that the five factors do
contribute to satisfaction with democracy. The model does perform differently in
each country, with the explanatory power being clearly stronger in some
countries than in others. Dividing the countries into the three categories appears
to be a somewhat useful heuristic device in identifying patterns and
understanding of satisfaction with democracy.
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 First, examining the strength of the public opinion on human rights
conditions, and therefore drawing conclusions on the hypotheses discussed at
the onset of this chapter, it is clear that perceptions of human rights conditions
are important to satisfaction with democracy. In each of the sixteen countries in
the study, perceptions of human rights conditions are significant statistically and
often demonstrated the greatest explanatory power, holding the other variables
equal. This occurred for all of the countries, regardless of their status of seeking
membership in the European Union.
The importance of the perceptions of human rights conditions to
satisfaction with democracy suggests that the respondents may conceptualize
democracy in terms of liberal democracy rather than as a pared-down nominal
democracy. In this sense, they would be interpreting democracy along a Western
European model where democracy and human rights are linked rather than other
forms of democracy, where democracy is limited simply to the right to vote and
fails to meet the standards of a liberal democracy.
The three economic variables appear to be important, with support for the
transformation to a market economy the most important of the three conditions in
most countries. Support for the market economy is an important factor in
satisfaction with democracy in all but one country (Hungary). This suggests that
attitudes about economic conditions influence attitudes about democracy.
Prospective and retrospective microeconomic expectations are each important in
11 countries (although not always in the same countries). For every country that
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is not a frontrunner for seeking membership into the European, perceived
household economic conditions over the past 12 months influenced satisfaction
with democracy, while expectations for future microeconomic conditions is
important three of the five times. In total, in eight of the eleven times that
household economic conditions are important, both the past 12 months and the
future 12 months are significant.
McIntosh and MacIver (1992) found that the people Central and Eastern
Europe defined their opinions on democracy based, in part, on economic terms.
The findings on public opinion about economic conditions suggest that there is
an important connection between economic and political conditions in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It has been suggested that there is a
connection between the two at the institutional level. Lipset (1959) and Bollen
(1979, 1983), for example, found a connection between democracy and the
market economy. The results of this chapter reinforce the understanding of the
relationships between politics and economics at the level of public opinion.
The variable with the least explanatory power is the opinion on the future
with the European Union. In only six of the sixteen countries this is found to be
significant. Three of the six countries are ‘frontrunner’ candidates for European
Union membership. In only one of the countries that is not a candidate but is still
seeking membership into the European Union is this variable a significant factor
in satisfaction with democracy.
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In comparing the countries based on their status for membership in the
European Union, the explanatory power of the model is greatest for the countries
that are the frontrunner candidates for accession into the European Union. The
countries seeking membership and the countries not seeking membership faired
about the same. One interesting item is that the variability in the model is better
explained in the countries not seeking membership into the European Union than
in the two sets of countries seeking membership. Therefore, the final hypothesis
must be rejected.
Overall, it is clear from this chapter that attitudes about economics, human
rights and foreign relations are important to the formation of attitudes about
democracy. The model performs well in most of the countries but different
patterns did emerge between the groups of countries. These patterns were more
apparent when the countries were examined individually than when the countries
were pooled together.
Based on the analysis of this chapter and the previous chapter, public
opinion on economic conditions is clearly important. One conclusion that can be
drawn is that public opinion on politics and economics are related. Factors that




Public Opinion on Political, Economic and Foreign Relations Conditions as
Predictors of Support for the Market Economy in
Central and Eastern Europe
After the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was expected that the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe would make rapid and successful
strides toward Western standards of a market economy. The belief in the West
was that the citizens of these countries would embrace the ideology of a market
economy, thereby rejecting forty-plus years of experience with a command
economy. The social costs which would result from the economic reforms were
thought to be the short-term costs of economic development. The experience of
the past decade has challenged these original expectations. The transformation
from a command economy to a market economy has been far more difficult than
many first imagined.
While it is clear that all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
have made strides away from the Soviet era command economy, functional and
stable market economies have been difficult to establish. Additionally the social
costs associated with the economic reform measures have been much greater
than anticipated (Nelson 1997). It has been the general public that has had to
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bear the social hardship produced by the collapse of the command economy and
the reforms necessary to establish a market economy.
While there is a need to study the structural changes necessary to
develop a market economy, Duch (1993) argues that to understand these
changes there must be accompaning research on the beliefs and values of the
masses with regard to the market economy. The purpose of this chapter is to
examine the public opinion of the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe
regarding the transition to a market economy. Specifically, this chapter explores
five political, economic, and foreign relation attitudinal factors that may contribute
to public opinion on the transformation to a market economy. The factors include
the perception of human rights conditions, satisfaction with democracy,
prospective and retrospective microeconomic conditions and perception of the
future foreign relations with regard to the European Union. These factors are
examined in sixteen countries individually and with regard to their country’s
status in seeking membership with the European Union. Table 7 lists the specific
countries included for analysis in this paper.
This chapter focuses on public opinion about the economic transformation
in Central and Eastern Europe for three reasons. First, public opinion research
on the political economy transformations in Central and Eastern Europe has
tended to focus on the political transformation and neglected the economic
transformation. Second, as the more neglected side of the transformation,
research to understand public opinion, and particularly public support, for the
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economic changes needs to be conducted. This is important because the
greatest social costs are incurred in the process of economic reforms of the
transformation process. It has been argued that public dissatisfaction with the
economic reforms may result in public disapproval of the political changes.
Potentially, the result of public dissatisfaction or disapproval of the transformation
could be due to a rejection of the political changes because of the hardships
imposed by the economic reforms (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990, Przeworski
1991, Schumpeter 1942).
Literature Review
There is widespread agreement that the deteriorating economic conditions
within the former Socialist countries contributed to both the elite and mass
support for economic change (Duch 1993). The resulting transformations in
Central and Eastern Europe have been as much economic as political, but it is
the economic changes that have produced the greatest social costs. It is the
market reforms that have resulted in serious short-term dislocations and
hardships (International Monetary Fund et al. 1991) which the general public has
had to bear. Clearly, the structural economic reforms necessary for the
transformation from a command economy to a market economy are quite costly.
At a minimum, when a government embarks upon this form of economic
transformation, temporary economic deterioration is inevitable. Unemployment
rises as the responsibility of finding and maintaining employment is shifted from
the state to the citizen (Duch 1993: 595). Under a market economy, individuals
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must contend with the real possibility of unemployment, which official statistics
suggest was nonexistent prior to 1992 (Cook 1990, Sanjian 1990). Inflation
increases and goods become scarce as adjustments in production are made. As
price controls are lifted, prices for consumer goods rise. All of these macro-level
economic adjustments have micro-level implications. Indeed, opposition to the
market liberalization reforms was expected due to the inevitable rise in consumer
prices (Sachs and Lipton 1990, Shiller, Boycko and Korobov 1991). The potential
problem, as Przeworski (1991) argues, is that a temporary deterioration of the
material conditions of the masses may be sufficient to undermine the political and
economic reforms.
Kluegel, Mason and Wegener (1999) examined the relationship between
macro-level and micro-level functioning of the economy. They stressed the
importance of both a structural and individual level of analysis in understanding
the development of a solid market economy. Their article focused on economic
justice attitudes in the Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Russia,
Hungary and Bulgaria. The findings suggested that the theory of legitimation of
the market, as is found in the West, applied to post-communist countries.
Furthermore, changes in the market and in social justice were found to be
functions of collective and individual level factors.
Cross-national and comparative research on the political and economic
transformations in Central and Eastern Europe have focused on the development
of the market economy in comparison to established market economies. In an
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early study, Shiller et al. (1991) conducted a telephone survey of Muscovites and
New Yorkers regarding their attitudes towards the free market. They found that
the Russia and American respondents were similar in their attitudes toward
fairness, income inequality and their understanding of the working of markets.
Miller, Reisinger and Hesli (1998) examined election outcomes with the
level of support for democratization and a market economy among the masses
and elites in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania.
They found attitudes towards market norms were more important than
democratic norms in the 1992 and 1995 elections in Russia, Ukraine, and
Lithuania. In those elections, the link between support for the democratic
reformers and support for the market was fairly strong.
Slomczynski and Shabad (1997) studies Polish students aged 13 to 14
and a corresponding ‘cohort’ of their parents and teachers to examine the relative
levels of support for democracy and a market economy. They found support for
democracy was greater for the adults in the study while market economy support
was greater for the students. This suggested that the base of support for the
economic transformation may be found in the younger people in society.
Duch (1993) explicitly examined the development of an economic culture
in Central and Eastern Europe. He developed the concept of a “free market
culture” in which “preferences for free-market reform reflect an acceptance on the
part of individuals of certain basic premises of free-market mechanisms” (Duch
1993: 590). Using data collected from a survey of European USSR in 1990, he
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tested different explanations for attitudes towards free-market reforms. He found
that there is a free-market culture in the Soviet Union that makes modest
contributions to support for free-market reforms. The free market culture
resembles social democracy, rather than laissez-faire capitalism.
The previous research on public opinions about various aspects of the
economic transformation suggests the importance of support for the economic
conditions to the people undergoing the transformation processes. The economic
reforms that are a part of the transformation process have profound social costs.
It is feared that a public backlash against these social costs may result in a
reversal of the progress of democratization in these countries. The research also
suggests that this may not be the case. The citizens of Central and Eastern
Europe may, in fact, be willing to support the economic reforms of the
transformation despite the social costs. One area that does need to be examined
is the relationship of other attitudes that may be related to public opinion on the
market economy. By examining these, a better understanding of the foundation
of public support for the market economy can be gained.
Hypotheses
It has been argued that preferences for democracy and capitalism are
shaped by similar factors (Duch 1993). The following five hypotheses are tested
in this chapter on each of the sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe
individually and on the countries grouped based on their status for membership
in the European Union. These were selected based on their apparent
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significance to opinions about the market economy found in other research and
on their significance to public opinion on democracy as discussed in the previous
chapter. These hypotheses cover political, microeconomic and foreign relation
opinions and should be influential in attitudes that are supportive of the
transformation toward a market economy.
H3.1: Individuals who believe there is respect for human rights are more likely to
support participation in a market economy than are individuals who believe there
is not respect for human rights.
H3.2: Individuals who are satisfied with democracy are more likely to support the
transition to the market economy than are individuals who are not satisfied with
democracy.
H3.3: Individuals who believe their future microeconomic conditions will improve
are more likely to support the transition to a market economy than are individuals
who believe their future microeconomic conditions will not improve.
H3.4: Individuals who believe their microeconomic conditions have improved are
more likely to support the transition to a market economy than are individuals
who believe their economic conditions have not improved.
H3.5: Individuals who believe that their country’s future is closely linked to the
European Union are more likely to support the transition to a market economy
than are individuals who believe the future of their country is linked with an entity
other than the European Union.
In addition to the above five hypotheses, a final hypothesis examines
public opinion in light of the country’s status for membership into the European
Union. Since the beginning of fundamental political and economic changes in the
late 1980s, some have considered integration into the European Union to be one
of the main tools of achieving transformation (Brinar and Svetlicic 1999: 816). It is
expected that the citizens of the Central and Eastern Europe would be influenced
by how successful their country has been with regard to integration into the
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European Union. This would work to shape public opinion about the
transformations in general and public support for the market economy in
particular.
H3.6: The general model tested through the above hypotheses will demonstrate
greater explanatory power in the countries most likely to be granted admission
into the European Union during the next enlargement compared to other
countries.
Public opinion is important to understanding the political and economic
changes in Central and Eastern Europe. It is expected that these hypotheses will
be supported most strongly in the countries that expect to be included in the first
wave of European Union enlargements. Further, it is expected that these
hypotheses will receive the least support in the countries that are not seeking
European Union membership. This framework of the status of seeking
membership in the European Union should provide insights into the patterns of
public opinion toward the economic transformation process.
Data and Methods
Data for this chapter are from the Central and Eastern European
Barometer 7 (Cunningham 1996). The data were collected on behalf of the
Commission of the European Communities in sixteen countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. The Central and Easter European Barometer 7 was conducted
as a face-to-face interview with respondents, age 15 years and older, in their
place of residence. It was conducted in each of the sixteen countries between
November 1 and November 29, 1996. The survey is a fully representative
national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country.
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There were slight variations in the sample design to account for the individual
characteristics and population structures in the specific country (see Appendix A
for details). The total number of respondents interviewed from the sixteen
selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe was 16,876.
Selected Variables
There are five predictor and one predicted variables in the model of public
support for the market economy. The predicted variable is support for the market
economy. The respondents were asked to report their opinions about the
transition to a market economy in their country. This variable, market economy
support, is based on the question, “Do you personally feel that the creation of a
free market economy, that is one that is largely free from state control, is right or
wrong for (our country)?” The response categories are “right” and “wrong.”
The five predictor variables in the model are the perception of human
rights conditions, satisfaction with democracy, future household economic
expectations, past household economic experiences and opinions on the future
of their country with the European Union. The first predictor variable is perceived
human rights conditions. The measure of perceived human rights condition is
based on the question, “To what degree do you believe that there is respect for
individual human rights in (our country)?” The response categories are “a lot of
respect for individual human rights,” “some respect,” “not much respect” and “no
respect at all.” These response categories are collapsed into two categories. The
first category, labeled “respect for human rights,” is composed of the original
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responses of “a lot of respect” and “some respect.” The second category, “no
respect for human rights,” is composed of the original response categories of “not
much respect” and “no respect at all.”
The second predictor variable in this study is satisfaction with democracy.
To measure this, the respondents were asked the following question: “On the
whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied
with the way democracy is developing?” The response categories are “satisfied,”
“fairly satisfied,” “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied.” For the purposes of
analysis, the original responses are categorized into “satisfied” and “not
satisfied.” The satisfied category includes all responses of either “satisfied” or
“fairly satisfied.” The responses of “not very satisfied” and “not at all satisfied” are
placed into the “not satisfied” category.
Respondents are asked about their prospective microeconomic
expectations. This is measured with the question, “Over the next 12 months, do
you expect that the financial situation of your household will . . . get a lot better,
get a little better, stay the same, get a little worse and get a lot worse?” The five
possible responses are collapsed into two categories of expecting improvement
and not expecting improvement. The responses of “getting a lot better” or “getting
a little better” are considered to be expectations of improvement. The remaining
response categories are considered as expecting no improvement in household
economic conditions over the next 12 months.
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The respondents are asked about their retrospective microeconomic
experience over the past 12 months. For this variable, the question asks,
“Compared to 12 months ago, do you think the financial situation of your
household has . . . got a lot better, got a little better, stayed the same, got a little
worse, got a lot worse?” These responses are collapsed into a dichotomous
variable indicating either improvement or no improvement in their household
economic conditions over the past 12 months. Improved conditions are those
where the respondents reported their household economic conditions to have
gotten a little or a lot better. The responses that indicated their household
economic conditions had stayed the same or worsened composed the category
of no improvement in household economic conditions.
The final predictor variable is the opinion of the future relationship of their
country to the European Union. The opinions about their country’s future being
linked closely to the European Union are measured with the question, “As things
now stand, with which of the following do you see (our country’s) future most
closely tied up?” The response categories are “The United States of America,”
The European Union,” “Other European countries like Norway and Switzerland,
which remain outside of the European Union,” “Other Central and Eastern
European countries,” “Russia or other countries in the Commonwealth of
Independent States,” “Turkey” and “Japan / South Korea.” These responses are
collapsed into a dichotomous variable of “European Union” and “other.”
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Methods
The analysis for this chapter is conducted using logistic regression.
Logistic regression is an appropriate technique due to the level of measurement
of the predictor variables. The predictor variables are collapsed into dichotomous
variables due to a number of cells containing very few responses (particularly in
the two household economic condition variables). A separate logistic regression
analysis is completed for each of the sixteen countries in the study. This is done
to test the hypotheses for each country. Additionally, the countries are divided
into three categories. First, are the countries seeking entry into the European
Union which are most likely to be granted membership in the next enlargement.
The second category is composed of the countries seeking membership into the
European Union that will not be granted membership with the next enlargement.
The final category is composed of the countries not seeking membership into the
European Union. A logistic regression is completed on each of the categories
and the findings are compared.   
Results
A correlation matrix is produced on the predictor variables in this study.
The results are displayed in Table 13. Generally the correlations between the
predictor variables are modest and positive. The highest degree of correlation is
found between perceived human rights and satisfaction with democracy with a
Pearson’s r of 0.388. Technically, all of the relationships are significant
statistically. Since the values of the correlations are relatively modest and the
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number of cases is very large, the level of significance is due more to the size of
the sample rather than actual relationships between the variables.
The Frontrunner Countries for Membership in the European Union
The results of the logistic regression analyses on the five countries most
likely to be granted membership into the European Union during the next
enlargement is found on Table 14. Satisfaction with democracy is significant
statistically in the five front-runner countries. In the case of the Czech Republic,
the odds of supporting the transition to the market economy are 3.5 times greater
for citizens of the Czech Republic that report being satisfied with democracy
compared to those that report not being satisfied with democracy. The odds of
supporting the transition to the market economy in Estonia is 1.9 times greater
for individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are
not satisfied with democracy. In Hungary, the odds of supporting the transition to
a market economy are 2.3 times greater for Hungarians who are satisfied with
democracy compared to Hungarians who are not satisfied with democracy. In
Poland, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 3.9 times
greater when individuals are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals
who are not satisfied with democracy. Finally, in Slovenia the odds of supporting
the transition to a market economy are 1.7 times greater for Slovenians that are
satisfied with democracy compared to Slovenians that are not satisfied with
democracy.
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In all five of the countries most likely to be admitted into the European
Union in the next enlargement, the public’s perception of the future of their
country with the European Union is significant statistically. In the Czech Republic,
the odds of supporting the move toward the market economy is 1.8 times greater
for individuals who believe that the future of the Czech Republic is with the
European Union compared to those that believe that the future of the Czech
Republic is with some other entity. In Estonia and Hungary, the odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater when the
respondents report that the future of their country is with the European Union
compared to individuals who report the future is not with the European Union. In
Poland, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.4 times
greater for the individuals who believe the future of Poland to be with the
European Union. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in
Slovenia are 2.1 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of
Slovenia lies with the European Union.
Perception of respect for human rights is significant statistically in four of
the five front-runner countries. In the Czech Republic, the odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who believe
there is respect for human rights in the Czech Republic compared to individuals
who believe there is little or no respect for human rights in the Czech Republic.
The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are between 1.6 and
1.7 times greater for the respondents in Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia who
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perceive there to be respect for human rights compared to individuals who
perceive a lack of respect for human rights in these countries.
In three of the front-runners for membership in the European Union, future
household economic expectations are significant statistically. The three countries
are the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. In the Czech Republic, all else
being equal, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy is 1.8
times greater for individuals who expected their household economic conditions
to improve over the next 12 months compared to individuals who expected their
household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over the next 12
months. In the case of Hungary, the odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who expected their household
economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to individuals
who expected their household economic conditions to not improve over the next
year. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.1 times
greater for Slovenians that expect their household economic conditions to
improve compared to Slovenians that do not expect their household economic
conditions to improve over the next 12 months.
Perceptions of the respondents of their past household economic
conditions are significant statistically in Estonia only. In that country, the odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.7 times greater for
individuals who report that their household economic conditions had improved
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over the past 12 months compared to individuals who report that their household
economic conditions has stayed the same or worsened over the part 12 months.
In all five of the countries, the model is significant statistically although the
amount of variance explained is not particularly great. In four of the countries
(Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) the percentage of variance in the
predicted variable explained by the predictor variables is between 12% and 14%.
For the Czech Republic, the percentage of variance in the predicted variable
explained by the predictor variables is 28%. The percentage of the cells
predicted correctly range from a low of 61.4% in Slovenia to a high of 78.3% in
Poland.
The Second Wave Countries Seeking European Union Membership
Table 15 shows the results of the logistic regression of the five countries
expected to be in the second wave of European Union enlargement. In the cases
of the five countries that are most likely to be included in the second wave of
European Union enlargements, only the variable on satisfaction with democracy
is significant statistically in all five countries. In Bulgaria, the odds of being
supportive of the transition to a market economy are 2.4 times greater for
individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not
satisfied with democracy. In Latvia, the odds are 2.9 times greater that the
Latvians who are satisfied with democracy are supportive of the transition to a
market economy. In Lithuania and Slovakia, the odds that the respective citizens
in these countries are supportive of the transition to a market economy are 1.8
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times greater for the citizens of each country that are satisfied with democracy
compared to those citizens that are not satisfied with democracy. The odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for
Romanians that are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are
not satisfied with democracy.
The public perception of the future of their country with the European
Union is significant statistically in four of the five countries. In Bulgaria, the odds
of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.7 times greater for
individuals who believe that the future of Bulgaria is with the European Union
compared to those that do not believe that the future of Bulgaria is with the
European Union. In Latvia and Slovakia, the odds of supporting the transition to a
market economy in their respective countries is 2.0 times greater for individuals
who believe the future of their country lies with the European Union compared to
those individuals who do not believe the future of their country is with the
European Union. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy in
Romania are 2.4 times greater for individuals who believe the future of Romania
is with the European Union compared to those individuals who believe the future
of the European Union is not with Romania.
In three of the second wave countries, the perception of human rights
conditions is an important predictor to support for the transition to a market
economy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8
times greater for the citizens of Latvia and Romania who perceive respect for
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human rights in their countries compared to the citizens of each country that
perceive a lack of respect for human rights in their country. In Lithuania, the odds
of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for the
Lithuanians that perceive respect for human rights in Lithuania compared to
those that do not perceive respect for human rights in Lithuania.
Perceptions of household economic conditions, future or past, are
significant statistically in four of the five countries in this category. In three of the
five countries (Lithuania, Romanian and Slovakia) the future household economic
expectations are significant statistically. In Lithuania, the odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for individuals who expect
their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months
compared to the individuals who expect their household economic conditions to
stay the same or worsen over the next 12 months. The odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for Romanians that expect
an improvement in their household economic conditions compared to those that
expect no improvement in their household economic conditions. The odds are
2.5 times greater in Slovakia that an individual supported the transition to a
market economy if the individual expects an improvement in their household
economic conditions over the next 12 months compared to the individuals who
expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen over the
next 12 months. In Latvia, the past household economic experience is significant
statistically. In that country, the odds of supporting the transition to a market
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economy are 2.1 times greater for the individuals who report their economic
conditions to have had improved over the past 12 months compared to
individuals who report their household economic conditions to have stayed the
same or worsened over the past 12 months.
Although the model is significant statistically in all five countries in this
category, the amount of variance in the predicated variable explained by the
predictor variables is low. The greatest amount of variance explained is 17.2%.
The percentage of cells predicted correctly range from 61.6% to 87.6%.
The Countries Not Seeking European Union Membership
Tables 16a and 16b show the results of the logistic regressions for the six
countries not seeking membership in the European Union included in this
analysis. For these countries, no variable is significant statistically in all of the
countries. Three variables are significant statistically in five of the six countries. In
one of the countries (Belarus) the model is not significant statistically.
Public perceptions of human rights conditions are significant statistically in
all of the countries in this category expect Belarus. In Albania, the odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.8 times greater for
individuals who perceive that there is respect for human rights in Albania
compared to those individuals who do not perceive that there is respect for
human rights in Albania. The odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 2.6 times greater for the Armenians that perceive respect for
human rights compared to the Armenians that perceive a lack of respect for
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human rights. In Macedonia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 1.6 times greater for the individuals who report respect for human
rights compared to the individuals who report a lack of respect for human rights.
In Russia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.1
times greater for individuals who perceive respect for human rights in Russia
compared to individuals who perceived a lack of respect for human rights in
Russia. Finally, in Ukraine, the odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 1.9 times greater for those that perceive respect for human rights
compared to those that perceive little or no respect for human rights in Ukraine.
Satisfaction with democracy is significant statistically in five of the six
countries in this group. In Albania and the Ukraine, the odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 2.3 times greater for the individuals in these
countries who are satisfied with democracy compared to those individuals who
are not satisfied with democracy. In Armenia, the odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 2.9 times greater for the Armenians that are
satisfied with democracy compared to the Armenians that are not satisfied with
democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.1
times greater in Macedonia for the individuals who are satisfied with democracy
compared to the individuals who are not satisfied with democracy. In Russia, the
odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 5.7 times greater for
individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are not
satisfied with democracy.
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Future household economic expectations are significant statistically in five
of the six countries. In Albania, the odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 3.2 times greater for the individuals who expect their household
economic conditions to improve compared to those individuals who expect their
household economic conditions to stay the same or worsen. The odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.5 times greater for the
Armenians that expect improvement in their household economic conditions over
the next 12 months compared to the Armenians that do not expect improvement
in their household economic conditions. In Macedonia, the odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for the individuals who
expect their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months
compared to those individuals who expect their household economic conditions
to stay the same or worsen over that same time period. For the Russians, the
odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.5 times greater for
individuals who expect their household economic conditions to improve in the
next year compared to the individuals who do not expect their household
economic conditions to improve over the next year. Finally, the odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy in the Ukraine are 1.8 times
greater for individuals who expect improvement in their household economic
conditions over the next 12 months compared to those individuals who expect no
improvement in their household economic conditions over the next 12 months.
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Past household economic experiences are significant statistically in three
of the six countries not seeking membership in the European Union. In Armenia,
the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater
for individuals who reported their household economic conditions have improved
over the past 12 months compared to the individuals who reported that their
household economic conditions have not improved in the past 12 months. In
Russia, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.5 times
greater for the Russians that report that their household economic conditions
have improved over the past 12 months compared to the Russians that reported
that their household economic conditions have stayed the same or worsened
over that time period. The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy
in Macedonia are 2.2 times greater for individuals who perceive their household
economic conditions to have improved over the past 12 months compared to the
individuals who do not perceive their household economic conditions to have
improved over the past 12 months.
The model is significant statistically in five of the countries in this group.
Those countries are Albania, Armenia, Macedonia, Russia and the Ukraine.
Although the model is significant statistically, it is very weak in explaining the
variance of the predicted variable with the predictor variables. The amount of
variance explained ranges from 13.8% to 21.7%. The percentage of cells
predicted correctly ranges from 64.5% in Macedonia to 86.6% in Albania.
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Comparisons Based on Countries Grouped by Status of Membership in the
European Union
Table 17 compares the logistic regression results from the countries
grouped according to their status of seeking membership in the European Union.
For the frontrunner countries and the countries not seeking membership in the
European Union, all of the predictor variables are significant statistically. For the
countries expected to be included in the second wave of European Union
enlargement, all of the variables except for past household economic
experiences are significant statistically. All three of the models are significant
statistically.
For the frontrunners to membership in the European Union, the odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.6 times greater for the
individuals in these countries that perceive respect for human rights compared to
individuals who do not perceive respect for human rights. The odds of supporting
the transition to a market economy in these countries are 2.4 times greater for
the individuals who are satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who are
not satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 1.5 times greater for the individuals who expect their household
economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to the
individuals who expect their household economic conditions to stay the same or
worsen. With regard to their household economic conditions over the past 12
months, the odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are 1.4 times
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greater if the person experienced improved household economic conditions
compared to the person that did not experience improved household economic
conditions. Finally The odds of supporting the transition to a market economy are
1.7 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of their country to be
with the European Union compared to individuals who do not believe that the
future of their country is with the European Union. For these countries
collectively, the model explains 15.3% of the variance in the predicted variable
with the predictor variables.
For the countries that are expected to be included into the European
Union in the second wave of enlargements, the odds of supporting the transition
to a market economy are 1.3 times greater for the individuals who perceive
respect for human rights compared to individuals who do not perceive there to be
respect for human rights. Collectively, in the second wave countries the odds of
supporting the transition to a market economy are 2.6 times greater for
individuals who report being satisfied with democracy compared to individuals
who report being dissatisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the
transition to a market economy are 2.2 times greater for individuals who expect
their household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months
compared to the individuals who do not expect improvement in their household
economic conditions. The odds of supporting the transitions to a market economy
are 2 times greater for the respondents that believe the future of their country lies
with the European Union compared to the respondents that believe the future of
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their country is not with the European Union. The percentage of cells predicted
correctly is 69.4%. The percentage of the variance in the predicted variable
explained by the predictor variables is low at 16.4%.
The six countries not seeking entry into the European Union composed
the grouping for final logistic regression. For this group, the odds of supporting
the transition to a market economy are 1.9 times greater for the individuals who
perceived respect for human rights in their country compared to individuals who
do not perceive respect for human rights in their country. The odds of supporting
the transition to a market economy are 2.7 times greater for the individuals who
reported being satisfied with democracy compared to individuals who reported
not being satisfied with democracy. The odds of supporting the transition to a
market economy are 1.8 times greater for the individuals who expected their
household economic conditions to improve over the next 12 months compared to
the individuals who expected their household economic conditions stay the same
or worsen over the next 12 months. The odds of supporting the transition to a
market economy are 1.9 times greater for the individuals who reported
improvement in their household economic conditions compared to individuals
who reported no improvement in their household economic conditions over the
past 12 months. Finally, the odds of supporting the transition to a market
economy are 1.8 times greater for individuals who believe that the future of their
country is with the European Union compared to individuals who believe the
future of their country is not with the European Union. Seventy one percent of the
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cells are predicted correctly. The percentage of variance in the predicted variable
explained by the predictor variables is 29.4%. The implications of the findings
reported from this table, as well as in the other tables in this chapter, are
discussed in the next section.
Discussion
The results of the analysis of the data in this chapter present a very
complicated but interesting picture of the foundation of public support for the
transition to a market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In
this section, I will discuss each hypothesis in turn. This is followed by a section
on the general conclusions that can be drawn from the findings in this chapter.
The first hypothesis considered the importance of the public’s perception
of human rights conditions to support for the market economy. Starting with the
individual country logistic regressions, in twelve of the sixteen countries, this
relationship is significant statistically. Additionally it is significant statistically in all
three of the logistic regressions of the collective public opinions in the countries
grouped based on the status of their seeking membership in the European
Union.
The importance of human rights conditions to the transformation is used
as a means by which to categorize the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
to examine support for democracy (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998, Hofferbert
and Klingmann 1999, Mishler and Rose 1996, Rose 1995, and Rose and Mishler
1996). The results of this chapter suggest that human rights are important to
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public opinion on the other half of the transformation process, that of the
transformation to a market economy. As Rose (1997: 96) pointed out, ending
shot-to-kill border guard orders and censorship have been some of the easier
and more quickly accomplished first steps in the transformation processes in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These conditions relate directly to the
status of respect for human rights. The findings in this chapter suggest that the
perceptions of respect for human rights conditions are linked positively to support
for the economic transformation.
As human rights conditions are a responsibility of the state, they can be
understood as related directly to the political changes in these countries. The fact
that perceptions of respect for human rights and support for the market economy
are related reinforces the relationship that scholars believe to exist between
political and economic conditions. The fact that human rights would be related
and, in some of the cases, be the single strongest predictor variable, suggests
that the changes in human rights conditions may be one of the more noticeable
aspects of the transformation processes. As a benchmark of transition, it is linked
to other, less clear and certainly more painful aspects of the transformation, that
of the movement toward a market economy.
The other political variable included in the analysis in this chapter is that of
satisfaction with democracy. Satisfaction with democracy is significant
statistically in fifteen countries in which the model is significant statistically and in
the three logistic regressions of the countries grouped based on status of seeking
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membership in the European Union. The importance of this second political
variable in the model further reinforces the argument about the connection
between political and economic conditions. While many (Lipset 1959, Bollen
1979, 1983, Dahl 1989, and Hayek 1944) have argued that there is a relationship
between market development and democracy at the institutional level, research
in this chapter suggests that there is a relationship between democracy and the
market economy public opinion.
There are positive and negative implications to the linking of public opinion
on democracy and the market economy. In the positive, this suggests that
building democracy in these countries could further build support for the
economic transformations and thereby, build tolerance for the social
consequences of the economic reform measures. How long and how strongly
this would be the case, would be an important question to investigate. This leads
to the more negative potential of the public linking the political and economic
conditions, the belief that economic unrest could lead to political change
(Przeworski 1991). One possibility is that the problems of economic well-being
may become so great that the public may reverse its support for democracy
(Miller, Reisinger and Helsi 1998: 328). One option that may be exercised by the
public is the electing of anti-democratic and anti-market parties into office, as has
been the case in Belarus. The direct result of this action in the political side of the
transformation would be a reverse wave of democratization. There may be
152
subsequent ramifications in the economic development as a reverse in
marketization may occur as well.
The two economic conditions included in the model performed well,
although not as well as the political variables. Public opinion on expectations of
the future household economic conditions over the next 12 months is significant
statistically in 11 of the 15 countries in which the model is significant statistically.
Additionally, it is significant statistically in all three of the logistic regressions of
the countries pooled based on their status of seeking membership in the
European Union. Public opinion on their household economic conditions over the
past 12 months is statistically in only five of the 15 countries in which the model
is significant statistically. Additionally, it is significant statistically in the pooled
countries that are front-runners in seeking European Union membership and in
the logistic regression of the pooled countries not seeking membership in the
European Union. The findings and differences in the performance of these two
economic variables and their relations to support for the economic transition in
these countries have some interesting implications to understanding the political
economy transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.
One of the most important findings in this chapter suggests that the public
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are looking forward rather than
backward. Is unknown if this is a constant or temporary situation and would
require the inclusion of more years into the study. What this does suggest is that
when the people are anticipating improving conditions, they are more likely to
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continue to support the transition to a market economy in their country.
Therefore, with either expectations of economic stagnation or worsening
conditions, there is an expectation that this will erode support for the
transformation to a market economy.
While it does appear that people are looking forward to improving
conditions and these are linked to support for the economic transformation, in the
countries that are not seeking membership in the European Union, the past
appears to be important. Specifically, public perception of past economic
conditions appears to the most important factor to support for the market
economy in the countries not seeking membership in the European Union. Of the
five countries in this group where the model is significant statistically, public
opinion on household economic experience is significant statistically in 3 of the 5
countries. In the other two categories, this variable is significant statistically in
only one country each.
In explaining public support for the market economy, the strength of the
economic variables, all else being equal, is much weaker than the strength of
either of the political variables, all else being equal. This suggests that support
for the market economy may be more closely linked to political factors and less
driven by the perceptions of economic conditions. This may mean that the public
is willing to endure a degree of economic hardship as long as progress is made
in the development of democracy and human rights conditions.
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The final variable that is examined in relation to support for the market
economy is the public’s perception of the future of their country with the
European Union. This variable is significant statistically in 11 of the 15 countries.
Also, it is significant in all three of the logistic regressions on the countries pooled
based on their status of seeking membership in the European Union. The
variable performed best in the countries seeking membership in the European
Union, both first and second wave groups.
The significance of the belief that the future of their country is linked to the
European Union to public opinion on support for the market economy suggests
that the public, particularly the public in the countries seeking membership in the
European Union, links their future foreign relations and place within the world
political economy to that of their support for the economic transformation. This
variable captures one of the most significant, obvious and often overlooked
aspects of the transformations in the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
Specifically, these countries have experienced an international reorientation
toward Europe that is part and parcel of the whole political economy
transformation. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe had been isolated
from the rest of Europe for half a century. The end of the Cold War and the
subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union demanded a shift in the international
relations of these countries. For many of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, the expected international reorientation is to look toward Europe first for
guidance and then for integration.
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Integration into the European Union is one of the main tools in achieving
the political and economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe (Brinar
and Svetlicic 1999: 816). Indeed, as Przeworski (1991) suggests that the main
reason to hope that Eastern Europe will escape the politics, economics and
culture of poor capitalism is its geography. The central premise of the rallying cry,
‘there is only one Europe’ is that the Eastern European countries have been only
temporarily separated from the rest of Europe. It is argued that these countries
need “to find their rightful place in the European family of nations.” Przeworski
1991: 190). The results from this chapter suggest that public opinion supports
this and sees the economic transformation as linked positively to the national
movement toward the European Union.
Rose and Haerpfer (1994) argue that economic conditions influence
political and social attitudes. From this chapter it is clear that political, economic
and foreign relations attitudes influence support for the market economy. The
results from this chapter indicate two things. First, for the general public, the
perception of the European Union as the future body of international integration
for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is important to the support of the
market economy. This suggests that the actions taken at the international level
regarding accession into the European Union will influence how people perceive
the economic transformation processes. Therefore, attention must be given to
public perceptions and expectations of the long-term future of their country with
the European Union.
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The second conclusion that can be drawn is that public opinion on political
conditions and economic conditions are linked. The relationship between the two
is clearly complex and mutually reinforcing. Public dissatisfaction with one can be
expected to affect the other. But, the outcome of dissatisfaction is not necessarily
revolution.  It could be a more insidious development of illiberal democracy and
weak capitalism where human rights are not institutionalized. It could even result
in the return to totalitarianism and the suspension of the rule of law has been
established. The formation of illiberal democracy and disregard for human rights
accompanied by weak and / or crony capitalism will work to keep Europe divided
as surely as the Iron Curtain did. Further, these conditions would relegate the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe to Third World status.
While the implications of the findings in this chapter are intriguing, much
work needs to be done before definitive answers and conclusions can be offered.
Future research on public opinion for the market economy should consider three
areas. First, a more thorough examination of the link between political and
economic opinion is needed, particularly across time. Second, studies should
examine the factors that are related to a lack of support for the transformation to
a market economy. As is done with democracy and its alternatives (Rose,
Mishler and Haerpfer 1998), opinions about alternatives to the market should be
considered. While support for the market may not be overwhelming,
understanding it in relation to possible alternatives would be illuminating for
scholars and policy makers. Finally, the public base of support needs to be
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examined. Specifically, the presences of groups or categories within these
countries that proved the base of support for the market reforms needs to be
examined. A general summary and conclusion of all of the chapters and more




A number of expected and unexpected conclusions can be drawn from
research conducted for this dissertation. In this chapter, several general
conclusions are discussed that address the questions presented in the first
chapter will be discussed. This is followed by a general discussion of some of the
methodological and conceptual implications of this project including general
limitations of this project. Finally, potential directions for future research will be
presented.
The Research Questions Revisited
The first research question considered the degree of public opinion
concerning  satisfaction with democracy and support for the transition to the
market economy. This question is addressed in Chapter 4.  Based on the
research conducted for this dissertation, it can be concluded that in most
countries, less than half of the population was satisfied with democracy. This was
consistent with other research on popular opinion about democracy in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Grey et al. 1995 and Wyman
1994).
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The actual percentage of the population satisfied with democracy varied a
great deal between countries. For example, in 1996, the percentage of the
population that was satisfied with democracy varied seventy percentage points
between the countries of Bulgaria and Albania. While there was a great deal of
difference between countries with regard to their public’s reported satisfaction
with democracy, in most cases, public satisfaction with democracy was generally
stable from year to year within a given country. Therefore, based on the findings
in this dissertation, it can be said that less than half of the population in the
sixteen countries of Central and Eastern Europe were satisfied with democracy in
their country and that this level of satisfaction was relatively stable across the five
year time period included in this study.
The other half of the first question posed in Chapter 1 addressed the level
of public opinion about the transformation to a market economy. In general,
public support for their country’s transformation to a market economy was higher
than satisfaction with democracy. Further, it was noticeably higher in the
countries seeking membership in the European Union than in the countries not
seeking membership in the European Union. In all of the countries seeking
membership in the European Union, more than half of the population supported
the transition to a market economy in at least three of the five years included in
this study. In five of the ten countries seeking European Union membership, in a
least one year, support for the transformation to a market economy was above
two-thirds of the populations. Clearly, support for the transition to a market
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economy was high in the countries seeking membership in the European Union.
In the six countries not seeking membership in the European Union, with the
exception of Albania, support for the transition to a market economy was much
lower than in the countries seeking membership in the European Union. Only in
Macedonia did support for the transition to a market economy reach fifty percent
of the population. In general, with regard to the first question posed in this
dissertation, it can be concluded that support for the transition to a market
economy was relatively high in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
particularly in the countries seeking membership in the European Union.
The second question posed in this dissertation explored whether there
was a difference in public opinion about democracy and the market economy
between the countries seeking and not seeking membership in the European
Union. From the frequency distributions of satisfaction with democracy, there did
not appear to be a difference between the two groups of countries. On the other
hand, when examining support for the market economy, a clear difference
emerged between the two groups of countries. In the case of public support for
the market economy, support was much higher overall in the countries that were
seeking membership in the European Union compared to the countries not
seeking membership in the European Union.
In order to answer this second question more definitively, a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was conducted to test if these two groups, in fact, represented
distinct populations. The results of the Kolomogrov-Smirnov tests confirmed that
161
public opinion regarding satisfaction with democracy does not differ between the
two groups of countries. Likewise, support for the transition to a market economy
does differ between the countries that are seeking membership in the European
Union and those countries not seeking membership in the European Union.
The answers to these two questions suggest that the real difference
between these two groups of countries lies not in the satisfaction with
democracy, but rather in the support for the market economy. The implications of
the importance of the market over that of democracy are profound, particularly in
light of the connections between politics and economics.
One of the most important implications for the presence of a single
population with regard to public opinion about democracy and two distinct
populations with regard to public opinion about the market economy has to do
with concerns about the relationship between public opinion on politics and
economics. As Przeworski (1991) has argued, the link between politics and
economics means that one may be held responsible for the other. Specifically,
democracy may suffer due to disapproval of the economic conditions. Since
public satisfaction with democracy was so low in many of the countries and
support for the market economy much higher, particularly in the countries
seeking entry into the European Union, it is conceivable that democracy may be
sacrificed in order to maintain the development of the market as was the case in
Latin America as O’Donnell (1979) discussed. The problem is that democracy is
seen as the single legitimate form of governing recognized by the international
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community (Zakaria 1997). To reject democracy for some other form of
governing is to lose legitimacy in the international community. Further, for the
countries seeking membership in the European Union, to reject democracy would
result in the denial of integration into the European Union.
One of the challenges the link between public opinion on democracy and
the market economy presents is to understand the factors that help to frame
public opinion on democracy and the market economy. This leads to the next
question, what attitudinal factors contribute to public opinion about democracy
and public opinion about the market economy? This question was addressed in
Chapters 5 and 6.
Based on a general review of the literature, political, economic and foreign
relations variables were included in a model of attitudinal factors to examine
public opinion on democracy and public opinion on the market economy. The
models were essentially mirror images of each other. This was done in order to
understand if public opinion on democracy and the market economy affected
each other and were affected by the same attitudes. Tables 18 and 19 show the
patterns of significant predictor variables as well as the Nagelkerke R2 for each
country.
Starting with public opinion on satisfaction with democracy (Table 18), the
results of the analysis in this dissertation suggest that attitudes about human
rights and attitudes about economic conditions were the most important in
predicting public opinion about democracy. Perception of human rights, support
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for the market economy and future microeconomic expectations were important
in most of the countries included in this dissertation. Past microeconomic
experience was more important in the countries that were not front-runners for
membership in the next European Union expansion. Perceived future with the
European Union was most important for the countries expecting to be integrated
into the European Union during the second wave of enlargement.
The variables that were most often important to public opinion about
support for the transition to the market economy were perception of human
rights, satisfaction with democracy and future microeconomic expectations.
Additionally, household economic experience over the past 12 months was
important to public opinion about support for the market economy in the countries
that were not seeking membership in the European Union. Public opinion on the
perceived future of their country with the European Union was more important to
support for the market economy in the countries seeking membership in the
European Union than in the countries not seeking membership in the European
Union.
Based on the findings of this dissertation, and specifically in answering the
third research question, it can be concluded that some of the same factors that
are important to public opinion about democracy were important to the public
opinion about the market economy. Perceptions of human rights conditions and
future short-term household economic expectations are important to both
satisfaction with democracy and support for the market economy. Based on the
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results of the analysis, it is clear that political opinions and economic opinions
influence each other. Finally, again based on the research presented in the
pervious chapters, it is clear that a great deal is still not known about which
attitudinal factors influence public opinions on democracy and the market
economies. The low Nagelkerke R2, especially with regard to explaining support
for the market economy suggests that there are other variables that should be
included in the model in order to have a more complete understanding of the
situation. One such factor that needed to be more thoroughly examined is that of
the status of the country in seeking membership in the European Union. That is
addressed in the final research question guiding this dissertation.
The final question asks if the status of seeking membership in the
European Union accounts for the differences in attitudinal factors that contribute
to opinions about democracy and about the market economy. The answer to this
question is difficult, especially when the countries were pooled into the respective
categories. What is clear is that some patterns did emerge when the analysis
was conducted on each country individually. The two variables that seemed to be
found in one set of countries but not the others were perceived future with the
European Union and household economic experience over the past 12 months.
The perceived future of one’s country with the European Union was most often
significant statistically in the countries expecting to be granted membership in the
European Union in the second enlargement when the predicted variable was
satisfaction with democracy. In the models of support for the market economy,
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household economic experiences over the past 12 months were more likely to be
significant statistically in the countries not seeking European Union membership.
Beyond, those two variables, one in each model, there did not appear to be a
pattern that differed from one group of countries to the next.
General Conclusions and Implications
There were a number of observations that could be drawn from the
research presented in this dissertation. First and foremost, there is support of the
argument that there is a link between politics and economics in the minds of the
citizens of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, in the case
of this dissertation, there is a clear link between public opinion on democracy and
the market economy.
Perceptions of human rights conditions were found to be important to
public opinion of democracy and the market economy. The importance of
perceptions of human rights probably lies in the fact that the improvements in
human rights conditions have been some of the fastest and most appreciable
differences between regimes. For example, loosening restrictions on the press,
multiparty elections and the removal of travel restrictions can be readily seen by
the public. The importance of perceptions of human rights to understanding and
monitoring public opinion could lie in using it as a barometer of the changing
conditions in these countries. Clearly, the importance of this factor requires
further examination.
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Another point that must be made about this dissertation pertains to the
framework used to categorize the countries. The framework of categorizing the
countries based on the status of their membership with the European Union was
useful although the patterns that emerged were not as clearly distinctive as
expected. The most striking finding was the difference between countries with
regard to support for the market economy. Clearly, that has been a point of
contention for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Further examination
of a number of economic factors should include the status of the countries with
regard to the European Union.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations in this study of public opinion. I will start
by discussing the limitations that I have imposed upon the dissertation. These
include the selection of countries and years, as well as the focus on attitudes and
opinions rather than behaviors. In the second section, I will discuss some of the
inherent limitations to any study such as this, including the limitations associated
with secondary data collection and public opinion research in countries with
relatively recent histories of repression.
The first limitation is that of the selection of countries to be included in this
dissertation. I have included sixteen countries from Central and Eastern Europe.
The countries are divided based on the status of their seeking membership in the
European Union. The first category is that of the ten countries seeking
membership in the European Union. This category is subdivided into the five
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countries most likely to be granted full membership status in the first wave of
European enlargement and the five countries most likely to achieve membership
in the second wave of European Union Enlargement. The second category is
composed of the countries that are not seeking entry into the United Nations.
Table 7 lists the countries based on status of seeking membership in the
European Union.
The selection of countries was based on three conditions. First, as many
countries as possible were included so as to get a variety of countries
undergoing the political and economic transformations away from socialism as
had it been know to new forms of political economy. Second, data on the country
had to be available for all of the years in the study. Finally, effort was made to
ensure that countries in each category based on the status of seeking European
Union membership was included to allow for the basic theoretical argument to be
tested between the countries that are seeking European Union membership and
the countries that are not seeking European Union Membership.
The second limitation imposed upon this dissertation project is the years
included. This project considers public opinion in the sixteen countries over a
five-year period from 1992-1996. These years were selected because they
include the longest time-span available that include the maximum number of
countries.
This dissertation is limited to the hypotheses testing of attitudes and
opinions only. I have purposely avoided hypotheses in which attitudes and/or
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opinions are examined in relationship to a behavior.  Although the linking of
attitudes and opinions to behaviors is frequently done in the social sciences,
there are significant reservations associated with doing so.
There are limitations imposed by the use of secondary data. There are a
limited number of questions and the questions are not necessarily worded in a
manner that is conducive to the research questions asked. The limited number of
questions means that variables in this study are represented by a single
question.  The wording of the available questions means that the best
approximations available have to be used. These limitations are found in all
secondary research work.
Finally, there are inherent limitations to the use of survey data, and
especially survey data in countries with a history of repressive regimes.
Research conducted this early in the transformation period in many of these
countries may be affected by ideological and practical conditions within these
countries prior to the start of the transformation processes.  That being stated,
the very problem becomes one of the project’s strengths.  The conditions in
Central and Eastern Europe provide an opportunity to explore public opinion on
democracy and capitalism in countries whose recent history consists of neither.
Despite all of these limitations, this study provides an important baseline from
which to examine the future trends in public opinion in Central and Eastern
Europe. Additionally, it offers a useful theoretical framework from which to
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understand patterns of public opinion regarding the political and economic
transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Future Research
A great deal of research on the political economy transformations in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe needs to be undertaken. While the
possibilities of research on public opinion and public conditions in Central and
Eastern Europe is almost limitless, based on the research presented in this
dissertation, future research is especially important in some areas. First, since
the political and economic reforms take time to implement as well as time to feel
the consequences of the reforms, studies must be done that better include time
as an important factor within the models examined. In the future, as more time
passes, enough time points of data will become available to conduct various
types of time series analyses. This will increase the depth of understanding of
public opinion and the political and economic transformation in Central and
Eastern Europe.
The second focus of research should examine the existence of supporters
and detractors of the political and economic transformations. As with any political
and/or economic change, people from various social classes, occupations, and
places of residences, etc. are affected differently. As this is the case, the social
costs of the economic reforms will not be carried evenly throughout the citizenry
of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Likewise, the benefits of the
political transformation to democracy may not be totally inclusive, leaving certain
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segments of society without access to power. In both of these cases, social
unrest is a possibility.
Related to the first and second areas for future research is another area in
need of further examination. Since public opinion does not occur within a void,
the relationship between the political and economic reforms and public opinion
needs to be examined. It may be done in a number of ways but ideally it would
be done in a manner that captures the public perceptions and reactions to
structural adjustments, political and economic, over short and long time periods.
Overall, public opinion research in Central and Eastern Europe is an
important and potentially fruitful endeavor. The situation and conditions in Central
and Eastern Europe offer an unprecedented opportunity to examine political,
social and economic change. The social costs of the transformation have been
very high. Understanding the people sentiments and concerns about the
changing conditions may provide insights into the dynamics of the political
economy changes beyond artificial institution building and toward the
establishment of stable democracies and efficient, functioning market economies.
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Table 1
Number of Respondents by County, 1992 – 1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Albania 1312 1198 1045 1098 1035
Czech Republic 924 817 1062 1075 1021
Estonia 1000 1011 1002 1001 1071
Hungary 1000 972 1018 1004 1002
Latvia 1000 992 1000 1094 1017
Lithuania 1000 1020 1008 1003 1012
Poland 999 1004 1004 1000 1004
Romania 100 1176 1281 1141 1195
Slovakia 734 684 995 1137 1066
Slovenia 1063 1000 1086 1164 1114
Albania 1049 1054 1034 1003 1013
Armenia 918 1000 1000 1000 1000
Belarus 1030 1143 1099 1021 1061
Macedonia 1002 1097 1000 1000 1000
Russia 1000 1377 1000 1178 1065
Ukraine 1400 1171 1200 1199 1200
Total Number 16,431 16,716 16,834 17,219 16,876
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Table 2
Central and Eastern European Countries and Their Status on Membership in the
European Union













Percentage of Respondents Satisfied with Democracy, 1992-1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Seeking Membership
Czech Republic 39.6 49.7 45.1 48.1 42.0
Estonia 29.9 41.0 35.7 39.6 42.2
Hungary 24.1 21.4 27.6 20.6 22.0
Poland 36.0 44.0 27.4 56.8 48.5
Slovenia 49.9 36.8 35.0 38.2 43.8
Bulgaria 39.9 23.1 4.0 14.3 6.2
Latvia 17.5 33.7 27.0 30.6 28.8
Lithuania 51.7 38.1 35.9 27.2 33.3
Romania 29.3 34.4 31.0 38.4 56.1
Slovakia 24.1 20.7 17.3 28.5 23.0
Not Seeking Membership
Albania 43.3 41.7 34.3 61.7 76.5
Armenia 14.3 6.4 10.0 19.6 19.7
Belarus 12.2 16.2 13.4 15.4 20.3
Macedonia 51.1 46.8 35.8 39.7 40.9
Russia 13.0 17.0 8.0 6.6 8.6
Ukraine 20.9 16.9 18.0 17.1 20.8
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Table 4
Percentage of Respondents Supporting a Market Economy, 1992 – 1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Seeking Membership
Czech Republic 62.8 59.1 57.3 54.8 52.5
Estonia 62.4 68.1 58.7 62.1 62.9
Hungary 75.6 64.8 65.3 54.4 55.6
Poland 69.6 72.0 68.9 81.2 75.4
Slovenia 73.9 52.9 62.3 55.2 55.2
Bulgaria 73.4 65.6 48.2 55.0 58.8
Latvia 46.7 55.4 48.7 52.3 56.4
Lithuania 78.2 73.2 59.5 63.9 57.4
Romania 73.0 68.6 77.5 77.3 85.2
Slovakia 57.3 50.0 50.9 50.1 51.1
Not Seeking Membership
Albania 78.3 77.4 72.0 83.3 83.5
Armenia 39.6 25.4 26.3 44.2 26.4
Belarus 38.2 38.0 34.9 42.3 47.3
Macedonia 36.9 38.6 40.7 52.5 52.4
Russia 49.4 36.6 27.0 23.4 29.6
Ukraine 47.1 37.6 38.9 30.2 32.4
175
Table 5
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Satisfaction with Democracy Between Countries
Seeking and Not Seeking European Union Membership, 1992-1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Most Extreme Differences
Absolute 0.567 0.667 0.467 0.567 0.567
Positive 0.133 0.133 0.100 0.167 0.167
Negative -0.567 -0.667 -0.467 -0.567 -0.567
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.097 1.129 0.904 1.097 1.097
Asump. Sig. (1-tail) 0.180 0.071 0.388 0.180 0.180
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Table 6
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on Support for a Market Economy Between Countries
Seeking and Not Seeking European Union Membership, 1992 - 1996
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Most Extreme Differences
Absolute 0.733 0.833 0.833 0.667 0.773
Positive 0.167 0.167 0.067 0.167 0.067
Negative -0.733 -0.833 -0.833 -0.667 -0.733
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.420 1.614 1.614 1.291 1.420
Assump. Sig. (1-tail) 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.036 0.018
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Table 7:














































































* p. < 0.001
N indicated in parentheses
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Table 9
Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the First  Wave Enlargement, 1996
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -2.611*** .209 .073 -1.985*** .177 .137 -2.530*** .249 .080 -1.965*** .250 .140 -1.394*** .166 .248
Perceived
Human Rights
1.228*** .175 3.414 1.496*** .155 4.463 .913*** .236 2.492 1.206*** .184 3.341 1.209*** .154 3.349
Market Economy
Support













.585*** .176 1.795 .173 .155 1.189 -.019 .221 .981 -.101 .185 .904 .156 .164 1.169
Model Chi-Square 233.656 / 5 d.f. *** 202.218*** 55.860*** 156.025*** 121.796***
Percent Correctly
Predicted
74.6 71.3 78.1 71.8 67.6
Nagelkerke R2 .357 .275 .141 .294 .184
N 755 833 579 627 821
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 10
Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the Second  Wave Enlargement, 1996
Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -3.876*** .440 .021 -2.561*** .216 .077 -1.872*** .215 .154 -1.426*** .241 .240 -2.611*** .209 .073
Perceived
Human Rights
.300 .354 1.349 1.369*** .191 3.930 2.313*** .295 10.104 1.824*** .172 6.197 1.946*** .199 6.998
Market Economy
Support













-.331 .360 .718 .113 .197 1.119 .610** .215 1.840 .734*** .179 2.084 -.400* .193 .670
Model Chi-Square 23.039*** 145.427*** 127.433*** 210.204 180.022***
Percent Correctly
Predicted
94.1 73.8 75.0 67.8 74.2
Nagelkerke R2 .100 .276 .303 .225 .304
N 628 673 511 1000 776
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 11a
Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the European
Union, 1996
Albania Armenia Macedonia
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -2.955*** .381 .052 -2.784*** .171 .062 -1.881*** .176 .153
Perceived
Human Rights
2.178*** .250 8.830 1.82*** .196 4.402 1.586*** .169 4.885
Market Economy
Support













.347 .242 1.414 -.082 .435 .922 .100 .169 1.105




Nagelkerke R2 .536 .299 .285
N 816 876 758
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 11b
Logistic Regression on Satisfaction with Democracy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the European
Union, 1996
Belarus Russia Ukraine
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -2.514*** .229 .081 -3.765*** .300 .023 -2.314*** .171 .099
Perceived
Human Rights
1.533*** .237 4.631 1.420*** .316 4.137 1.055*** .228 2.872
Market Economy
Support













-.754 .481 .470 -.215 .411 .807 .787*** .246 2.197




Nagelkerke R2 .183 .269 .213
N 551 628 648
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 12
Logistic Regression of Satisfaction with Democracy for Countries Pooled Based on Status of Seeking Membership with the European Union,
1996
Frontrunner Countries Seeking Entry
into the European Union
Countries Seeking Entry into the
European Union
Countries  Not Seeking Entry into
the European Union
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -1.988*** .085 .137 -2.387*** .097 .092 -2.855*** .083 .058
Perceived Human
Rights
1.141*** .075 3.131 1.176*** .080 3.241 1.756*** .085 5.791
Market Economy
Support
.866*** .080 2.378 .972*** .094 2.642 .983*** .087 2.672
Future Household
Economic Expectation
.540*** .085 1.716 .959*** .082 2.609 .823*** .092 2.278
Past Household
Economic Experience
.851*** .097 2.342 .820*** .099 2.270 .986*** .097 2.679
Perceived Future with
European Union
.301*** .075 1.351 -.114 .080 .892 .576*** .094 1.778
  Model Chi Square 753.005*** 749.555*** 1889.095***
  Percent Correctly
  Predicted
70.3 73.5 81.2
  Nagelkerke R2 .250 .261 .494
  N 3665 3588 4277
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 13


































































Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the First  Wave Enlargement, 1996
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -1.290*** .150 .275 -.314*** .127 .731 -.547*** .148 .579 .319 .171 1.376 -.831*** .148 .436
Perceived
Human Rights .767*** .172 2.152 .474** .157 1.606 .521*** .179 1.684 .221 .222 1.248 .483** .158 1.621
Satisfaction with













.591*** .197 1.806 .451** .150 1.569 .498** .187 1.645 .503** .171 1.376 .720*** .155 2.055
Model Chi-Square
179.617*** 84.442*** 55.467*** 61.144*** 85.236***
Percent Correctly
Predicted 71.1 67.2 62.7 78.3 61.4
Nagelkerke R2 .283 .125 .122 .143 .132
N 755 883 579 627 821
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 15
Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Expecting Membership in the European Union During the Second  Wave Enlargement, 1996
Bulgaria Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -.067 .140 .935 -.525*** .127 .591 -.141*** .140 .869 .663*** .193 1.940 -.723*** .128 .485
Perceived
Human Rights .310 .175 1.363 .573** .183 1.774 .829** .307 2.292 .563* .264 1.756 .150 .170 1.111
Satisfaction with













.989*** .173 2.688 .646*** .179 1.909 .177 .197 1.193 .862*** .211 2.368 .740*** .154 2.095
Model Chi-Square
45.546*** 92.060*** 40.323*** 62.022*** 83.407***
Percent Correctly
Predicted 61.6 66.0 64.6 87.6 63.7
Nagelkerke R2 .094 .172 .103 .114 .136
N 628 673 511 1000 776
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 16a
Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the
European Union, 1996
Albania Armenia Macedonia
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -.354 .231 .702 -1.800*** .123 .165 -.846*** .139 .429
Perceived
Human Rights .582* .299 1.789 .962*** .180 2.617 .452** .167 1.571
Satisfaction with













.203 .219 1.225 -.028 .381 .941 .353* .157 1.424
Model Chi-Square 107.396*** 129.789*** 91.943***
Percent Correctly
Predicted 86.6 75.9 64.5
Nagelkerke R2 .217 .199 .152
N 816 876 758
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 16b
Logistic Regression on Support for the Market Economy in the Countries Not Seeking Membership in the
European Union, 1996
Belarus Russia Ukraine
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -.210 .120 .810 -1.455*** .126 .234 -1.314*** .121 .269
Perceived
Human Rights .012 .205 1.012 .741** .253 2.097 .642** .218 1.900
Satisfaction with

















Predicted 56.1 74.8 69.8
Nagelkerke R2 .022 .212 .138
N 551 628 648
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 17
Logistic Regression of Support for the Market Economy for Countries Pooled Based on Status of Seeking Membership with the European
Union, 1996
Frontrunner Countries Seeking Entry
into the European Union
Countries Seeking Entry into the
European Union
Countries  Not Seeking Entry into
the European Union
B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B) B S.E. Exp(B)
Constant -.529*** .063 .589 -.285*** .061 .752 -1.223*** .051 .294
Perceived Human
Rights
.484*** .075 1.623 .261** .084 1.298 .619*** .082 1.857
Satisfaction with
Democracy
.868*** .080 2.382 .956*** .095 2.600 .982*** .087 2.671
Future Household
Economic Expectation
.429*** .088 1.535 .804*** .085 2.234 .591*** .081 1.806
Past Household
Economic Experience
.370*** .104 1.448 .176 .113 1.192 .616*** .090 1.851
Perceived Future with
European Union
.514*** .072 1.673 .693*** .077 1.999 .606*** .084 1.833




Nagelkerke R2 .153 .164 .294
N 3665 3588 4277
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0. 001
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Table 18


















First Wave for Membership
Czech Rep. 35.7 X X X X
Estonia 27.5 X X X X
Hungary 14.1 X X
Poland 29.4 X X X
Slovenia 18.4 X X X
Second Wave for Membership
Bulgaria 10.0 X
Latvia 27.6 X X X X X
Lithuania 30.3 X X X X X
Romania 22.5 X X X X X
Slovakia 30.4 X X X
Not Seeking Membership
Albania 53.6 X X X X
Armenia 29.9 X X X X
Belarus 18.3 X
Macedonia 28.5 X X X X
Russia 26.9 X X
Ukraine 21.3 X X X X
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Table 19


















First Wave for Membership
Czech Rep 28.3 X X X X
Estonia 12.5 X X X X
Hungary 12.2 X X X X
Poland 14.3 X X
Slovenia 13.2 X X X X
Second Wave for Membership
Bulgaria 9.4 X X
Latvia 17.2 X X X X
Lithuania 10.3 X X X
Romania 11.4 X X X X
Slovakia 13.6 X X X
Not Seeking Membership
Albania 21.7 X X X
Armenia 19.9 X X X X
Belarus 15.2 X
Macedonia 2.2 X X X X X
Russia 21.2 X X X X
Ukraine 13.8 X X X
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The Central and Eastern European Barometer is a nationally-
representative survey conducted each year in a number of countries in Central
and Eastern Europe.  Like its counterpart, the Eurobarometer, the Central and
Eastern European Barometer, is conducted with person-to-person with people 15
years or older in their homes in the country-appropriate language.  In this study,
data from the countries of Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine from 1992 to 1996 (Central and Eastern
European Barometers 3 – 7) included in the analysis.  In this appendix, the
specific sampling procedure for each year and each country will be discussed.
 The Central and Eastern European Barometer 3 was conducted from
October 30 to November 17, 2001.  Multistage national probability samples were
employed in of Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Ukraine.  In each country the sample was representative of the
adult population age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents
interviewed from the eight selected countries is 16,431.
Central and Eastern European Barometer 4 was conducted for 10 days to
2 week periods from November 1 to November 27 in Albania, Armenia, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.  The survey was
a fully representative national sample using a multi-stage random probability
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sample for each country.  In each country, there were slight variations in the
sample design to account for its individual characteristics and population
structures.  The sample was representative of the adult population age 15 years
and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the eight selected
countries was 16,716.
Central and Eastern European Barometer 5 was conducted for 10 days to
2 week periods in November in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.  The survey was a fully representative
national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country.
In each country, there were slight variations in the sample design to account for
its individual characteristics and population structures.  The sample was
representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number
of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries was 15,000.
The Central and Eastern European Barometer 6 was conducted from
November 2 to November 28 in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.  The survey was a fully representative
national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country
except Russia and Estonia.  In the case of Russia, the Far North and
inaccessible regions of Siberia were omitted.  The islands of Saarema and
Hiiumma in Estonia were omitted also.  In each country, there were slight
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variations in the sample design to account for its individual characteristics and
population structures.  The sample was representative of the adult population
age 15 years and older. The total number of respondents interviewed from the
eight selected countries was 17,219.
Central and Eastern European Barometer 7 was conducted from
November 1 to November 29 in Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Macedonia, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine.  The survey was a fully representative
national sample using a multi-stage random probability sample for each country.
In each country, there were slight variations in the sample design to account for
its individual characteristics and population structures.  The sample was
representative of the adult population age 15 years and older. The total number
of respondents interviewed from the eight selected countries was 16,876.
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Appendix B. Table 1
Question: On the whole are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not
at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing?




N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Albania
1992 101 (9.8) 344 (33.5) 421 (41.0) 162 (15.8)
1993 85 (8.2) 347 (33.5) 477 (46.0) 128 (12.3)
1994 74 (7.3) 276 (27.1) 484 (47.5) 186 (18.2)
1995 112 (11.2) 506 (50.5) 267 (26.7) 116 (11.6)
1996 343 (34.1) 427 (42.4) 149 (14.8) 88 (8.7)
Armenia
1992 29 (3.3) 98 (11.0) 328 (37.0) 432 (48.7)
1993 11 (1.2) 48 (5.2) 392 (42.3) 476 (51.3)
1994 11 (1.2) 84 (8.8) 371 (38.9) 488 (51.2)
1995 6 (.6) 186 (19.0) 427 (43.5) 362 (36.9)
1996 13 (1.3) 180 (18.3) 413 (42.1) 376 (38.3)
Belarus
1992 11 (1.2) 100 (11.0) 467 (51.4) 330 (36.3)
1993 11 (1.1) 145 (15.1) 535 (55.6) 272 (28.2)
1994 8 (.8) 120 (12.6) 502 (52.6) 324 (34.0)
1995 4 (.5) 127 (14.9) 385 (45.2) 336 (39.4)
1996 13 (1.5) 160 (18.7) 404 (47.3) 277 (32.4)
Bulgaria
1992 52 (4.4) 417 (35.5) 417 (35.5) 290 (24.7)
1993 9 (.8) 243 (22.3) 378 (34.6) 462 (42.3)
1994 5 (.5) 35 (3.5) 452 (45.1) 510 (50.9)
1995 26 (2.6) 119 (11.7) 495 (48.8) 375 (36.9)
1996 15 (1.6) 44 (4.6) 410 (42.9) 486 (50.9)
Czech Rep.
1992 21 (2.4) 332 (37.7) 439 (49.3) 99 (11.1)
1993 17 (2.2) 376 (47.6) 306 (38.7) 91 (11.5)
1994 32 (3.1) 436 (42.9) 426 (41.1) 143 (13.8)
1995 34 (3.3) 464 (44.8) 420 (40.6) 117 (11.3)
1996 18 (1.8) 400 (40.2) 440 (44.2) 138 (13.9)
Appendix B Table 1 continued on next page
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Slovakia
1992 11 (1.5) 161 (22.5) 420 (58.8) 122 (17.1)
1993 11 (1.7) 126 (19.0) 380 (57.3) 146 (22.0)
1994 15 (1.6) 152 (15.7) 548 (56.7) 251 (26.0)
1995 23 (2.1) 282 (26.3) 552 (51.4) 214 (20.0)
1996 23 (2.3) 212 (20.8) 498 (48.8) 288 (28.2)
Estonia
1992 13 (1.4) 259 (28.5) 403 (44.3) 234 (25.7)
1993 24 (2.7) 340 (38.3) 385 (43.4) 138 (15.6)
1994 13 (1.4) 318 (34.3) 395 (42.7) 200 (21.6)
1995 28 (2.9) 351 (36.6) 430 (44.9) 149 (15.6)
1996 20 (1.9) 418 (40.3) 474 (54.7) 126 (12.1)
Hungary
1992 16 (1.7) 212 (22.4) 440 (46.4) 280 (29.5)
1993 22 (2.4) 175 (19.0) 430 (46.8) 292 (31.8)
1994 16 (1.8) 233 (25.8) 419 (46.5) 234 (25.9)
1995 19 (2.0) 181 (18.6) 462 (47.5) 311 (32.0)
1996 11 (1.2) 195 (20.8) 400 (42.6) 332 (35.4)
Latvia
1992 8 (.9) 156 (16.6) 551 (58.7) 223 (23.8)
1993 16 (1.8) 291 (31.9) 447 (49.1) 157 (17.2)
1994 9 (1.0) 246 (26.9) 460 (48.6) 231 (24.4)
1995 19 (1.8) 296 (28.7) 524 (50.9) 191 (18.5)
1996 18 (1.8) 264 (27.0) 457 (46.7) 240 (24.5)
Lithuania
1992 41 (4.4) 436 (47.3) 395 (42.8) 50 (5.4)
1993 29 (3.1) 328 (35.0) 442 (47.2) 138 (14.7)
1994 18 (1.9) 321 (34.0) 442 (46.9) 162 (17.2)
1995 12 (1.3) 242 (25.9) 488 (52.3) 191 (20.5)
1996 6 (.7) 298 (32.6) 466 (51.0) 144 (15.8)
Macedonia
1992 92 (9.5) 403 (41.6) 250 (25.8) 223 (23.0)
1993 91 (8.9) 389 (37.9) 309 (30.1) 237 (23.1)
1994 44 (4.4) 310 (31.3) 365 (36.9) 270 (27.3)
1995 56 (6.0) 316 (33.8) 399 (42.6) 165 (17.6)
1996 41 (4.2) 354 (36.6) 497 (51.4) 74 (7.7)
Poland
1992 22 (2.2) 299 (33.6) 387 (43.7) 181 (20.3)
1993 34 (3.9) 346 (40.0) 389 (45.0) 95 (11.0)
1994 9 (1.0) 235 (26.3) 464 (52.0) 184 (20.6)
1995 53 (6.0) 451 (50.8) 299 (33.7) 85 (9.6)
1996 43 (4.8) 396 (43.8) 350 (38.7) 116 (12.8)
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Romania
1992 37 (3.8) 251 (25.6) 434 (44.2) 260 (26.5)
1993 20 (2.0) 329 (32.4) 505 (49.7) 162 (15.9)
1994 18 (1.4) 371 (29.5) 618 (49.2) 249 (19.8)
1995 11 (1.0) 411 (37.4) 550 (50.0) 127 (11.6)
1996 30 (2.6) 623 (53.5) 459 (39.4) 53 (4.5)
Russia
1992 9 (.1) 105 (12.0) 419 (47.9) 342 (39.1)
1993 22 (1.8) 181 (15.1) 563 (47.0) 431 (36.0)
1994 2 (.2) 72 (7.8) 399 (43.2) 450 (48.8)
1995 5 (.5) 66 (6.1) 482 (44.6) 527 (48.8)
1996 5 (.5) 77 (8.0) 462 (48.2) 414 (43.2)
Slovenia
1992 32 (3.1) 479 (46.7) 447 (43.6) 67 (6.5)
1993 22 (2.3) 329 (34.5) 472 (49.4) 132 (13.8)
1994 17 (1.7) 339 (33.3) 498 (48.9) 164 (16.1)
1995 22 (1.9) 411 (36.3) 547 (48.3) 153 (13.5)
1996 37 (3.4) 433 (40.4) 492 (45.9) 111 (10.3)
Ukraine
1992 15 (1.2) 239 (19.7) 582 (47.9) 378 (31.1)
1993 15 (1.5) 158 (15.5) 342 (33.5) 506 (49.6)
1994 15 (1.5) 170 (16.6) 370 (36.1) 470 (45.9)
1995 25 (2.4) 153 (14.7) 333 (32.0) 530 (50.9)
1996 27 (2.6) 187 (18.1) 405 (39.3) 412 (40.0)
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Appendix B. Table 2
Question: Do you personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that
is largely free from state control, is right or wrong for (our country?
Right Wrong
N (%) N (%)
Albania
1992 769 (78.3) 213 (21.7)
1993 738 (77.4) 216 (22.6)
1994 693 (72.0) 270 (28.0)
1995 789 (73.3) 158 (16.7)
1996 769 (83.5) 152 (16.5)
Armenia
1992 325 (39.6) 496 (60.4)
1993 227 (25.4) 666 (74.6)
1994 224 (26.3) 682 (73.7)
1995 434 (44.2) 548 (55.8)
1996 253 (26.4) 704 (73.6)
Belarus
1992 348 (33.8) 562 (61.8)
1993 348 (30.4) 568 (62.0)
1994 311 (34.9) 581 (65.1)
1995 335 (42.3) 457 (57.7)
1996 372 (47.3) 415 (52.7)
Bulgaria
1992 738 (73.4) 268 (26.6)
1993 623 (65.6) 326 (34.4)
1994 415 (48.2) 446 (51.8)
1995 443 (55.0) 362 (45.0)
1996 474 (58.8) 332 (41.2)
Czech Rep.
1992 509 (62.8) 301 (37.2)
1993 423 (59.1) 293 (40.9)
1994 516 (57.3) 385 (42.7)
1995 470 (54.8) 387 (45.2)
1996 458 (52.5) 415 (47.5)
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Slovakia
1992 371 (57.3) 277 (42.7)
1993 288 (50.0) 288 (50.0)
1994 434 (50.9) 418 (49.1)
1995 452 (50.1) 451 (49.9)
1996 252 (51.1) 433 (48.9)
Estonia
1992 497 (62.4) 300 (37.6)
1993 542 (68.1) 254 (31.9)
1994 490 (58.7) 345 (41.3)
1995 561 (62.1) 342 (37.9)
1996 611 (62.9) 361 (37.1)
Hungary
1992 556 (75.6) 179 (24.4)
1993 449 (64.8) 244 (35.2)
1994 449 (65.3) 139 (34.7)
1995 405 (54.4) 339 (45.6)
1996 556 (55.6) 309 (44.4)
Latvia
1992 395 (46.7) 451 (53.3)
1993 463 (55.4) 356 (44.6)
1994 398 (48.7) 420 (51.3)
1995 475 (52.3) 443 (47.7)
1996 455 (56.4) 352 (43.6)
Lithuania
1992 658 (78.2) 183 (21.8)
1993 623 (73.2) 228 (26.8)
1994 508 (59.5) 346 (40.5)
1995 497 (63.9) 281 (36.1)
1996 413 (57.4) 306 (42.6)
Macedonia
1992 303 (36.9) 519 (63.1)
1993 348 (38.6) 554 (61.4)
1994 352 (40.7) 512 (59.3)
1995 403 (52.5) 365 (47.5)
1996 435 (52.4) 395 (47.6)
Poland
1992 556 (69.6) 243 (30.4)
1993 575 (72.0) 224 (28.0)
1994 518 (68.9) 234 (31.1)
1995 642 (81.2) 149 (18.8)
1996 637 (75.4) 208 (24.6)
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Romania
1992 656 (73.0) 243 (27.0)
1993 600 (68.5) 275 (31.4)
1994 921 (77.5) 268 (22.5)
1995 816 (77.3) 240 (22.7)
1996 959 (85.2) 166 (14.8)
Russia
1992 406 (49.4) 416 (50.6)
1993 423 (30.7) 732 (36.6)
1994 232 (27.0) 627 (73.0)
1995 235 (23.4) 770 (76.6)
1996 262 (29.6) 622 (70.4)
Slovenia
1992 702 (73.9) 248 (26.1)
1993 445 (52.9) 396 (47.1)
1994 557 (62.3) 337 (37.7)
1995 537 (55.2) 436 (44.8)
1996 518 (55.2) 420 (44.8)
Ukraine
1992 542 (47.1) 608 (52.9)
1993 361 (37.6) 398 (62.4)
1994 360 (38.9) 565 (61.1)
1995 275 (30.2) 637 (69.8.)
1996 306 (32.4) 637 (67.6)
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Appendix B. Table 3
Question: To what degree to you believe that there is respect for individual
human rights in (our country)?




N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Albania
1992 139 (13.9) 146 (46.7) 296 (29.5) 99 (9.9)
1993 87 (8.5) 484 (47.2) 345 (33.6) 110 (10.7)
1994 139 (14.0) 434 (43.8) 311 (31.4) 108 (10.9)
1995 223 (22.5) 549 (55.3) 152 (15.3) 68 (6.9)
1996 229 (23.3) 499 (50.8) 169 (17.2) 85 (8.7)
Armenia
1992 30 (3.6) 162 (19.6) 176 (21.3) 459 (55.5)
1993 9 (0.9) 165 (16.5) 247 (24.9) 517 (57.7)
1994 6 (0.6) 151 (15.3) 273 (27.6) 559 (56.5)
1995 22 (2.2) 247 (24.8) 340 (34.2) 385 (38.7)
1996 14 (1.4) 267 (26.9) 298 (30.8) 415 (41.8)
Belarus
1992 25 (2.6) 279 (29.4) 348 (36.7) 296 (31.2)
1993 26 (2.3) 428 (37.5) 483 (42.4) 203 (17.8)
1994 11 (1.0) 249 (23.0) 443 (40.9) 380 (35.1)
1995 6 (0.6) 348 (25.4) 354 (36.2) 369 (37.8)
1996 27 (2.7) 389 (28.8) 367 (36.5) 322 (32.0)
Bulgaria
1992 195 (17.6) 550 (49.7) 243 (22.0) 118 (10.7)
1993 96 (8.8) 466 (42.9) 331 (30.5) 194 (17.8)
1994 75 (7.8) 365 (37.9) 335 (34.8) 189 (19.6)
1995 120 (12.3) 359 (36.8) 351 (36.0) 146 (15.0)
1996 72 (7.6) 347 (36.6) 330 (34.8) 200 (21.1)
Czech Rep.
1992 54 (6.5) 450 (54.3) 278 (33.5) 47 (5.7)
1993 57 (7.1) 391 (49.6) 297 (37.7) 44 (5.6)
1994 56 (5.5) 499 (48.6) 404 (39.4) 67 (6.5)
1995 45 (4.4) 484 (47.7) 406 (40.0) 79 (7.8)
1996 35 (3.6) 440 (45.0) 394 (40.3) 108 (11.1)
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Slovakia
1992 195 (29.1) 272 (40.5) 155 (23.1) 49 (7.3)
1993 130 (19.8) 291 (44.4) 151 (23.0) 84 (12.8)
1994 213 (22.6) 441 (46.8) 198 (21.0) 91 (9.7)
1995 51 (4.8) 441 (41.4) 447 (41.9) 127 (11.9)
1996 28 (2.8) 387 (38.2) 455 (44.9) 144 (14.2)
Estonia
1992 107 (12.4) 309 (35.8) 274 (31.7) 174 (20.1)
1993 119 (12.4) 442 (45.9) 291 (30.2) 111 (11.5)
1994 49 (5.0) 393 (40.3) 383 (39.3) 149 (15.3)
1995 82 (8.3) 427 (43.4) 350 (35.5) 126 (12.8)
1996 72 (6.8) 462 (43.6) 418 (39.4) 108 (10.2)
Hungary
1992 127 (14.2) 481 (53.7) 202 (22.5) 86 (9.6)
1993 113 (12.2) 488 (52.8) 224 (24.2) 100 (10.8)
1994 112 (12.2) 529 (57.6) 211 (23.0) 66 (7.2)
1995 102 (10.5) 503 (51.9) 256 (26.4) 108 (11.1)
1996 67 (7.1) 458 (48.8) 278 (29.6) 135 (14.4)
Latvia
1992 75 (8.1) 320 (34.7) 376 (40.7) 152 (16.5)
1993 64 (6.6) 375 (38.9) 361 (37.4) 165 (17.1)
1994 46 (4.8) 347 (35.8) 373 (38.5) 202 (20.9)
1995 59 (5.6) 407 (38.4) 435 (41.0) 160 (15.1)
1996 50 (5.0) 331 (33.3) 432 (43.5) 181 (18.2)
Lithuania
1992 34 (3.8) 338 (38.2) 403 (45.5) 110 (12.4)
1993 16 (1.6) 187 (19.1) 483 (49.2) 295 (30.1)
1994 14 (1.4) 229 (23.4) 472 (48.3) 262 (26.8)
1995 8 (0.8) 165 (17.3) 482 (50.5) 300 (31.4)
1996 3 (0.3) 163 (17.0) 521 (54.4) 270 (28.2)
Macedonia
1992 223 (24.1) 296 (32.0) 217 (23.5) 188 (20.3)
1993 217 (21.3) 354 (34.7) 250 (24.5) 200 (19.6)
1994 99 (10.0) 364 (36.7) 291 (29.4) 237 (23.9)
1995 104 (11.0) 434 (45.9) 250 (26.5) 157 (16.6)
1996 70 (7.2) 390 (39.8) 314 (32.1) 205 (20.9)
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Poland
1992 28 (3.2) 316 (35.9) 384 (43.6) 153 (17.4)
1993 25 (2.7) 366 (39.5) 387 (41.8) 148 (16.0)
1994 19 (2.1) 284 (31.1) 440 (48.2) 169 (18.5)
1995 23 (2.5) 426 (45.4) 374 (40.7) 96 (10.4)
1996 37 (2.8) 374 (39.5) 428 (45.1) 119 (12.6)
Romania
1992 147 (15.7) 394 (42.1) 232 (24.8) 162 (17.3)
1993 94 (8.7) 402 (37.2) 398 (36.8) 187 (17.3)
1994 35 (2.8) 311 (24.6) 624 (49.3) 296 (23.4)
1995 25 (2.3) 297 (27.0) 619 (56.4) 157 (14.3)
1996 28 (2.4) 358 (30.5) 649 (55.2) 140 (11.9)
Russia
1992 8 (0.9) 212 (23.9) 323 (36.4) 345 (38.9)
1993 36 (2.7) 252 (18.9) 427 (32.7) 611 (45.7)
1994 2 (0.2) 137 (14.0) 321 (32.9) 516 (52.9)
1995 4 (0.3) 147 (12.8) 391 (34.1) 606 (52.8)
1996 5 (0.5) 143 (13.9) 336 (32.7) 543 (52.9)
Slovenia
1992 138 (14.0) 486 (49.4) 291 (29.6 69 (7.0)
1993 66 (6.8) 379 (39.1) 410 (42.3 114 (11.8)
1994 38 (3.6) 366 (34.4) 513 (48.2 147 (13.8)
1995 67 (5.8) 484 (42.1) 475 (41.3 123 (10.7)
1996 73 (6.7) 407 (37.3) 485 (44.4 127 (11.6)
Ukraine
1992 9 (0.7) 367 (29.6) 479 (38.7 383 (30.9)
1993 11 (1.0) 183 (16.7) 330 (30.1 573 (52.2)
1994 15 (1.3) 206 (18.0) 379 (33.2 543 (47.5)
1995 9 (0.8) 166 (14.5) 334 (29.1 638 (55.6)
1996 23 (2.0) 212 (18.8) 329 (29.2 564 (50.0)
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Appendix B Table 4
Question: Over the next 12 months, do you expect that the financial situation of











N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Albania
1992 194 (19.5) 523 (52.5) 179 (18.0) 67 (6.7) 33 (3.3)
1993 156 (16.6) 463 (49.2) 218 (23.1) 62 (6.6) 43 (4.6)
1994 98 (10.9) 472 (52.4) 226 (25.1) 62 (6.9) 42 (4.7)
1995 259 (26.8) 507 (52.5) 170 (17.6) 20 (2.1) 9 (0.9)
1996 378 (41.2) 387 (42.2) 118 (12.9) 22 (2.4) 12 (1.3)
Armenia
1992 43 (5.7) 125 (16.6) 143 (19.0) 161 (21.4) 279 (37.2)
1993 11 (1.3) 157 (18.8) 160 (19.1) 143 (17.1) 365 (43.7)
1994 14 (1.6) 146 (16.7) 208 (23.8) 218 (25.0) 287 (32.9)
1995 25 (2.6) 303 (31.9) 306 (32.2) 167 (17.6) 148 (15.6)
1996 28 (2.9) 260 (27.3) 329 (34.6) 129 (13.6) 205 (21.6)
Belarus
1992 12 (1.3) 140 (15.7) 251 (28.2) 245 (27.6) 241 (27.1)
1993 16 (1.6) 117 (12.0) 315 (32.3) 323 (33.1) 204 (20.9)
1994 32 (3.6) 187 (21.3) 241 (27.5) 222 (25.3) 195 (22.2)
1995 17 (2.1) 157 (19.6) 337 (42.1) 198 (24.8) 91 (11.4)
1996 29 (3.6) 189 (23.7) 308 (38.6) 177 (22.2) 95 (11.9)
Bulgaria
1992 54 (4.8) 392 (34.7) 316 (27.9) 155 (13.7) 214 (18.9)
1993 18 (1.7) 204 (19.2) 311 (29.2) 275 (25.8) 257 (24.1)
1994 20 (2.1) 242 (25.8) 282 (30.1) 189 (20.1) 205 (21.9)
1995 39 (4.0) 345 (35.6) 388 (40.0) 121 (12.5) 77 (7.9)
1996 9 (1.0) 199 (21.5) 238 (25.7) 160 (17.3) 321 (34.6)
Czech Rep.
1992 19 (2.1) 203 (22.9 335 (37.9) 214 (24.2) 114 (12.9)
1993 22 (2.8) 202 (25.7 304 (38.6) 192 (24.4) 67 (8.5)
1994 19 (1.9) 228 (22.9 450 (45.3) 227 (22.8) 70 (7.0)
1995 26 (2.6) 257 (25.6 456 (45.4) 217 (21.6) 49 (4.9)
1996 21 (2.2) 205 (21.6 463 (48.8) 196 (20.7) 63 (6.6)
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Slovakia
1992 15 (2.1) 131 (18.4) 165 (23.2) 224 (31.5) 176 (24.8)
1993 10 (1.5) 156 (23.7) 186 (28.3) 202 (30.7) 103 (15.7)
1994 20 (2.1) 208 (21.9) 396 (41.7) 236 (24.8) 90 (9.5)
1995 21 (2.0) 245 (23.6) 449 (42.9) 242 (23.3) 86 (8.3)
1996 17 (1.7) 236 (23.4) 406 (40.2) 254 (25.2) 96 (9.5)
Estonia
1992 21 (2.6) 199 (24.2) 261 (31.8) 173 (21.1) 167 (20.3)
1993 28 (3.4) 247 (29.7) 304 (36.6) 177 (21.3) 75 (9.0)
1994 19 (2.3) 271 (32.5) 328 (39.3) 158 (18.9) 58 (7.0)
1995 30 (3.2) 260 (27.8) 418 (44.7) 157 (16.8) 70 (7.5)
1996 38 (3.8) 289 (28.6) 488 (48.4) 140 (13.9) 54 (5.4)
Hungary
1992 10 (1.1) 124 (13.4) 263 (28.5) 311 (33.7) 216 (23.4)
1993 19 (2.1) 146 (16.4) 272 (30.5) 281 (31.5) 173 (19.4)
1994 8 (0.9) 146 (16.1) 235 (25.9) 292 (32.1) 228 (25.1)
1995 11 (1.2) 95 (10.1) 197 (21.0) 339 (36.1) 297 (31.6)
1996 6 (0.6) 139 (14.9) 261 (27.9) 308 (32.9) 222 (23.7)
Latvia
1992 25 (3.1) 157 (19.4) 212 (26.2) 183 (22.6) 232 (28.7)
1993 10 (1.2) 227 (28.3) 330 (41.1) 153 (19.1) 82 (10.2)
1994 24 (2.9) 186 (22.2) 422 (50.4) 139 (16.1) 67 (8.0)
1995 18 (1.9) 198 (20.5) 454 (46.9) 250 (20.7) 97 (10.0)
1996 18 (1.9) 179 (19.2) 457 (49.0) 189 (20.3) 90 (9.6)
Lithuania
1992 15 (1.7) 192 (21.7) 286 (32.4) 275 (31.1) 115 (13.0)
1993 9 (1.0) 149 (16.3) 392 (42.9) 167 (29.2) 97 (10.6)
1994 10 (1.1) 184 (20.2) 383 (42.0) 235 (25.8) 99 (10.9)
1995 13 (1.4) 168 (18.7) 364 (40.5) 252 (28.0) 102 (11.3)
1996 8 (0.9) 200 (22.4) 426 (47.7) 197 (22.0) 63 (7.0)
Macedonia
1992 40 (4.4) 348 (38.1) 244 (26.7) 151 (16.5) 130 (14.2)
1993 34 (3.3) 299 (29.1) 434 (42.3) 152 (14.8) 108 (10.5)
1994 80 (8.2) 443 (45.4) 253 (25.9) 109 (11.2) 91 (9.3)
1995 51 (5.7) 389 (43.4) 245 (27.3) 110 (12.3) 101 (11.3)
1996 41 (4.4) 325 (34.6) 378 (40.2) 113 (12.0) 83 (8.8)
Poland
1992 16 (1.9) 171 (20.2) 316 (37.4) 223 (26.4) 119 (14.1)
1993 14 (1.6) 240 (28.3) 362 (42.6) 175 (20.6) 58 (6.8)
1994 9 (1.1) 144 (17.3) 365 (43.9) 229 (27.6) 84 (10.1)
1995 26 (3.2) 229 (27.9) 406 (49.5) 127 (15.5) 33 (4.0)
1996 27 (3.1) 205 (23.3) 429 (48.8) 165 (18.8) 53 (6.0)
Appendix B Table 4 continued on next page
208
Romania
1992 117 (12.9) 337 (37.1) 218 (24.0) 152 (16.7) 85 (9.4)
1993 32 (3.0) 380 (35.7) 201 (18.9) 360 (33.8) 91 (8.6)
1994 64 (5.2) 446 (36.3) 393 (32.0) 212 (17.2) 115 (9.3)
1995 40 (3.7) 202 (37.2) 285 (26.2) 253 (23.3) 105 (9.7)
1996 114 (9.8) 754 (64.9) 188 (16.2) 82 (7.1) 23 (2.0)
Russia
1992 21 (2.7) 171 (22.1) 230 (29.7) 158 (12.4) 194 (25.1)
1993 43 (4.2) 321 (22.7) 326 (32.1) 225 (22.1) 191 (18.8)
1994 12 (1.5) 134 (16.7) 272 (33.8) 196 (24.4) 190 (23.6)
1995 6 (0.7) 194 (21.2) 328 (35.8) 230 (25.1) 157 (17.2)
1996 13 (1.5) 115 (13.7) 335 (39.8) 212 (25.2) 167 (19.8)
Slovenia
1992 32 (3.3) 396 (40.7) 366 (37.6) 155 (15.9) 24 (2.5)
1993 37 (4.0) 302 (32.5) 376 (40.5) 178 (19.2) 36 (3.9)
1994 32 (3.1) 309 (30.1) 553 (53.8) 119 (11.6) 15 (1.5)
1995 43 (3.8) 364 (32.5) 496 (44.3) 190 (17.0) 27 (2.4)
1996 22 (2.1) 319 (30.6) 478 (45.9) 187 (18.0) 35 (3.4)
Ukraine
1992 26 (2.4) 291 (27.4) 290 (27.3) 239 (22.5) 217 (20.4)
1993 19 (2.0) 111 (11.6) 196 (20.4) 202 (21.1) 431 (44.9)
1994 18 (2.0) 132 (14.8) 215 (24.1) 222 (24.9) 306 (34.3)
1995 29 (3.0) 161 (16.4) 277 (28.2) 225 (22.9) 291 (29.6)
1996 27 (2.9) 197 (21.0) 296 (31.6) 221 (23.6) 197 (21.0)
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N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Albania
1992 147 (14.5) 447 (47.0) 198 (19.5) 129 (12.7) 64 (6.3)
1993 119 (11.4) 518 (49.7) 219 (21.0) 115 (11.0) 72 (6.9)
1994 88 (8.6) 479 (46.6) 290 (28.2) 116 (11.3) 55 (5.4)
1995 207 (20.7) 583 (58.2) 163 (16.3) 28 (2.8) 20 (2.0)
1996 316 (31.8) 454 (45.6) 166 (16.7) 46 (4.6) 13 (1.3)
Armenia
1992 34 (3.7) 58 (6.4) 110 (12.1) 247 (27.2) 459 (50.6)
1993 9 (.9) 87 (8.7) 169 (16.9) 244 (24.4) 491 (49.1)
1994 13 (1.3) 112 (11.2) 224 (22.5) 259 (26.0) 388 (39.0)
1995 10 (1.0) 246 (24.6) 269 (27.0) 236 (23.6) 237 (23.7)
1996 13 (1.3) 214 (21.4) 315 (31.5) 170 (17.0) 287 (28.7)
Belarus
1992 18 (1.8) 134 (13.1) 217 (21.2) 325 (31.8) 329 (32.2)
1993 19 (1.7) 85 (7.6) 221 (19.8) 456 (40.8) 337 (30.1)
1994 16 (1.5) 97 (8.9) 197 (18.1) 397 (36.6) 379 (34.9)
1995 22 (2.2) 127 (12.5) 300 (29.6) 256 (25.3) 307 (30.3)
1996 16 (2.5) 179 (17.4) 377 (36.6) 266 (25.9) 181 (17.6)
Bulgaria
1992 41 (3.2) 210 (16.4) 311 (24.3) 350 (27.3) 369 (28.8)
1993 7 (0.6) 120 (10.1) 284 (23.9) 367 (30.9) 410 (34.5)
1994 12 (1.2) 77 (7.5) 237 (23.2) 304 (29.7) 393 (38.4)
1995 25 (2.4) 187 (17.7) 400 (38.0) 273 (25.9) 169 (16.0)
1996 4 (0.4) 35 (3.5) 152 (15.0) 321 (31.7) 502 (49.5)
Czech Rep.
1992 40 (4.4) 146 (15.9) 262 (28.5) 286 (31.2) 184 (20.0)
1993 33 (4.0) 149 (18.2) 271 (33.2) 262 (32.1) 102 (12.5)
1994 22 (2.1) 217 (20.6) 396 (37.6) 263 (25.0) 156 (14.8)
1995 42 (4.0) 262 (24.7) 452 (42.6) 213 (20.1) 92 (8.7)
1996 30 (3.0) 211 (21.1) 431 (43.1) 247 (24.7) 82 (8.2)
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Slovakia
1992 18 (2.5) 106 (14.6) 148 (20.4) 247 (34.0) 207 (28.5)
1993 14 (2.1) 66 (9.7) 188 (27.6) 224 (32.8) 190 (27.9)
1994 22 (2.2) 141 (14.2) 313 (31.6) 317 (32.0) 197 (19.9)
1995 23 (2.0) 225 (20.0) 428 (38.0) 281 (25.0) 168 (14.9)
1996 31 (2.9) 224 (21.3) 386 (36.7) 264 (25.1) 148 (14.1)
Estonia
1992 15 (1.5) 74 (7.5) 159 (16.0) 301 (30.3) 443 (44.7)
1993 17 (1.7) 218 (21.8) 267 (26.8) 282 (28.3) 214 (21.4)
1994 21 (2.1) 264 (26.5) 325 (32.6) 237 (23.8) 149 (15.0)
1995 31 (3.1) 264 (26.5) 363 (36.4) 230 (23.0) 110 (11.0)
1996 29 ( 2.7) 257 (24.1) 421 (39.5) 242 (22.7) 118 (11.1)
Hungary
1992 10 (1.0) 49 (5.0) 224 (22.8) 359 (36.5) 342 (3.8)
1993 7 (0.7) 67 (6.9) 231 (23.9) 371 (38.4) 290 (30.0)
1994 7 (0.7) 73 (7.4) 248 (25.0) 386 (38.9) 279 (28.1)
1995 4 (0.4) 48 (4.8) 169 (16.9) 357 (35.7) 421 (42.1)
1996 5 (0.5) 47 (4.8) 215 (21.8) 341 (34.5) 379 (38.4)
Latvia
1992 26 (2.6) 81 (8.2) 145 (14.7) 264 (26.7) 471 (47.7)
1993 10 (1.0) 159 (16.2) 280 (28.5) 276 (28.1) 258 (26.2)
1994 31 (3.1) 165 (16.6) 337 (34.0) 257 (25.9) 202 (20.4)
1995 20 (1.8) 145 (13.4) 366 (33.7)  318 (29.3) 237 (21.8)
1996 14 (1.4) 127 (12.6) 358 (35.5) 329 (32.9) 180 (17.9)
Lithuania
1992 15 (1.5) 93 (9.3) 188 18.9) 436 (43.8) 264 (26.5)
1993 15 (8.5) 112 (11.1) 252 (24.9) 389 (38.5) 253 (25.0)
1994 17 (1.7) 147 (14.7) 347 (34.6) 315 (31.4) 176 (17.6)
1995 15 (1.5) 172 (17.4) 333 (33.7) 300 (30.3) 169 (17.1)
1996 13 (1.3) 127 (12.8) 417 (42.0) 292 (29.4) 143 (14.4)
Macedonia
1992 12 (1.2) 89 (9.1) 260 (26.5) 302 (30.8) 318 (32.4)
1993 9 (0.8) 145 (13.5) 340 (31.7) 351 (32.8) 226 (21.1)
1994 53 (5.3) 189 (19.0) 388 (39.0) 232 (23.3) 134 (13.5)
1995 7 (0.7) 121 (12.5) 344 (35.6) 317 (32.8) 176 (18.2)
1996 19 (1.9) 113 (11.3) 406 (40.7) 264 (26.5) 195 (19.6)
Poland
1992 16 (1.6) 101 (10.2) 262 (26.4) 341 (34.4) 272 (27.4)
1993 7 (0.7) 88 (9.0) 320 (32.7) 318 (32.5) 245 (25.1)
1994 17 (1.7) 93 (9.5) 328 (33.5) 343 (35.0) 199 (20.3)
1995 39 (4.0) 172 (17.5) 418 (42.6) 244 (24.8) 109 (11.1)
1996 44 (4.5) 156 (15.8) 403 (40.9) 264 (26.8) 118 (12.0)
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Romania
1992 45 (4.5) 228 (23.0) 248 (25.1) 257 (26.0) 212 (21.4)
1993 20 (1.7) 102 (8.9) 349 (30.4) 512 (44.6) 164 (14.3)
1994 27 (2.1) 273 (21.4) 359 (28.1) 369 (28.9) 249 (19.5)
1995 20 (1.8) 239 (21.1) 318 (28.0) 362 (31.9) 196 (17.3)
1996 18 (1.5) 247 (20.8) 454 (38.2) 326 (27.4) 145 (12.2)
Russia
1992 25 (2.5) 148 (15.1) 334 (22.8) 237 24.1) 348 (35.4)
1993 56 (4.1) 242 (17.8) 365 (26.8) 347 (25.5) 350 (25.7)
1994 14 (1.4) 117 (11.8) 311 (31.3) 251 (25.2) 302 (30.4)
1995 18 (1.5) 131 (11.2) 333 (28.4) 321 (27.4) 369 (31.5)
1996 15 (1.4) 100 (9.5) 292 (27.7) 279 (26.4) 369 (35.0)
Slovenia
1992 15 (1.4) 174 (16.5) 407 (38.6) 354 (33.6) 105 (10.0)
1993 15 (1.5) 177 (11.8) 387 (39.0) 348 (35.0) 126 (12.7)
1994 25 (2.3) 189 (17.5) 530 (49.2) 267 (24.8) 67 (6.2)
1995 21 (1.8) 176 (15.2) 558 (48.1) 312 (26.9) 93 (8.0)
1996 14 (1.3) 138 (12.6) 540 (49.2) 315 (28.7) 90 (8.2)
Ukraine
1992 288 (2.0) 198 (14.3) 262 (19.0) 394 (28.5) 500 (36.2)
1993 13 (1.1) 39 (3.4) 145 (12.5) 329 (28.4) 634 (54.7)
1994 16 (1.4) 52 (4.4) 181 (15.3) 321 (27.1) 613 (51.8)
1995 20 (1.7) 83 (7.0) 221 (18.6) 287 (24.1) 578 (48.6)
1996 12 (1.0) 91 (7.7) 305 (25.7) 281 (23.7) 498 (42.0)
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Appendix B. Table 6
Question: “As things now stand, with which of  the following do you see (our
country’s) most closely tied up?”
EU Other than EU
N (%) N (%)
Albania
1992 674 (66.7) 336 (33.3)
1993 623 (59.1) 410 (39.7)
1994 665 (65.9) 344 (34.1)
1995 416 (47.1) 517 (52.9)
1996 526 (54.2) 445 (45.8)
Armenia
1992 104 (11.3) 814 (88.7)
1993 64 (6.4) 904 (93.4)
1994 41 (4.2) 932 (95.8)
1995 28 (2.8) 964 (97.2)
1996 42 (4.4) 918 (95.6)
Belarus
1992 158 (16.2) 815 (83.8)
1993 178 (17.7) 827 (82.3)
1994 87 (8.5) 936 (91.5)
1995 77 (8.4) 838 (91.6)
1996 68 (6.9) 919 (93.1)
Bulgaria
1992 508 (48.8) 533 (51.2)
1993 316 (34.0) 613 (66.0)
1994 344 (39.4) 528 (60.6)
1995 313 (36.8) 537 (63.2)
1996 379 (47.7) 416 (52.3)
Czech Rep.
1992 424 (49.0) 447 (51.0)
1993 379 (47.9) 412 (52.1)
1994 437 (44.6) 542 (55.4)
1995 421 (46.2) 491 (53.8)
1996 470 (50.8) 456 (49.2)
Appendix B Table 6 continued on next page
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Slovakia
1992 256 (37.0) 435 (63.0)
1993 253 (39.5) 387 (60.5)
1994 347 (37.9) 568 (62.1)
1995 386 (38.8) 608 (61.2)
1996 438 (45.1) 533 (54.9)
Estonia
1992 138 (14.6) 805 (85.4)
1993 235 (24.9) 710 (75.1)
1994 202 (21.6) 735 (78.4)
1995 456 (47.8) 498 (52.2)
1996 458 (44.4) 573 (55.6)
Hungary
1992 282 (32.6) 583 (67.4)
1993 228 (28.4) 574 (71.6)
1994 234 (29.9) 549 (70.1)
1995 296 (32.9) 604 (67.1)
1996 278 (32.4) 579 (67.6)
Latvia
1992 173 (18.8) 748 (81.2)
1993 230 (25.7) 664 (74.3)
1994 257 (29.7) 609 (70.3)
1995 370 (37.3) 623 (62.7)
1996 308 (33.6) 608 (66.4)
Lithuania
1992 239 (25.3) 705 (74.7)
1993 243 (26.4) 676 (73.6)
1994 267 (30.5) 609 (69.5)
1995 361 (45.4) 435 (54.6)
1996 282 (38.3) 455 (61.7)
Macedonia
1992 279 (29.8) 656 (70.2)
1993 219 (21.5) 799 (78.5)
1994 405 (41.5) 572 (58.5)
1995 349 (37.1) 592 (62.9)
1996 397 (42.1) 545 (57.9)
Poland
1992 335 (36.0) 595 (64.0)
1993 394 (45.4) 473 (54.6)
1994 392 (47.3) 437 (52.7)
1995 418 (47.5) 462 (52.5)
1996 478 (53.6) 413 (46.4)
Appendix B Table 6 continued on next page
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Romania
1992 316 (36.1) 559 (63.9)
1993 376 (35.3) 689 (64.7)
1994 525 (45.3) 633 (54.7)
1995 418 (42.3) 570 (57.7)
1996 512 (47.0) 577 (53.0)
Russia
1992 168 (19.9) 678 (80.1)
1993 186 (15.9) 984 (71.5)
1994 111 (13.0) 743 (87.0)
1995 153 (14.7) 888 (85.3)
1996 138 (14.7) 801 (85.3)
Slovenia
1992 441 (42.5) 561 (57.5)
1993 431 (46.8) 490 (53.2)
1994 370 (36.8) 635 (63.2)
1995 575 (53.7) 496 (46.3)
1996 641 (61.8) 396 (38.2)
Ukraine
1992 248 (20.3) 976 (79.7)
1993 291 (28.0) 750 (72.0)
1994 167 (15.7) 896 (84.3)
1995 175 (15.6) 945 (84.4)
1996 157 (13.9) 971 (86.1)
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